793.94/9218: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

250. Department’s 138, August 5, noon.

1.
We feel as previously reported that there exists no discernible enthusiasm among the Japanese Government or people for war with China. Obviously the military machine must be omitted from this characterization. We believe that the prevailing feeling among the Japanese Government and the people is that the present situation was brought about by Chinese manifestations of enmity towards Japan and that if China should demonstrate by action that it wishes war the Japanese people will support whatever military or other measures the Government may decide to take but that the Government and the people would still be glad to avoid a general war. The appropriations exceeding 400 million yen for military operations on the Continent together with the assurance of steadily mounting costs in case of an extensive campaign present a powerful and practical argument for peace.
2.
The Japanese Government insists that the initiative for either war or peace must now come from China. (See Hirota’s statement to me today as reported in my 248, August 6, 5 p.m.) On the other hand while deferring to any contrary opinion on the part of Johnson it now seems to us highly unlikely that the Chinese will take any initiative toward peace now that Chinese civil and military authority in the Peiping area has been virtually eliminated. If the Chinese Central forces continue to concentrate and to move forward into Hopei a general clash appears to be inevitable.
3.
In view of the extreme importance of our leaving no stone unturned to avoid war I cannot conscientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good offices on the practical basis proposed by the British Government making it abundantly clear that the proposal is in no sense intervention. We feel that the chances of acceptance in Tokyo are [Page 341] small but not necessarily hopeless. Much would depend on the method and manner of approach. Publicity should be most carefully avoided. If the two Governments should decide to proceed I would recommend that the British Chargé d’Affaires and I separately should ask to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his residence instead of at the Foreign Office and should present the proposals in the utmost confidence thereupon inquiring whether from the Japanese point of view the Minister thought that any useful purpose would be served by our Governments proceeding with the suggested plans. A similar approach in a similar manner might be made simultaneously in Nanking if it were felt undesirable to sound out one of the powers before the other.
4.
As regards the probable reception in Tokyo, I think that an exploratory and confidential approach such as I have outlined would offer the best prospects of forestalling open resentment. No resentment whatever was shown today when I asked Hirota on my own initiative and responsibility to let me know if I could ever be of help (see my 248, August 6, 5 p.m.). The proposed offer by the American and British representatives could profitably be phrased in a way which would indicate that these channels were open to the two adversaries either now or later if needed.
5.
I wish to emphasize that in my careful opinion an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the British proposal would be more likely to bring favorable results and certainly more likely to avoid any possible resentment than the communication of a formal proposal delivered as a “diplomatic démarche”. It is highly important that publicity be avoided.
6.
With full awareness of my previously expressed view that we have left nothing undone which could favorably affect developments, I should like to feel that history will regard the record of American action in this most critical and pregnant period in Far Eastern affairs as exhaustive, unstintedly helpful and impartially correct.

Repeated to Nanking.

Grew