793.94/6580: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
164. My despatch number 2557, February 22, and 2611, March 21 [27].20 It becomes increasingly evident that the Japanese have conveyed to the Nanking Government the threat that unless the latter reaches a “compromise” with Japan in regard to demand of the North China “Manchukuo” police authorities the Japanese military will in some manner effect the separation of North China from the nominal control of Nanking and obtain its desires with respect to this area without Nanking’s concurrence.
Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Tang Yu-jen told me on March 19th that the Government could not keep Huang Fu in Peiping indefinitely procrastinating with the Japanese over the question of certain demands concerned with relations between North China and “Manchukuo.”
[Page 107]General Huang Fu left Peiping for Central China April 3 having delayed his departure for a number of weeks and is now reported to be conferring with General Chiang Kai-shek presumably urging the wisdom of a policy of “compromise” or “friendship” with Japan. Huang Fu’s delay in going south seems to have been due to the fact that he did not wish to make the visit until the differences of opinion existing among officials at Nanking about Sino-Japanese policy had been more or less resolved eventually [through?] Tang Yu-jen, visiting Peiping, probably at the instance of Huang Fu and it is presumed that upon his return to the south he reported on the serious situation existing in North China and the dangers involved in continuing to ignore the wishes of the Japanese military. It is supposed that when Huang Fu finally left for the south he had received some assurance that a settlement of China’s policy with respect to Japan was nearing accomplishment.
It is not known whether Nanking officials will be able to reach an agreement on policy. If they do not decide upon a policy of “compromise”, which means a solution satisfactory to Japan of the question of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway Line and resumption of postal facilities (and in fact substantial Japanese influence in North China which will be only nominally under Nanking’s jurisdiction), it is anticipated that Huang Fu will not return to North China and that the Japanese military will take measures to effect the separation of North China from Nanking’s normal control and to obtain from local Chinese militarists those advantages in North China which the Japanese military are determined to have.
It is not believed that the Japanese military will employ Japanese troops in North China to gain their ends; rather it will use persuasion reinforced by money on the local dissatisfied or ambitious militarists. It may be that the Japanese military will attempt to put North China under the control of one complacent Chinese militarist although recent information reaching the Legation indicates that the Japanese may be content to have dealings with the leaders of the various provinces, the provinces no longer having connection with Nanking and no longer having nominal union through the existence of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Committee. If fighting occurs during this readjustment it will be by Chinese troops, not by Japanese troops, if the latter can avoid being driven in as the Japanese military obviously wish to obtain their ends in a manner which they believe [will?] appear to foreign government[s] as coming spontaneously from the Chinese themselves and as not being the result of Japanese use of military force.
Considerable speculation is now current with regard to the visit which Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, is [Page 108] making General Yen Hsi-shan at Taiyuan. It is believed that Shibayama assured Huang Fu that he would not visit Yen Hsi-shan (to further Japanese policy among local militarists) until it was definitely known that Nanking refused to agree to a policy of “compromise” with Japan. As Shibayama is admitted even by the civilian officials of his Legation who are out of sympathy with the Japanese military to be a man of high character, of comparatively liberal views and opposed in some degree to the headstrong Japanese officers in Tientsin and in the Kwantung army, it seems reasonable to suppose that his visit to Yen is not for the purpose of creating discord in North China at present but is for the purpose of reminding the officials now conferring in the South of what the Japanese military will attempt to do vis-à-vis dissatisfied Chinese military leaders in North China in case Nanking officials fail to agree to a policy of “compromise” or “friendship” with Japan.
It is impossible to forecast what Nanking’s decision will be. It is evident that if Nanking agrees it will retain nominal control over a North China where Japanese will obtain all that they desire and that if it does not agree it will lose even nominal control while Japan will obtain all its objectives in North China who will act as the Japanese wish them to act.
Copy to Tokyo by mail.