Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/805

The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State

No. 3052

Berlin, September 21, 1936.
[Received September 29.]

Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s telegram No. 284 dated September 18, 3 p.m.,³ I have the honor to inform the Department that for the purpose of despatch reporting the pronouncements and activities of the Nuremberg Congress, September 8–14, 1936, as well as such developments as up to this time appear, from the Berlin angle, to have taken place as a result thereof, will be covered by three separate reports, (1) the present one concerning the international aspects, (2) one on internal matters,⁴ and, (3) because of the important pronouncements regarding German attitude towards the Soviets and Communism, a third report⁵ following the Department’s instruction No. 650 dated August 5, 1936. While most of the important speeches at the Congress were ostensibly concerned with other matters, they overwhelmingly dealt with various aspects of the Nazi attitude towards the Soviets, and as the Department specifically desires that attitude documented, copies and translations thereof are being forwarded with the last mentioned despatch only. Copies and translations of certain other speeches, dealing purely with internal matters or for internal consumption, will be forwarded with the second report listed.

The international potentialities of the policy pronouncements of the Congress, while setting forth no new points specifically, are so far-reaching and complex, that the element of time will be necessary properly to categorize them. An important immediate result however, is that Germany’s foreign policy, outwardly rather vague and indefinite in the past few months, now appears to be somewhat clarified and subject to possible canalization along the following general lines:

• First, and of immediate interest, is Germany’s attitude toward the forthcoming Five-Power conference. Whatever may have been any previous beliefs in this regard, it must now be quite apparent to all concerned that Germany will not be represented at any international conference where Bolshevik representatives are present. Indeed, even though Bolshevik influence, e. g. through Franco-Soviet pact^5a in its present form, is brought within the frame-work of an international agenda, any German representation would be openly given restrictive instructions. Predicated on such an understanding is the exclusion of thought of eastern in connection with western problems, a point which England has insisted upon. To this extent, German foreign policy has been furthered, and the ground has been prepared for the next step regardless of its direction. If Hitler and his government—as they undoubtedly feel able—can thus accomplish something in the way of isolating the Soviets from Europe, what appears to be their correlative activity—the establishment of a Fascist bloc—is facilitated.
• Second, while not having a public place on the Congress program, closer relations with Italy formed one of the strong undercurrents, and evidences of a growing desire to cooperate in a common cause are now quite apparent. Much has been said concerning the suspicions with which the two leading Fascist powers regard each other. The parallelity of their policies may not be sufficiently strong to bring about a satisfactory settlement of their many differences of opinion, and subsequently a general agreement. But the fact remains that at the moment at least, Germany feels that Italy can discreetly be made useful to the Third Reich in its ominous growth in power, without alienating any affections which England may have for Germany, and it is believed that Italy is not overlooking the advantages of closer cooperation with a powerful Fascist colleague in her Mediterranean aims, as evidenced in what is understood to have been the relations of the two countries in aiding the Spanish military insurgents. Also, the forthcoming Locarno arrangements as proposed by the British, have met with identical action on the part of Mussolini and Hitler, and indications here are that Germany is now endeavoring to persuade Italy to denounce as noxious the Franco-Soviet pact with a view to weakening Blum’s government, the ultimate object being to make England less averse to the anti-Bolshevik and pro-Fascist front. As a further step, and a fear strongly expressed by my Russian colleague, the Eastern European countries could be appealed to on the ground that no further aid could be expected from France and that a Fascist tie-up would now be preferable.
• Third, while a deep-seated, sincere hatred of Bolshevism has been and is one of the consistencies of Nazism, and there are numerous patent reasons why a sudden and violent outburst against Bolshevism should come at this time, the thought occurs to observers in Berlin that there are other strings to the Nazi bow. For example, is it not possible that Germany has in mind the isolation of the Soviets for the purpose of eventually dictating her own terms in the matter of obtaining the raw materials she needs so badly in the pursuit of her aims and which Russia could supply? Outside of actual measures of aggression, what else could Hitler have meant when he said, as he did in one of his Congress speeches, that he could do wonders if he could command the resources of “the Ural Mountains, with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, Siberia with its vast expanse of forests, and the Ukraine with its huge grain fields?” Schacht is reported to have offered, during his recent visit in Paris, to settle Germany’s quarrel with the Soviets if the Communists would abandon their propaganda program—but the price demanded of the Soviets would probably be higher than that offered. Another thought is that the present anti-Bolshevik crusade simply advantageously covers a “multitude of sins” in the activities connected with the civil strife in Spain, the one to two years increase in military service, the continued oppression of the Jews, et cetera.
• Fourth, while the Congress tirades naturally brought out strongly protesting reaction in France, they did not seem to interfere with the directly subsequent conversations of the French Minister of Commerce, M. Bastid, in Berlin regarding economic agreement between the two countries. These conversations were probably important only in that they actually arrived at a talking point, but the local press ventured the hope strongly that they might lead to broader understandings.

Summing up the immediate international results, as seen in Berlin, it may be said that while this Party Congress brought forth no particularly new developments, it has probably precipitated a situation in Europe which will mean new relations and alignments, and in this sense it may be considered more important than any of the three previous Congresses since the Nazis assumed power. Furthermore, whatever good it may have done for Germany, it has at least given food for thought to the balancing power—England—which apparently at the moment is not quite sure that Fascism in Europe is to be preferred to Bolshevism.

It cannot be said that the utterances at Nuremberg should give any particular hope to conscientious seekers of peace in Europe. Hitler sees peace and happiness ahead for Germany and at the same time points with pride at the ominous development of his means of “defense”; the Soviet Commissar for Defense, in answering Nuremberg, says his army is “one of peace” and at the same time warns those who would destroy Communism.

Respectfully yours,

William E. Dodd

3. Not printed.
4. For extract from political report, transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 3069, September 29, see vol. ii, p. 182.
5. Despatch No. 3091, October 8; not printed.
6. Signed May 2, 1935; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxvii, p. 395.