611.4131/399: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:22 p.m.]
671. In the course of a luncheon conversation Sir William Brown, Permanent Under Secretary of the Board of Trade, stated that a memorandum had been put before the Cabinet which is meeting today setting forth the status of Anglo-American trade interchanges and requesting authority to define to the United States the British position on pertinent individual items. Brown took the line that he was not at all sure that the Cabinet would decide today inasmuch as Chamberlain, the staunchest protagonist for the agreement could not attend due to an attack of gout and the fact that recent telegrams from the British Embassy in Washington and High Commissioner in Ottawa regarding the outcome of the Canada-United States interchanges had caused considerable difficulties and in his opinion beclouded the situation. These telegrams had conveyed the following information:
- (1)
- That the Canada-United States discussions had, contrary to expectations, ranged over a very wide and extensive field and covered the question of the Ottawa items (i. e. must list);
- (2)
- According to a statement Norman Robertson made to a member of the High Commissioner’s staff in Ottawa there was now nothing more that could be done for the next 3 or 4 weeks until after the information supplied by the Canadians in Washington had been digested there;
- (3)
- The suggestion had been put forth to Chalkley by the Department, of the possibility of negotiating in Washington with the United Kingdom and the Dominions at the same time.
As regards (1) Brown said that he feared this information might have the effect of permitting the Cabinet to take the line of least resistance, viz that there is little the United Kingdom can do if the Americans and Canadians are attacking the matter themselves. In reply it was strongly represented to Brown that the American Government’s position was that it could not pay two for one in the matter of concessions. Brown indicated that he thoroughly understood this; consequently it was the more surprising to him that these discussions had been so broadened. Nevertheless, in spite of these new developments, if the Cabinet approved, he hoped to lay proposals before the American authorities which went further than he understood the Canadians had gone. But his information regarding the Canadians’ statements was as yet imperfect. Brown also emphasized that Stanley [Page 74] had again today expressed to him his anxiety lest the United States be unaware of his efforts to facilitate an agreement.
Incidentally, Brown referred to the Canadian allegation that they had not been informed during the Imperial Conference in London of the British willingness to release Canada from certain preferences on British industrial products as compensation for Canada’s releases to Great Britain on certain Ottawa agricultural items. About a month ago they had disposed of this matter once and for all by sending to the High Commissioner in Canada for transmission to Mackenzie King a copy of the minutes of the meeting at which this suggestion was put forward; on seeing the record Mackenzie King had backed down. Brown went on to say that they had been quite prepared to bring all proper pressure to bear on Mackenzie King to facilitate action but now the character of the Canadian-United States talks might handicap them.
As regards (2) Brown emphasized that in his view time was of the essence and that he deplored such a delay as Robertson’s remark prophesied.
(3) “An Ottawa Conference in Washington” he said frankly was a new idea to him and had filled him with “horror”. He recounted at some length the difficulties of the Ottawa Conference itself, professing to fear the manner in which the Dominions when gathered together were able to logroll the United Kingdom into untenable positions and added that if Australia and Canada should join forces they might push the United Kingdom in the matter of concessions so far that the whole structural framework might collapse. He went on to say that he appreciated the special relationship existing between the United States and Canada and why it was highly desirable that a supplementary Canadian-United States agreement be reached. In his view, concurrent negotiations with the other Dominions could hardly be required for the same reason.
In conclusion Brown said he was “desperately afraid lest wires be crossed and time fly by without concrete results eventuating”. He suggested another luncheon for Friday, at which time he hoped to be able to clarify further the Cabinet’s attitude.
In a conversation with Ashton-Gwatkin83 last evening he referred to his recent travels and said that the proposed Anglo-American trade agreement had taken on a “mystical quality” in central and southeastern Europe; that it was fast becoming in other countries a symbol of vague but profound hopes. Brown likewise mentioned Ashton-Gwatkin’s statement and said that he had urged him to make Eden use this line in today’s Cabinet meeting.
- Frank T. W. Ashton-Gwatkin, Counselor, British Foreign Office.↩