611.4131/415: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 11—6:25 p.m.]
711. (1) In a long conversation at lunch today Sir William Brown discussed the latest British trade agreement proposals. (See Embassy’s [Page 82] telegram No. 700, November 5, 8 p.m.) He started by saying that Oliver Stanley had wished to give a copy of the proposals to the Ambassador personally in order not only to keep the Embassy informed but also to emphasize his own great interest in the consummation of a trade agreement. Brown continued by saying that the latest proposals were “as far as the British Government could possibly go at this stage”. He appreciated that we would possibly not be satisfied with the proposals on every item.
(2) When we expressed disappointment at the small advance over the previous British proposals, he intimated that if the United States did not feel able to accept the proposals as a whole he hoped it would not turn them down in general terms but would indicate the specific items on which it was really essential that the British make further concessions. Later in another connection he referred [to] Stirling’s arrival and said that among other things he was “over there to see where the shoe pinches most”.
(3) As to the recent exchanges between Chamberlain and the Dominion Prime Ministers (see Embassy’s telegram 678, October 29, 9 p.m.) Brown only volunteered that a reply had been received from Mackenzie King and that its tenor gave no grounds for discouragement; the reply from Australia had unfortunately in no way advanced the position.
(4) In the course of the discussion Brown reiterated the British Government’s fear of being put in an impossible position through joint Canadian and Australian action (see Embassy’s telegram 671, October 27, 5 p.m.). When reference was made to paragraph 11 of the note of November 5, with its implication that the United States might have to bear at least a share in effecting the releases by the United Kingdom, Brown tacitly admitted that this had had to be included for negotiating purposes. He went on to say that naturally in the case of Canada, because of its special relationship to the United States, the Canadian-American negotiations would be closely geared to the Anglo-American negotiations but that as far as the other Dominions were concerned “we will of course bear the responsibility of exerting the pressure”. We took cognizance of this assertion which he then amplified by saying that the cooperation of the Canadians must be secured and a meeting of minds be effected between the Canadians, the British and the Americans before it would be found productive, in his opinion, to face the Australians with the necessity of “coming through”. He said that while Stirling would have to say officially to you that the British proposals represented their maximum offers, he would explain confidentially something along the lines of the foregoing.
(5) Incidentally Brown did not attempt to conceal his desire to have the announcement of formal negotiations made as soon as possible [Page 83] and he specifically referred to the desirability of concluding any agreement before April 1. He also showed that he had in mind as well that the trade recession in the United States, whatever its degree, cautioned speed.
(6) Brown then referred to specific commodities:
- (a)
- Apples. He repeated his former statement that the British were “ready” to go as far on apples as the Canadians would. He apparently felt that this was one of the items of which the United States would make further demands.
- (b)
- Tobacco. Brown was categoric in saying there was nothing doing on reduction in preference but that they would be willing to bind the preferential margin as well as the tarin.
- (c)
- Douglas fir. He began by saying that his conscience was awakened vis-à-vis the Scandinavian countries, and later emphasized the Canadian aspect. Although he was obviously aware of the extraordinary importance of this item to us he remained noncommittal. He did, however, tie this up with Stirling’s impressions referred to at the end of paragraph 2.