Office of the Historian

761.93/1600: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 26, 1937—10 p.m.
[Received August 26—7:30 p.m.]

234. I am setting forth herewith certain impressions obtained by this Mission of present Soviet policies and tactics with respect to the Far East. These impressions have been gained from a study of the Soviet press and from conversations with Soviet officials, members of the local diplomatic corps including Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors and other qualified observers.

1.
The Kremlin is pleased that the Central Government has finally begun to offer armed resistance to Japan and is hoping that with the development of hostilities Japan will become so deeply enmeshed in Central China that it will not be able to pursue an aggressive policy to the North.
2.
Although Soviet press and spokesmen intimate the desirability of collective action on the part of Western powers in order to prevent spread of hostilities, it is believed that they would have little real sympathy for any movement which might promise peace unless such movement would be of a kind likely seriously to weaken the military power of Japan.
3.
The Kremlin is determined that the Soviet Union should not become embroiled; nevertheless, it does not desire for reasons of prestige that Japan or China should gain the impression that it will tolerate affronts. It is therefore protesting such provocations as the recent raids on the Consulate at Tientsin and Shanghai vigorously but at the same time in such a manner that disputes arising therefrom are not likely to develop into issues solvable only by armed conflict.
4.
Soviet press and officials make no secret of Soviet sympathy for China. They are careful, however, to express this sympathy in a manner which would not give Japan ground to charge active intervention.
5.
Kremlin apparently has directed its adherents in China to support the Central Government so long as that Government follows policy of resistance to Japan. It is believed, however, that Moscow would use such influence as it has over Communist and Left Wing elements in China to prevail upon them to work for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek in case he should embark on policy of temporization or mediation with Japan.
6.
General impression is that Soviet Union has not as yet begun to furnish military supplies to China. Whether it will do so in the future depends almost entirely upon general international situation, direction of development of hostilities, policies of Chinese Government, and so forth. Difficulties of transportation are such that supplies in any event would probably be limited largely to certain types of aircraft.
7.
Soviet Government is apparently extremely anxious that the route from Outer Mongolia to China through Kalgan should not fall into Japanese hands. There is even a possibility that Soviet Union would take active steps to assist Chinese in defense of route in case Japanese should seriously threaten it.
Henderson