793.94/9045: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 28—7:27 p.m.]
1067. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador, returned to Paris this morning by airplane from London where last night he was present at a conference called by H. H. Kung at which were present the Chinese Ambassador to London and the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow who flew from Moscow yesterday.
Koo said that this conference had been called by Kung in order to advise Chiang Kai-shek with regard to help which he might or might not expect from European powers. The conference was based on the assumption that the Chinese Government would have to fight.
Koo stated that the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow had expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union would preserve strict neutrality and would do nothing whatever to aid the Chinese Government during the first few months at war. He believed, however, that if the war should be protracted the Soviet Government, provided it could obtain assurances of support from either England, France or the United States, would intervene.
The Chinese Ambassador to London was of the opinion that Great Britain would do nothing. He, Koo, was of the opinion that while the French Government would be prepared to act in concert with Great Britain and the United States, France was relatively impotent in the Far East.
Koo went on to say that it was the consensus of opinion at the meeting that Chiang Kai-shek would fight and could continue to fight, being defeated in each battle and retreating for a period of 6 to 8 months, not longer.
Ultra confidentially Koo informed me of a remarkable pair of conversations in Moscow. He asserted that a few days ago in Moscow the German Chargé d’Affaires at a reception had said to the Chinese Ambassador that he desired to have a most serious conversation with him. The Chinese Ambassador had replied that a reception was perhaps not an appropriate place for such a conversation and that he would be glad to see the German Chargé d’Affaires at his Embassy the next day. The German Chargé d’Affaires had sent a Secretary of Embassy the next day who had said to the Chinese Ambassador that if the Soviet Union should intervene on the side of China, Germany [Page 289] would be compelled to intervene on the side of Japan. The same day Rosso, Italian Ambassador in Moscow, had sent a Secretary of Embassy to the Chinese Ambassador. The Italian Secretary had stated that if the Soviet Union should intervene on the side of China, Italy would be compelled to intervene on the side of Japan.
I asked Koo if this information had been communicated to our Government or to the British Government. He replied that it had been communicated to no one except Chiang Kai-shek and last night verbally to Kung by the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow.
Koo went on to say that he felt certain that Chiang Kai-shek was determined to fight but that his decision would be influenced by the prospect of financial and economic support from the great democracies of the world.
Koo then talked about various methods of mobilizing world public opinion in favor of China and intimated that the Chinese Government might make a formal demand for collective action by the powers signatory to the Nine Power Pact or might call on the League of Nations or invoke the Kellogg Pact or indeed might possibly appeal under all three instruments simultaneously.11
In the course of our conversation Koo showed me a telegram which he had just received from Nanking which stated that Chinese troops in a counter attack had ejected Japanese troops from two villages in the neighborhood of Peiping.
- Cf. telegram No. 1077, July 30, noon, vol. iv, p. 2.↩