894.00/510
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 21.]
Sir: If the Diet session, recently concluded, accomplished nothing else of particular importance, it did demonstrate unmistakably the existence of a strong feeling in Japan against the abuse of power by the military. This, it seems to me, is of considerable significance, in view of the fact that until the Diet met in January hardly a voice had been raised against military dominance since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair. For over two years the military influence in the councils of the nation has been paramount. Military men, military affairs, wars past and wars probable have occupied a great deal of the attention of the nation during this period. Americans, preoccupied with the problems of domestic economic reconstruction, have been prone to point to these obvious signs of militarism as proof of the inherent belligerency of the Japanese people. Virile as the nation is, there is not much evidence that the Japanese are much more bellicose than the peoples of other strong nations, while there is definite evidence that there is a substratum of common sense and reason in this country which holds firm against extremes.
The most distinctive characteristic of the Japanese people is their intense social consciousness; their discipline and unity. In this they, at times, show an almost sheep-like tendency to follow their leaders. Such a people must needs lack a well-developed critical faculty, particularly that involving bold and independent thinking. Consequently when in September 1931 the nation was led into the gravest and most hazardous adventure since the Russo-Japanese war, the response by the general public was instantaneous and fervid.
During these two years past, an emergency spirit has been maintained, partly through the determined efforts of the military, and partly by the series of events which have aroused the nation;—the Manchurian issue, the Chinese boycott and the Shanghai affair, the Lytton report and the withdrawal from the League, the talk of war with Russia and the United States, the threat of a naval race, the mandated islands issue, and the trade controversy with British India. These events produced a national psychology bordering on hysteria, in which Japan seemed isolated and friendless with the whole world aligned [Page 645] in opposition. In these circumstances military preparedness seemed the only dependable policy for the nation, and military men were looked to as saviors of the country. As a speaker in the Diet stated: “Not to be a soldier was not to be a man.”
The state of mind of this nation is, and has been for some time, abnormal. Americans have only to recall the delirious days between 1917 and 1920 to realize that no nation is immune to mass hysteria. In what might be called the more normal days between 1921 and 1930, the soldier in Japan was steadily losing in prestige and favor. Following the disastrous and expensive Siberian expedition, the soldier had come to be regarded as something of a social parasite. Good families declined to allow their daughters to marry military officers. Repeatedly during this period loud protests against military costs and the size of the military establishments were made* and the army had been forced to give up two divisions. Many observers believe that the outbreak at Mukden in September 1931 was part of the effort of the Army to save itself from further adversity.
All this was changed overnight following the Manchurian outbreak. The soldier was immediately restored to fame and favor and has remained in that happy state until recently.
The reaction against the military was first sensed a year ago following a speech in the Diet by Count Uchida21 in which he stated in effect that Japan would rather be reduced to ashes before abandoning her position in Manchuria. This extraordinary statement, with its dire implications, occasioned some sober thinking in this country, and has contributed a new phrase to the language: “shodo gaiko” or “desperate diplomacy”. This phrase was freely discussed at the time of Uchida’s resignation, and strong hints were made that Japan had no stomach for any such policy of desperation in dealing with foreign affairs.
Count Uchida was known to be hand-in-glove with the military authorities, and his resignation was undoubtedly a blow to the military influence. The new Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, has so unmistakably demonstrated his eagerness to cultivate better relations abroad that mere mention of the changed Japanese diplomacy is sufficient in this discussion. The Department will recall that shortly before Hirota assumed office, Mr. Shiratori, notorious chief of the publicity section of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Tani, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau, both closely in touch with the War Office and highly influential officials under the Uchida regime, were transferred away from the Foreign Office. These arch leaders of the chauvinistic element had split the Gaimusho into two bitterly hostile camps. Their passing [Page 646] healed this split and left the more moderate camp under the new Foreign Minister definitely in control.
No discussion of military influence in Japan during the past two years would be complete without mention of that extraordinary highpriest of the military cult, half-mystic and half-Spartan,—General Araki.22 His great personal influence both in military and civilian circles made him a unique, as well as highly dangerous element in the Government. Literally speaking, what he demanded was done, and no one, not even with the prestige of Mr. Takahashi, the veteran Finance Minister, could successfully oppose him. Had he decided for a war with Russia or the United States, there is little doubt as to what would have happened.
But even General Araki was not immune to the new moderate spirit. It seems certain that he capitulated to the conciliatory policies of Hirota in the famous Five-Ministers Conference† last fall, following which this country has very apparently changed its attitude toward the rest of the world. But in conceding to the liberal policies, General Araki seems to have lost the confidence of the chauvinists in the Army and to have dug his own political grave. As someone has said, he gave the Army too many unredeemed (political) checks. Realizing this situation, he resigned on the score of illness which seems to have been no more serious than a cold.
General Hayashi, the present Minister of War, is generally regarded as an old fashioned warrior type of leader. However, his cautious and moderate utterances in the Diet have shown him to be an entirely different type from his predecessor. His appointment may be considered a decided step forward for the liberal school of thought in Japan, as opposed to the extreme chauvinist element.
I have mentioned the reaction against Count Uchida’s declared policy of “desperate diplomacy”, and have digressed to touch on the personalities of his associates and successors, who have influenced the conduct of foreign affairs. An outline of other factors which have changed public attitude toward the military should follow.
In Japan, as in all countries, the pendulum of public feeling tends to resume the norm. The public may be aroused to a high pitch of feeling over a given situation, but sooner or later the tautness slackens. This, in my opinion, is what is happening in Japan. Under the calm leadership of Mr. Hirota, the country has come to accept a more reasoned view of foreign relations, and to discount the cries of “emergency” and “crisis” from the military diehards. Utterances in the Diet would indicate that the public now begins to feel that it has [Page 647] been tricked into an unnecessary state of agitation, and is inclined to blame the military for the false alarm.
Outspoken discussions of the budget in the Diet also reveal dismay over the size of the military demands and the suspicion that the military have deliberately stirred up the people with the talk of a crisis in order to get the money for their own plans. The staggering cost of the “desperate diplomacy” is being brought home to the Japanese in earnest. The Army and Navy budget for the 1934–35 year is approximately Yen 940,000,000 out of a total budget of Yen 2,112,000,000. But more sobering is the fact that the military expenditure exceeds the total revenue from taxation by about Yen 150,000,000. As one speaker stated in the Diet: “We will have no country to defend if we spend all our resources on defense”.
Curiously enough, the most heated criticism of the military in recent months, both in the Diet and the press, has been of military meddling in politics and of military indiscipline. The notorious “May 15th Affair” in which Premier Inukai was assassinated in a plot involving Army and Navy officers, caused a tremendous shock to the nation. At the trials the military authorities seemed to try to exploit the affair as a demonstration against the corruption of party government. More recently the public has seemed to suspect that the whole parliamentary structure was being undermined in favor of a movement toward fascism of a Japanese brand, led by elements in the armed forces. Japanese may feel disgust at the corruption of the politicians, but they obviously dread a fascist regime. Criticism of military interference with affairs of state outside of their proper ken occupied more attention in the Diet than any other topic, barring the budget. I have appended to this despatch translations of selected statements23 made in the Diet in this connection. They bear out practically all conclusions drawn in this despatch.
The influential capitalistic classes have long fretted under the exactions of the military and the Army’s restrictions on the capitalistic exploitation of Manchuria. No extension of military or fascist authority would be pleasing to these classes.
Finally, due consideration of the effect of military appropriations on the farming classes must be given in assigning causes for the decline of military favor. The Army and Navy draw most of their personnel directly from the farms, where during the past few years conditions have become almost intolerable, with prices falling and debts increasing. Relief funds appropriated in last year’s budget have been severely cut in the present year’s budget due to the pressure of military demands. Although Finance Minister Takahashi cleverly avoided admitting this fact in the Diet, it was obvious to all [Page 648] listeners that there was not enough pie to go all around if the military seized a disproportionate share.
To the American observer, interest in this changing attitude toward the military lies in the fact that the nation is obviously regaining its equilibrium. The tumult and shouting, the hysteria and fanaticism are dying down and the nation is awakening, with a throbbing financial hang-over, to the realization that Japan has more enemies than friends, and that friendship must be cultivated if Japan is to avoid disaster. Isolation may be a proud pose, but cooperation is the surer path to peace and prosperity. It is this, I think, that the Japanese are now beginning to realize.
One must bear in mind, however, that due to the peculiar structure of the Japanese constitution by which the supreme command of the Army and Navy lies out of the competence of the civilian government, and due to the character of the Japanese people, at once excitable and easily led, this country will remain an unstable quantity in international relations until time has worked more fundamental changes.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s despatch No. 223 of May 9, 1931. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs until September 1933.↩
- Japanese Minister of War until January 1934.↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 566, October 31, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Not printed.↩