740.00/86
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 24.]
Sir: In continuation of my previous despatches concerning recent events in Central Europe, I have the honor to report that in a conversation [Page 376] with Dr. Ferdinand Veverka, formerly Czech Minister to the United States and now Czech Minister at Vienna, today, the Minister voluntarily informed me that from his observations from the viewpoint of Vienna, together with the information that the Government had received and his conversations with Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, and even Count Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Vienna, he had formed the opinion that the influence of Italy in Central Europe—as well as her desire to continue to mix therein—was slowly but noticeably waning.
He said that he thought that within a relatively short time it would be demonstrated that Italy was now too weakened by obligations elsewhere to continue to play a prominent role in Central European affairs, and that it would soon be found that she was concentrating upon strengthening her position in the Mediterranean and upon the development of Abyssinia.
I inquired whether that would not connote that Mussolini’s recent gesture in his speech at Milan29 in favor of Hungary, was to be taken with a generous pinch of salt (see my telegram No. 56, November 18, 11:00 a.m., 193630). He said that such was undoubtedly the case and observed that neither the Regent nor the Hungarian Prime Minister had appeared—to him at least—to repose much reliance upon these assurances of Mussolini, while Count Ciano had frankly said to him that “of course, the hopes expressed in speeches frequently fell short of the steps that were possible in reality”.
Of course, information of this nature cannot but be music to Czech ears, because if Hungary is thus forced again to return to the solid earth of actualities and not to repeat her mistake of relying upon sentimental assurances which never take tangible form, her campaign of revision will be necessarily modified and postponed—and there will be one less of the immediate problems by which Czechoslovakia is faced.
With regard to that phase of the situation which more directly affects Czechoslovakia in its relations with Germany, Dr. Veverka said the time had come when his Government would have to reach some agreement with Germany: the present situation of affairs was not only leading nowhere but afforded constant peril for provocative assertions and for continued unrest, and he intimated that these considerations were very much to the fore in the minds of the Chief Officers of the State, with whom he had apparently conversed within the last few days. At this point and in order that he might be aware of the nature and extent of my information in this regard and of the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to me upon this subject, (see [Page 377] my despatch No. 546 of September 5, 1936), I observed that I had understood from Dr. Krofta that the two conditions which Germany would probably attempt to impose upon this country in that connection were the abrogation of the Soviet Pact and the relinquishment of Czechoslovakia’s position concerning minorities such as Teschen.
Dr. Veverka said that the Soviet Pact would certainly appear as one of the conditions, but that he believed the second would be more specifically directed to the Sudetendeutsche Districts.
We discussed the latter first:—he confirmed the impressions which we had received from other sources that the Sudetendeutsche Party was far from united at present; in fact, he characterized it as a “true coalition”; i. e., a mingling of many interests and blocs within the party which, while temporarily united at the time of the Presidential and Congressional elections a year ago, were now showing every evidence of growing lack of cohesion. It was interesting to observe therefrom that he confirmed the impressions of which we have been aware for some months and regarding which report has been duly made. He said, however, that the situation as it at present stood, created nothing but friction, and dangerous friction at that, for it continued to afford ammunition for attacks against the Government within the country, to say nothing of continued propaganda and attacks directed against Czechoslovakia from Germany.
I said to him that I had had the privilege of unreservedly discussing this matter with President Beneš some months ago and, feeling confident of his knowledge of my interest in the welfare of this State, that I had formed the opinion from many sources that the two chief dangers were first the physical suffering in those districts, especially malnutrition of children; and, secondly, the bitter feeling occasioned by methods of administration in certain regions by Czech officials—to say nothing of the preference given to Czechs rather than to citizens of that region in connection with unemployment relief, road construction, etc.
Dr. Veverka said that he unhesitatingly agreed in both opinions. He confirmed the information which I had already received from the son of ex-President Masaryk31 that a fairly wide program of child feeding had been inaugurated and would be continued throughout the winter—observing in connection with this particular phase and the general lack of employment and cessation of normal activities, that the difficulties arose from the fact that these regions were almost wholly exporting districts—a process which, under present day clearing arrangements and financial impediments, appeared to bring in little, if anything, in return to the people of the region.
With regard to the difficulties of Administration, he admitted that many mistakes, and some very egregious ones, had been made and that [Page 378] the Government was doing everything possible to correct it—although he agreed that, at one time in the evolution of this question, the Government had actually feared that the electorate would consider such change of policy as an evidence of fear of Germany and would act accordingly to the detriment of the Government.
With the disinterested frankness with which I have always endeavored to discuss matters of this nature when broached to me by officials of this Government, I said that two and a half years residence in this country and extensive travel by automobile in all portions of it, led me more and more to the belief that if more elasticity of administration were resorted to in these districts, there could be no better way to draw the fangs of very bitter and latently dangerous criticism on the part of Germany—which might conceivably arrive at a point at which she would resort to any expedient for a display of force against this country. He agreed and observed again that the matter was very much in the minds of his Government at the moment.
Turning then to the first point mentioned above: i. e., the Czech-Soviet Pact, he said that the main advantage of the Pact was really as a trading basis with Germany—for the truth was that Germany was very much afraid of Russia and that, therefore, an agreement of this nature between Czechoslovakia and the Soviets—while not inherently particularly tasteful to the Czech people—was not only the best insurance which this Government could at present find, but also in fact the only one available against Germany. He went further to state that if at any time a satisfactory agreement could be reached with Germany—upon a basis to which full credence could be given as a permanent obligation and with concomitant understanding and assurance that Germany would thereupon desist from all efforts to bring Czechoslovakia within the sphere of its economic control—the Pact with the Soviets might be discarded much more easily than was generally believed to be the case. He did not say that this development would occur immediately, but he did say that the channels of negotiation with Berlin appeared to be much more promising than before. I asked whether it was not true that these improvements were due not only to the ability of Minister Mastny in Berlin but also to the fact that Eisenlohr, German Minister at Prague, had proven a more available channel for such discussions than had originally been expected. He replied that such was the case—thus confirming the impressions which I had received from other sources to the effect that the German Minister (Eisenlohr) had found some of the duties incumbent upon him—such as the brusque announcement of the denunciation of the international control of navigation on German rivers, for instance—far from his liking and, further, that he had been found to be approachable.
[Page 379]Dr. Veverka also intimated that he had been working along this line in Vienna with his German colleague, but he vouchsafed no definite information on this point.
In connection with this problem as it is related to the restoration of normal commercial circulation in the Danubian region, and the Schuschnigg and Hodža plans, he stated that he believed it to be an interesting and opportune corollary of the present trade agreements policy of the United States and believed that we might be upon the eve of further developments in that connection.
Respectfully yours,