793.94/9723: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:10 p.m.]
1202. Delbos, who has just returned to Paris, dined with me alone last evening and we had an exhaustive conversation with regard to foreign affairs.
First China. Delbos said that he believed Great Britain, France and the United States should make a united appeal to Japan and China to enter negotiations for the establishment of peace in the Far East. He said that he understood it would be difficult for the United States to enter any joint démarche with France and England; but he hoped that it might be possible for the Secretary of State to summon the Japanese Ambassador (and immediately afterward the Chinese Ambassador) [Page 476] at the same moment that he should summon the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors in Paris and that Eden should act simultaneously in London. He believed that those charged with the direction of foreign affairs in Paris, London and Washington should say to the Ambassadors of both countries in the most polite manner that they had no intention of abandoning any of their rights, privileges, or obligations in China; that the present hostilities in China were infringing gravely on those rights, privileges and obligations; that menace to world peace was involved; and that it was felt that China and Japan should cease fighting and attempt to reach an adjustment of the dispute by peaceful means.
Delbos added that the Russians would of course support any such démarche if their support should be desired. He personally was feeling violently hostile to the Soviet Government at the moment. The insults which had been poured upon him by the Communists when he had spoken at the celebration at the Pantheon in honor of Jaures recently had given him a severe emotional shock. He had feared at one moment that he was about to be murdered. Nevertheless he felt that the Russians should be made use of, if they could be useful. The Russian Government had informed him that it was entirely ready to threaten the Japanese with intervention if any approval from either England, France or the United States should be forthcoming.
His views with regard to the Japanese attack on China were the following: He believed that the final objective of the Japanese attack was not China but the Soviet Union. The Japanese desired to seize the railroad from Tientsin to Peiping and Kalgan in order to prepare an attack on Inner and Outer Mongolia and later on the Trans-Siberian Railroad in the neighborhood of Lake Baikal. He felt that the Japanese had chosen the present moment for this attack because they were fully cognizant of the disorganization of the Russian Army produced by the recent slaughtering of its leading officers.
In his opinion the vital question was whether Russia would feel strong enough to intervene before the Japanese had overwhelmed Chiang Kai-shek. He felt that the interests of England, France and the United States were identical in the present Far Eastern conflict. Neither Japan nor Russia should control the Far East. If the present war should go on and Russia should not intervene Japan would first control China and later drive the Soviet Union off the Pacific and establish Lake Baikal as the Japanese frontier. The Far East would become a Fascist area. If on the other hand the Soviet Union should intervene and should defeat Japan there was a considerable chance that social revolution in Japan would follow and the entire Far East might become Bolshevik. Both eventualities were entirely opposed to the ideals and interests of France, England and the United States. [Page 477] Therefore it was desirable to do everything possible to stop the war in China as rapidly as possible.
France was ready to cooperate in any maneuver that might be invented by either Great Britain or the United States, even though it might involve the use of force.
The Chinese Ambassador had informed him yesterday afternoon that the Chinese Government had decided to appeal to the League of Nations at the September meeting. He believed that the League must act in this matter as strongly as possible. The aggression of Japan on China was flagrant and if the League should refuse to take cognizance of it, the League would become a complete farce. The whole world would realize that naked force was the only factor of importance in world affairs.68
The French Government had decided yesterday to continue to supply airplanes to China. The decision had been made on the basis of a somewhat dishonest subterfuge. The production of munitions and most airplanes was now entirely in the hands of the French Government. There were, however, a number of airplane factories which were not nationalized. The Chinese Government would be permitted to buy all the airplanes it wanted from those French factories, and the French Government would explain to the Japanese Government that the French Government had no control over private enterprise in this matter.
Parenthetically he stated that the Japanese had not shown any great concern over the French supplying arms and ammunition to the Chinese Government; but when the Japanese Government had learned that a retired French General had been invited to go to China to assist on the staff of the Chinese armies, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris had made a protest of the most violent nature.
Delbos added that he feared the Japanese military were becoming as crazy as the German naval authorities had become when they sank the Lusitania. The French Ambassador in Tokyo had telegraphed him yesterday that a series of facts and events had compelled him to reach the conclusion that Japan was likely to declare war on the Soviet Union although the Soviet Union might remain completely passive. At this point he remarked that the Soviet Union undoubtedly would supply large numbers of airplanes to the Chinese Government.
Inasmuch as I gather that you have stated a number of times to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors in Washington that we intend to defend our interests in China and have urged that China and Japan compromise their differences by peaceful means, I wonder if you might not care to have Delbos and Eden make similar statements at some future time simultaneously. If so I am certain that Delbos will make [Page 478] any statement that you may care to have him make to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors, and if by any chance you should wish to prepare a text, I should not despair of persuading him to employ it verbatim.
[Here follows discussion of European affairs; see volume I, page 117.]
- For action on this issue by the League of Nations, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.↩