Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/8766: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 14, 1937—5 p.m.
[Received July 14—1:05 p.m.]

199. My 196, July 13, 9 a.m. [p.m.]

1. A day or two ago the British Chargé d’Affaires recommended to his Government that in certain eventualities he be instructed to call on Hirota⁹⁷ and to say to him that the improved Anglo-Japanese relations so earnestly desired by the Minister could not materialize if Japan should turn North China into a Manchukuo.

2. Today Dodds has received a telegram from Eden approving the recommendation and directing him to take the action at the earliest moment. Dodds says that his Foreign Office has totally overlooked his phrase “in certain eventualities” by which he intended to convey the meaning “as a last resort”. He is so informing Eden and strongly advising against the action at this juncture as it would merely anger the Japanese Government without producing favorable results.

3. In the meantime, according to Dodds, Eden has “warned” Yoshida⁹⁸ that if further Japanese troops are sent into China the expected Anglo-Japanese negotiations in London cannot be hoped for.

4. We are informed by the Associated Press correspondent that this morning he invited the Foreign Office spokesman to comment on press reports to the effect that conversations are now taking place between the American and British Governments with regard to the possibility of making to the Japanese and Chinese Governments a joint offer of mediation and that the spokesman replied that any such offer if made would be rejected by the Japanese Government which takes the view that the North China incident is a matter for settlement by Japan and China without outside intervention. On the other hand Byas, correspondent of New York Times, states that at this morning’s conference of the foreign press correspondents with the Foreign Office spokesman the question was asked whether Japan would consider an offer of mediation and that the spokesman had replied that the offer would be examined in the light of circumstances in which it was made. Byas considers the statement as merely an inept reply to a leading question and does not attach importance to it. It is his opinion that any offer of mediation would be rejected by the Japanese Government.

5. There are several reasons upon which I base my recommendation set forth in paragraph 3 of my No. 196, July 13, 9 p.m., that the American Government refrain from offering its good offices toward settlement of the North China incident and of those reasons I enumerate the following:

(a) One of the principal objectives of Japan’s foreign policy is the elimination of the influence of western powers as a factor in Far Eastern politics, especially as a factor in relations between China and Japan. This objective has been repeatedly enunciated by Japanese leaders and it is a logical corollary of Japan’s continental policy for the reason that the effectuation of Japan’s program of expansion in China is necessarily retarded by occidental support, even though falling short of physical support, of resistance by China. Whereas there exists in the Japanese view no moral right which would warrant the western powers in participating in the regulation of political affairs in the Far East, especially of relations between Japan and China, acceptance by Japan of offer of good offices by the United States or by Great Britain would necessarily constitute an admission of such a right. We therefore find it difficult to believe that the Japanese Government would in the present circumstances respond favorably to any such offer.

(b) So far as we can ascertain no negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Central Government looking toward settlement of the North China incident are taking place. In the event that the Department does not concur in the view set forth in preceding subparagraph we would urge that no initiative toward tender of good offices be taken until such negotiations have begun or until the Japanese Government has manifested desire for such tender (which contingency we consider remote).

6. The situation has not sufficiently developed in our opinion to permit of formulation of recommendation as to any other action which might with advantage be taken by the American Government. However, we wish to point out that the improvement in relations between the United States and Japan, which are now better than they have been for a long time past, was made possible when the American Government transferred the emphasis of the actions taken by it in matters affecting relations between Japan and China from (a) endeavor to restrain the use by Japan of force to (b) the laying down of reservations of American rights in China. It is our opinion if there should occur an outbreak of organized hostility that we should continue to follow the course which our Government has followed during the past 4 years and should resort to protests against Japanese military action only in those circumstances where such protests might be expected not to aggravate the situation or when American citizens and property are molested or when humanitarian considerations make necessary an expression of American official opinion.

Repeated to Peiping.

Grew

97. Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
98. Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom.