852.00/6672
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The Spanish Ambassador called to see me this morning. He told me that he had no specific representations to make nor any official inquiry to propound but that he had called merely to greet me upon my return from my vacation and to inquire what my impressions might be with regard to the European situation in general.
I told the Ambassador that my trip to Europe had been in the nature of a vacation and that while I had had the opportunity of meeting and talking with certain members of the European governments, I was not in a position to give him any information or any impressions beyond those of a very general and personal character. I said that on the whole it appeared to me that the prospects for the maintenance of peace in Europe seemed somewhat more encouraging than they had three or four weeks before, but that, of course, recent developments since my return to Washington were of great importance and that it could not be denied that the present moment was again exceedingly critical.
The Ambassador then launched into a long discussion on conditions in Spain and on the policy adopted by the Great Powers of Europe. He stated that the control by the insurgents of the Atlantic ports of Spain and in particular of the Spanish Coast on the Bay of Biscay was a direct threat to British naval supremacy. He said that the control by the Franco Government of Bilbao and Santander placed those two ports now directly at the disposal of Germany for use as submarine bases and that the munitions factories in that region were staffed by German technical experts and were turning out munitions in ever-increasing amounts. In Spanish Morocco Ceuta was to all intents and purposes a German garrison and the aviation field in Spanish Morocco was likewise a source of immediate danger to the British and French navies. He insisted that under these conditions England and France would have to present an ultimatum to the Italian Government first and subsequently to Germany providing for the immediate withdrawal of the “volunteers” of those two nations in Spain or else admit their own military inferiority.
I inquired whether he thought that the Italian Government would agree to this step unless the two Governments in question agreed simultaneously to guarantee the withdrawal of all foreigners fighting on the Loyalist side. The Ambassador replied that as a Spaniard he did not know really which would be the best solution for Spain since if all assistance from France and Russia were cut off from Spain the present preponderance in munitions on the part of the Franco Government might jeopardize the existence of the Valencia [Page 410] Government, but that on the other hand, if Italian troops—and, he insists, German troops as well—were permitted to continue pouring into Spain, the Valencia Government could not cope with the situation unless similar reinforcements in men entered Spain from France.
The Ambassador referred to the reports published today that Germany and Italy were considering a joint aviation attack on Madrid. He said that these reports had originated apparently in London and wondered whether it was not a British maneuver to try and excite British public opinion so as to obtain increasing support from the British public for firmer action on the part of the British Government against Italy.