611.4231/2031
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European, Affairs (Hickerson)
Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Hickerson saw Mr. Chalkley of the British Embassy at lunch today at the Metropolitan Club. In the course of the conversation, Mr. Hawkins referred to the fact that Mr. Norman Armour, our Minister to Canada, had been in Washington on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week, and that we had discussed with Mr. Armour the conversations which had taken place with the British representatives regarding the possible basis for trade agreement negotiations with the United States, particularly in so far as the position of Canada is concerned. Mr. Hawkins said that we had learned from Armour with a considerable shock that certain important permanent officials of the Canadian Government appear to know nothing whatever about the British offer stated to have been made to each Dominion in turn to compensate the Dominions for releasing Great Britain from certain guaranteed preferences in their favor by Britain’s releasing the Dominions from guaranteed preferences in Dominion [Page 64] markets. Mr. Hawkins said that attaching, as we do, such importance to an offer, which in the very nature of things is so logical, we were at a loss to understand why a matter of such consequence was apparently unknown to the very Canadian officials who would have to formulate recommendations for their Government.
Mr. Chalkley stated that it was unfortunately quite true that Canadian officials generally had not been informed of what he considered a tremendously important offer on the part of his Government. He said that this matter was discussed at London in detail with Mr. Norman Robertson of the Canadian Department of External Affairs and that he could not understand why Mr. Robertson had not passed on to his superiors this information concerning an offer of such great importance. Chalkley stated that the minutes of the particular meeting clearly show that the offer was made to Robertson.
Mr. Chalkley went on to say that he did not know whether the Prime Minister knew of this offer or not, but he knew for a fact that Mr. Dunning, the Minister of Finance, did not know of it. He added, however, that “this has now been rectified” and that the appropriate Canadian officials had been fully informed on this subject. He added, however, that it was his impression, from information received from the British High Commissioner’s Office in Ottawa, that the Canadian officials were inclined to minimize the importance of this offer.
Mr. Chalkley went on to say that following his conversation with us on July 21 when we had told him that it would be necessary for the British to inform us in detail (“in shillings and pence”) of the maximum British offer on each of the products on our “must” list, his Government had undertaken conversations with Canada to find out the ultimate limit to which Canada would go. He said that before these conversations were completed the Canadian Government might wish to send someone to Washington to discuss informally the Canadian position. He urged that we receive any such representatives sympathetically, even though he was aware of the fact that we would necessarily have to tell them exactly what we have already told him in this matter.
Mr. Chalkley went on to say that after termination of their conversations with the Canadians, it was proposed by his Government to approach the other Dominions in turn, timing their overture to Australia to follow the forthcoming election there.
Mr. Chalkley stated that we have “an important ally” in Mr. Neville Chamberlain, who, he stated, had become a convert to the thesis of removing an important portion of the imperial preferences in order to make possible a comprehensive agreement with the United States. Mr. Chalkley added parenthetically that for the son of Joseph Chamberlain to take such a position was “nothing short of a miracle.”