711.6112 (Aggressor)/4: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:30 p.m.]
25. Continuing my 24, March 21, 8 p.m.98 We discussed the question of a general nonaggression pact in the Pacific. Litvinov said “There are two ways to approach such a pact (1st) in the hope that such a pact may be concluded (2d) in the hope that such a pact may [Page 83] be proposed and rejected by the Japanese. To conclude such a pact it will be necessary to leave out China so that the matter of ‘Manchukuo’ will not arise.” I expressed the personal opinion that the Government of the United States would under no conditions desire to adhere to any pact which did not include China.
Litvinov then said that the Japanese would certainly never agree to sign any pact which included China unless “Manchukuo” should be recognized; that the Soviet Government would be glad to sign a pact involving the recognition of “Manchukuo” as a quid pro quo for Japan. I replied that I felt sure the Government of the United States was not prepared to recognize “Manchukuo.”
- Printed in Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, section on 1934.↩