Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/8789: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 16, 1937—6 p.m.
[Received July 16—11:05 a.m.]

205. Following is summary of an extended account which Yoshizawa²¹ gave “personally and unofficially” to Dooman²² this afternoon of the situation in North China.

1. The 29th Chinese Army and the Hopei-Chahar authorities have not thus far disavowed the agreement which they signed and gave to the Japanese on July 11. It will take some time to carry out the terms of that agreement but no overt act has been taken by the 29th Army which would conclusively indicate that the agreement is not to be carried out or is to be disavowed.

2. The steady development of plans of the Chinese Government to mobilize its forces and to concentrate them in North China was the principal cause for the decision taken yesterday by the Japanese Government to send reenforcements from Japan to North China and so to assure the safety of the Japanese forces in the Peiping area.

3. Out of the Marco Polo Bridge incident there have developed two virtually separate and distinct questions: (1) settlement of the incident arising out of hostilities between the 29th Army and the Japanese forces and (2) the question whether the Chinese Government will observe the terms of the Ho–Umezu Agreement. With regard to the first question in addition to the circumstances set forth in paragraph 1 above, the 29th Army is composed of various conflicting elements which can be roughly grouped into two factions: one which advocates resistance to the Japanese and the other which advocates coming to terms with the Japanese on the basis of the agreement of July 11. The indications are that the latter is in the ascendency. With regard to the second question there could be no solution satisfactory to the Japanese other than strict observance by the Chinese Government of the Ho–Umezu Agreement.

4. If the Chinese Government forces should cross the Ho-Umezu line, there are in Yoshizawa’s “personal” opinion three possible developments: (a) the Japanese military will move against the Central Chinese forces with the “friendly cooperation or possibly with the support” of the 29th Army; (b) the Japanese Army will move against the Central Chinese forces with the 29th Army maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality; (c) the Japanese military may have to deal with both the Central Chinese forces and the 29th Army. Of these three possible developments Yoshizawa thought that (b) would be the most likely.

5. An officer in the War Office in conversation this afternoon with the Military Attaché²³ expressed the opinion that there is a “50–50” chance that a peaceful settlement of the whole affair will be reached. He also stressed the importance attached to faithful observance of Ho–Umezu Agreement although no serious view is being taken of minor violations which have occurred to date. The officer affirmed as did the Foreign Office yesterday that the agreement of July 11 has no reference to economic or political questions.

6. The Military Attaché states in his report to me that he believes from various indications that part (probably a brigade of two infantry régiments with some artillery, cavalry, and engineers attached) of the 6th Division stationed in Southern Kyushu sailed from Shimonoseki last night; that a partial mobilization of some units including the requisitioning of motor vehicles is under way and that supplies of aviation gasoline are being accumulated. There are ample indications that Japan is preparing to use the force necessary to compel execution of the agreement of July 11 if that agreement is not carried out voluntarily.

Repeated to Peiping.

Grew

21. Director of the American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office.
22. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan.
23. Lt. Col. William C. Crane.