933.4111 Duke of Windsor/34
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called to see me this morning upon his return from a two months vacation in England.
[Here follows a discussion of the possible visit to the United States of the Duke of Windsor.]
I then took up the subject of trade agreement negotiations and expressed the gratification which we had experienced as a result of recent word from London. The Ambassador then said that he understood instructions from Mr. Chalkley were due today and that he felt at the moment everything was very encouraging except for continued difficulties with regard to timing as regards negotiations with Great Britain and negotiations with the Dominions. He emphasized the fact that if simultaneous negotiations were undertaken here with Canada, Canada would demand simultaneous negotiations with Great Britain and that the many Dominions would then make the same demand. I told him of my depressing experience at the Foreign Office when I had found so little knowledge of the status of the trade agreement negotiations on the part of Sir Alexander Cadogan, although [Page 78] the best of disposition and evidence of the realization of the importance of negotiations. The Ambassador said that, unfortunately this was true insofar as the Foreign Office was concerned, but that the important feature of the present situation was that the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Oliver Stanley, was heart and soul in favor of consummation promptly of the British-American trade agreement and that he could assure me that this was far more important than any activity on the part of the Foreign Office. He told me finally that he had sat in at sub-Cabinet meetings last week when in London when the British-American trade agreement matter had been up for discussion and that the sole member of the Cabinet there present who was opposed to a trade agreement was the Minister of Agriculture and that, unfortunately, the influence of the latter had resulted in an agreement on the part of the Cabinet less satisfactory than what the Ambassador had hoped for. Nevertheless, the Ambassador said that he believed that the ground was now prepared for a successful and prompt negotiation. I reminded him that in our judgment a pro forma trade agreement would be worse than useless. In our judgment the trade agreement must be a real trade agreement. The Ambassador said that he entirely concurred and evidenced the belief that it must be a trade agreement which at the outset “hurt both ways”. I said that on that point we had far greater difficulties to contend with and far more powerful interests in this country to combat than his Government did and that we were convinced that the beneficial results of a real trade agreement would be felt promptly in both countries, not only to our respective advantages, but to the advantage of the rest of the world as well.