751.60C/96
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that yesterday I called on M. Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I was accompanied by Mr. Wilson, Counselor of Embassy.
In the course of our conversation M. Léger made certain statements which were not without interest.
(1) Poland
M. Léger said that General Rydz-Smigly’s visit to Paris had produced great improvement in Franco-Polish relations. He said that the French Government had complete confidence in Rydz-Smigly, who was a straightforward, loyal soldier and a man of his word. He added that as soon as it had become evident that Rydz-Smigly would dominate Poland and was, indeed, the true successor of Pilsudski, the French Government had felt that it would be possible to establish satisfactory relations with Poland through him in the same way that satisfactory relations had been established through Pilsudski. M. Léger commented that this method of procedure had its disadvantages inasmuch as the disappearance of the single personality might mean a complete change in relationship.
M. Léger then said that Rydz-Smigly had promised the French Government that so long as he continued to hold his position, Poland would refrain from any activity against a country to whose assistance France had gone. M. Léger added that this pledge applied even to the case of the Soviet Union.
He then expressed the opinion that it might also be of great importance to Czechoslovakia, and that he anticipated some improvement in the relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia. M. Léger obviously attached great importance to this promise of Rydz-Smigly’s and took it to mean that Poland positively would not cooperate in a German attack on either the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia.
M. Léger then went on to say that Rydz-Smigly and the French General Staff had concluded both verbal and written understandings with respect to Franco-Polish cooperation in case of German attack.
[Page 357]M. Léger then asserted that the French Government understood and always had understood the necessity for Poland to keep a complete balance in its relations with regard to Germany and the Soviet Union; that the French Government had always advised the Polish Government to maintain cordial relations with Germany; that the French had been delighted that the danger of a German attack on the Polish corridor had been reduced; but that Beck had pursued the policy of balance between Germany and the Soviet Union in such a tortuous manner and with such ill will toward France that he had destroyed real cooperation between France and Poland. He then expressed the hope that, in spite of Beck’s continuance in office, true cooperation might now be established.
(2) Germany.
In replying to my questions with respect to German policy, M. Léger made the following statements:
He said that it was certain that the German Government had no intention whatsoever of attacking the Soviet Union. He said that the entire road-building program, the entire aviation-field program, and other military preparations in Germany made this clear. He asserted that the French General Staff had full information as to German military preparations. He stated that the information had recently been obtained and verified that eight of the ten new divisions recently created by Germany were on the French and Belgian frontiers, two remaining in the interior of Germany. He added that in spite of Germany’s promises three additional divisions had recently been stationed in the Rhineland.
I asked M. Léger why he thought Hitler was continuing to talk so violently about the Soviet Union if he had absolutely no intention of attacking the Soviet Union. He replied that in his opinion the answer was clear: that Hitler desired to lull France, Belgium and England into a false sense of security by making them believe that they had nothing to fear from his armaments. He was able to do this by proclaiming himself to be the defender of Europe against Bolshevism.
M. Léger then went on to discuss the alternative policies which Germany might follow. He predicted that if Germany should decide to avoid war and move by way of political pressure and agreements as she had recently in the case of Austria, she would proceed by bringing pressure on Czechoslovakia and the small Central European states to the south of her. On the other hand, if Germany should decide to risk war, the attack unquestionably would be directed not against Czechoslovakia or any other state to the south but against France. He said that all the information of the French Foreign Office and the French General Staff agreed on this point; that it was furthermore clear if Germany should defeat France and England [Page 358] the world was hers. So far as Central Europe was concerned Germany would merely have to pick up the pieces. M. Léger expressed the opinion that Germany would be ready for such an attack on France in the course of about a year to a year and a half.
I asked M. Léger whether the Germans were pressing their claims for colonies. He said that he felt that Hitler was anxious to have a colonial success. I suggested that the Cameroun would possibly be the immediate object of his interest, as it belonged to France, and the demand for it would not bring Hitler into the conflict with Great Britain which he so ardently desired to avoid.
M. Léger said that if there were any colonial concessions to Germany, France might give one-third, but England would have to give two-thirds.
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Respectfully yours,