741.94/131
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 2482 of June 24, 1937,64 relating to the preliminary Anglo-Japanese conversations which had taken place in London between the Japanese Ambassador there and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and also with Mr. Eden. It will be recalled that although these conversations were largely of an exploratory and preparatory nature, they had nevertheless reached the point where it is evident that formal negotiations were about to begin. While the results might have fallen far short of the expectations on the part of certain enthusiastic instigators and supporters of the plan, it may be supposed that the conversations would not have been permitted to develop unless there were prospects of the net result being favorable to Anglo-Japanese relations.
[Page 346]However, with the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities conditions have rapidly changed in Anglo-Japanese relations. Whether or not we were correct in our reasoning in the despatch under reference that one of the main reasons which impelled the Japanese to seek a rapprochement with Great Britain was a further effort to seek to emerge from her isolated position in the family of nations, it is becoming increasingly evident that this North China affair has already greatly damaged Japan’s chances for gaining additional friends among the major powers and it is practically a certainty that should the present situation become more serious or should be greatly protracted, Japan’s position will rapidly revert to the same state of isolation in which she found herself from 1932 to 1936. Even the anti-Comintern agreement with Germany appears to be failing in the present instance to evoke for Japan any great measure of open sympathy on the part of Germany, at least so long as the struggle with China does not involve the Soviet Union.
Within a week of the first incident in the present Sino-Japanese difficulties, Mr. Eden informed the Japanese Ambassador at London that the expected negotiations with Japan could not be hoped for if further Japanese troops were sent into China and the British Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo recommended to his government that “in certain eventualities” he be authorized to make a similar statement in his conversations with the Foreign Office in Tokyo. The obvious implication was, of course, that the British Government wished to use the proposed negotiations as a lever to force Japan to employ moderation in dealing with the Chinese situation. This belief on the part of the British that a threat to break off the Anglo-Japanese conversations would be really effective in preventing Japanese action in North China is clearly indicative of the naїveté, if not fatuity, of the British attitude toward Japanese policy on the mainland as well as a lack of comprehension of the motives behind the Japanese desire for the negotiations in London. Among the chief benefits to Japan from the successful conclusion of the negotiations would have been the removal in some part of the friction which has recently marred the interests between the two countries due to the conflict between their respective interests in China; but the advantages to be gained by such a step are not to be compared, in Japanese eyes, to the conversion of North China into an area completely dominated by Japan and in which her commercial advantages will become even greater with a corresponding detriment to the interests of Great Britain and others.
If we are correct in our analysis of the arrangement with Great Britain which was contemplated by the Japanese Government, namely, that Japan would refrain from molesting British commercial and economic interests in China, in return for which Great Britain would undertake not to discriminate against Japanese commerce with British [Page 347] areas (see pages 5 and 6 of the despatch under reference) we must see that the uncertainty of any assurances which Japan could give for non-molestation of British interests in China has become much greater in view of the present situation. The record in “Manchukuo”, where as implacably as the flow of the incoming tide, the Japanese are driving out the established interests of other nations, speaks for itself. While Japan may not be seeking to set up in North China a second “Manchukuo”*, the form which their domination of the North China area takes is of no consequence. It is perfectly obvious that the Japanese are now determined that this area is henceforth to be under their exclusive control under one guise or another, whether it be out and out separation, semi-autonomy or by any other device by which the Nanking Government is forced to relinquish all effective control.
If, then, the prospects of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations reaching a successful conclusion were somewhat uncertain prior to the North China incident, it appears probable that these prospects will become even more uncertain in proportion to the seriousness with which affairs with China develop. It must be increasingly clear to the British that while the Japanese may sincerely desire a rapprochement with Great Britain they are not in a position to offer the British any proposition sufficiently attractive to compensate the latter for the sacrifices which they would be called upon to make.
It may be of interest to report a remark made by a highly placed official of the British Embassy to a member of my staff. This official stated that he felt the best thing for us all (meaning the United States and Great Britain) would be for Japan in the present instance to become involved in a long and difficult military campaign in China which would become such a drain upon the resources of Japan that she would suffer a financial collapse and thus be removed from the field as an economic and a naval threat for years to come. While, of course, such remarks are irresponsible in themselves, they do indicate the trend of feeling in some British quarters toward Japan.
During the frequent contacts which I have had during the past month with the British Chargé d’Affaires I have been surprised, not by the firm determination of the British Government to resist within practicable limits any extension of Japanese influence in China, but by their indifference to (and at times ignorance of) the elements of Japanese policy. The Japanese for their part have shown little confidence in the disinterestedness of the efforts of the British Government toward resolving the present difficulty between China and Japan. There has, in short, developed on the part of both Great Britain and Japan an attitude of irritation, suspicion, and resentment which [Page 348] seems to have effectively removed for some years to come any possibility of there being concluded between the two countries a political agreement such as that contemplated a few weeks ago.
Respectfully yours,