Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

894.6363/154: Telegram

The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

London, December 18, 1934—7 p.m.
[Received December 18—6:10 p.m.]

628. In compliance with Department’s 431, December 14, 8 p.m., Millard and I met at the Foreign Office today with the officers handling this problem.

1. British Government feel that it is the Japanese application of the law and not the law itself that is particularly detrimental to foreign oil interests. On November 20 the Japanese Government, in conversation with oil interests, expressed a willingness to consider certain modifications which, up to date, has never been replied to. British Government do not feel these modifications go far enough and are practically no concession at all. It is for this reason they do not favor the procedure outlined in paragraph two of subdivision 1 of your 428, December 10, 8 p.m., since Foreign Office argues that if American and/or British officials should now merely pave the way for subsequent conversations by the oil interests with Japanese officials it would look as though the Governments concerned tacitly acquiesced in the above-mentioned Japanese suggestions to the oil companies on November 20th.

2. Consequently, the Foreign Office prefer that Clive and Grew, or any high-ranking officials of the Embassies, should make an early visit at the Tokyo Foreign Office very much as outlined by Grew in paragraph 2 of Department’s 431, December 14, 8 p.m. These officials would explain that from their Governments’ point of view the suggestions made by the Japanese Government to the oil interests on November 20th were in fact no concession at all. These officials, while stressing orally their Governments’ position, would then leave written memorandum with the Japanese as approved by their Governments. The British envisage that Clive’s oral representations should be supplemented by memorandum based on the British oil interests’ brief referred to in paragraph 1 of my 620, December 11, 6 p.m.

3. The Foreign Office states it will be very much influenced by the British Ambassador’s opinion but it is prepared to authorize Clive or whatever official may have this proposed discussion with the Japanese Foreign Office to state, in his discretion, at the conclusion of this proposed discussion (if indeed the Japanese attitude makes such a suggestion feasible) that if the Tokyo authorities would desire to discuss the matter with the interested oil high officers, the British Embassy would undertake so to inform them (these British officers are now in Shanghai.) Should the Japanese authorities appear to view this suggestion favorably the British Embassy in Tokyo would then advise the local oil interests there, who would in turn consult with the high officers of their companies as to whether or not to proceed to Tokyo for discussion with the Japanese authorities. In other words, I gather the British do not think it worth while bringing the oil high officers into direct contact with the Japanese Government through official paving of the way if the Japanese Government, in discussion with interested foreign officials, remains adamant in its position. Furthermore, Foreign Office is apprehensive over oil high officers threatening the Japanese now with “measures to meet the situation” if American cooperation can not be effective. The British Foreign Office obviously realize the special United States circumstances involved in the Department’s present decision in paragraph 3 of telegraphic instruction 422, December 5, 11 a.m. Nevertheless, they are frankly apprehensive of any threat being advanced by the oil interests to the Japanese Government if these British, American, and Dutch oil interests are not agreed beforehand among themselves that such a threat can eventually be satisfactorily implemented. Therefore, the British do not desire that the oil high officers talk direct with the Japanese Government if Clive is of the conclusion that the Japanese Government remains as adamant as it was in the beginning. On the other hand, the Foreign Office was inclined to be hopeful that the Japanese might begin to show a little more conciliatory tone.

Please cable Department’s instructions that I may inform the Foreign Office.

Atherton