740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/520
The Ambassador in Poland (Cudahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 26.]
Sir:
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On March 10 I called on the French Ambassador, M. Noel, who confirmed the press statement concerning his meeting on March 7, 1936, with Foreign Minister Beck. He said that Colonel Beck had summoned him to this meeting following a conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at which he understood the Prime Minister and Inspector-General Rydz-Smigly conferred with the Foreign Minister. He said that Colonel Beck gave him assurance that Poland would adhere to the Franco-Polish alliance and that there would be no wavering in its commitment under that treaty. The Ambassador told me very confidentially that he believed that General Rydz-Smigly had inspired this utterance of the Foreign Office and that how serious it should be taken would be contingent upon how onerous the assistance demanded of Poland in fulfillment of its obligation under the Franco-Polish alliance. He said that the important thing was that the army, which he considered the real power in Poland, had thus gone on record for adherence to the alliance in the present crisis between France and Germany, and that this word of reassurance gave him a limited feeling of confidence.
The Ambassador did not attempt to conceal his emotion concerning the turn of events caused by Hitler’s declaration. He said that at the time of the peace negotiations Foch had pointed out to the Allies that the destruction of the German fleet and disarmament meant security from the German menace only for a time and that France would be unprotected in years to come unless provided with a frontier as invulnerable as it was then possible to achieve. Foch had [Page 240] therefore insisted upon a military line delimited by the Rhine. But in this contention he had been overruled and in compromise the demilitarized zones of the Rhineland had been established. France would never have consented, the Ambassador said, to the present frontier had it not felt that the guarantee of the Allies under the Versailles treaty made certain a demilitarized zone. The Ambassador said that his information was that instead of a “symbolic” occupation German troops were now in possession of all Rhineland garrisons in “formidable” numbers.
He said that the outstanding feature of the situation was a devastating realization that as far as Germany was concerned diplomacy meant faits accomplis in defiance of sacred international commitments. This conduct, he insisted, was the method of the revolutionary and a travesty on every honorable settlement between nations. It was ridiculous that Hitler dropping from his hands the fragments of two treaties—Versailles and the Locarno—should come into court and express willingness to enter any pact for the security of Europe. The signature of Germany would in the future be meaningless, the Ambassador stated; good faith on the part of that country in all treaty obligations had been effectually destroyed.
He went on to say that the German Chancellor’s arguments were childish in their reasoning. Hitler’s pretext that the Franco-Soviet pact violated the Locarno treaty and thus freed Germany from its obligation under Locarno was absolutely unfounded. If Hitler’s contention was honest he had a remedy provided by Article 3 of the Locarno treaty which made obligatory by judicial means the settlement of differences concerning the treaty. Hitler’s argument, the Ambassador said, was a juridical one and afforded no basis whatsoever for his brutal political action.
Asked if, under the present circumstances the French Senate would ratify the Franco-Soviet treaty, the Ambassador replied that he was certain ratification would take place at the next meeting of the French Senate on March 12. He said that failure to ratify now would make it appear as if Hitler had dictated by arrogant threat to France and this was an intolerable contemplation.
He said that he was very pessimistic and regarded the week ending March 14 as the most critical for Europe since the summer of 1914. He said that public sentiment in France was united back of the Government in dealing unyieldingly with Germany. He expressed the opinion that France was far more united than in 1914 when the Left element was distinctly hostile to the war. Now French Socialists and Communists presented an unbroken front and the sentiment against Hitler was unanimous.
On March 111 called on Count Jan Szembek, Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He stated that Foreign [Page 241] Minister Beck had made a solemn promise to Ambassador Noel that Poland would remain faithful to its commitments under the Franco-Polish alliance. He said that the Polish Government did not construe the occupation of the demilitarized zone by German troops as “an aggressive action” against France demanding military assistance from Poland under the alliance, that an actual invasion of French soil would be necessary before Poland would be bound to act. He said that if France were to send troops into the demilitarized zone in an effort to eject German military occupation such action on the part of France would not be regarded as “defensive” under the terms of the Franco-Polish alliance and that Poland did not feel under obligation to render assistance to France under these circumstances.
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Poland will proceed very cautiously. It is believed that Minister Beck will take advantage of the present crisis to insist before the League of Nations that in return for the participation of Poland in any proposed scheme of security that consideration must be given to the protection of Polish territorial integrity and the inviolability of Polish frontiers as distinguished from the present treaty of Locarno which is regarded as a scheme of security for Western Europe to the exclusion of Polish interests.
Every effort, it is believed, will be made by Poland to continue its difficult balancing feat between Russia and Germany; to maintain present highly satisfactory relations with Germany, and at the same time to acknowledge adherence to the Franco-Polish alliance. In the opinion of the Embassy, every attempt will be made to achieve every national advantage and obtain all possible prestige by an avowal of the alliance with France with the hope that no demand will be made for the fulfillment of obligations under the alliance.
Respectfully yours,