611.9431/53
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador, in company with his Counsellor, called and handed me a memorandum, copy of which is hereto attached,91 regarding trade relations between the two countries, their complementary nature to a large extent, and emphasizing the lack of a trade balance of imports and exports between the two nations; also urging that further increases in our trade barrier against certain Japanese commodities, as set out in the memorandum, should be given further and serious consideration before affirmative action; porcelain and potteries were also mentioned, and the hope expressed that our government would not impose any additional restrictions on Japanese exports of these latter commodities. I replied that each of these matters would be given the most careful attention and consideration.
I then stated that a single policy of bilateral bargaining trade between two given countries, for the purpose of balancing trade between [Page 808] the two, would never get either country very far; that this eliminated all triangular and a number of other trade methods and policies which were vital to anything like the development of full and normal trade betweeen nations; and that the trade of most important countries of Europe, such as France, Germany, and Italy, under narrow bilateral bargaining plans, attempting to equalize such trade between every two countries, showed an actual loss in their respective exports, while the sum total of trade barriers showed a net increase in height. I suggested what, I said, many of us had been urging in public addresses for a considerable time—and that was a broader commercial policy than mere bilateral bargaining arrangements. I pointed out that the adoption of the reciprocity trade agreement policy by the United States Government was by itself just a first step in the direction of a more universal liberalized set of trade methods and trade policies, which were so indispensable to restoration of the normal volume of world trade. Frequently I suggested that nations would have to rise to higher levels of commercial policy if anything like normal and permanent trade was to be restored; that many of us in this country very earnestly were pleading with statesmen of other countries to take this broader view and urging their respective countries to move back in the direction of economic sanity. The Ambassador expressed himself as very much interested and very much in approval of these ideas.
I called his attention specially to the fact that our reciprocity policy included the unconditional form of the favored-nation doctrine which within itself meant a much broader commercial policy than the ordinary bilateral bargaining method would imply.
The Ambassador finally remarked that with reference to his and my confidential conversations, it had occurred to him that the Japanese Foreign Minister might be interested in them, or that they might be useful to him, and so he, the Ambassador, took the liberty of conveying to Foreign Minister Hirota the substance of our conversations, at least to a material extent. I expressed no surprise, but instead reminded him very definitely that beyond the slightest question the two notes exchanged between Foreign Minister Hirota and myself some weeks ago92 afforded the broadest and most complete foundation on which to build in the most satisfactory way all desirable relationships—economic, peace, and otherwise, including those of friendship between the two nations—; that in view of so much careless talk that was taking place in different parts of the world I [Page 809] had found it necessary to state later very succinctly but very respectfully, the fundamentals of our attitude at the present.93
- Infra.↩
- 0n February 21 and March 3; for texts, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 127 and 128.↩
- See telegram No. 59, April 28, 7 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 231.↩