740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/425: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 12—7:45 p.m.]
74. An official statement has just been issued through the Deutsches Nachrichtenburo “in response to various press reports and remarks of foreign statesmen”. This long and somewhat rambling statement, repeating various arguments regarding the Locarno treaty and Franco-Soviet pact, would prove in detail French security as abundantly realized through herself and her alliances, defends Germany from giving annexing fear to France and recites and discusses the proposals made last Saturday underlying German desire for European understanding through “sincere negotiations with France and other European powers.” Concluding on this note the statement says: “What the German Government is striving for is not the conclusion of treaties which after all remain outwardly and inwardly unreliable because they would be united with moral burdens for an honor-loving and decent people; it is striving for a real and actual pacification of Europe for the next quarter of a century. This means a pacification which bears the character of an absolute European imperial system built up on the free decisions of equal European nations and states; however, should this conception not receive the approval of the other governments then the German Government will of course withdraw its suggestion and counting on the trustworthiness, the fidelity and the historical spirit of sacrifice and sense of sacrifice of the German people will from now on prefer to elect an honorable isolation than to live as a nation discriminated against in the community of others.”
On first impression this document is not so much challenging as querulous and argumentative. It is probably only a part of the diplomatic maneuvers preliminary to the London Council meeting. On the other hand, this statement may evidence a growing impatience on [Page 238] Hitler’s part resulting from rash counsel of his radical associates. While not giving exaggerated importance to these factors yet I am somewhat apprehensive of this sort of polemics in connection with a man of Hitler’s unstable and explosive character on the one hand and on the other hand taking into account the deep feeling of outraged sensibilities and nervous distrust in France. Should this sort of thing continue and the French persist in their refusal to consider the constructive aspects of the Hitler proposals, there might be a rapid development to a point where he and his associates would become convinced that France and her allies were definitely headed for military intervention in Germany or its economic strangulation. Hitler might then decide instantly on action.
I have talked over this point with the Military Attaché and he has made the following observations: There need be no mobilization in Germany today in the 1914 sense of the word as all existing German war units are now at war strength and military movements can be executed with almost complete secrecy. The German war plan, based on Poland remaining neutral, is believed to provide for a strategic defensive on the west front, which Major Smith believes the Germans could successfully hold, and a rapid offensive overpowering of Czechoslovakia. The eruption of Germany into Czechoslovakia would be launched instantly and in overwhelming force as the German General Staff would insist on the annihilation of the Czechoslovak “menace”, once it is believed in Berlin that France plans to take military action in the Rhineland.
While I do not wish to be alarming and still feel that the chances favor a constructive outcome of the situation, I have felt it necessary to submit the above.