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Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) of a Conversation With the British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Wellesley)62
I referred to the fact that when I was in Japan last October and early in February the question of Russo-Japanese relations had been very much to the fore. Sir Victor inquired whether I thought that an armed conflict between Soviet Russia and Japan was likely. I replied that, in my opinion, there existed fundamental differences between Soviet Russia and Japan which made it possible, if not probable, that an armed conflict might break out at any time, but that I estimated that the chances of a war breaking out in the immediate or the near future were not more than thirty-five out of a hundred. Sir Victor referred to the fact that one could never tell what the Japanese military might do. He said that in the event of a war between Soviet Russia and Japan, he thought that Japan would be victorious.
Sir Victor brought up the question of the recognition by the Powers of “Manchukuo”. He said that it seemed likely that Japan would proceed with the development of “Manchukuo”; that in the process of that development business and commercial opportunities would naturally be opened; and that it was almost inevitable that some Government would recognize “Manchukuo” in order that its nationals might be given the opportunity to participate in these commercial possibilities. He wondered whether it was practicable or desirable that Governments continue to estop their nationals from participating in the commercial development of “Manchukuo” by continuing to decline to accord recognition to “Manchukuo”. I said that, speaking entirely personally, I was ready to admit that, if “Manchukuo” continued to exist as a fact for an indefinite number of years, recognition by the Powers of “Manchukuo” probably could not be held off forever. I added, however, that in my opinion the weight of evidence was strongly against the present recognition by the Powers of “Manchukuo”. I referred to the interest of the American and British peoples in the peace movement and to the adoption by the League of Nations and by the American Government of a policy of non-recognition of “Manchukuo”. I mentioned also the uncertainties connected with “Manchukuo”, including the question of the form of government of “Manchukuo”, the ultimate attitude that China might take toward “Manchukuo”, the possibility that Japan might annex “Manchukuo”, [Page 56] and the critical situation existing between Japan and Soviet Russia, which, if it developed to the point of a war, might change the whole face of northeastern Asia. I said that I also did not believe that any practical advantages of consequence would flow to the nationals of any country which might accord recognition to “Manchukuo.”
I said that it seemed to me that Japan was determined to limit foreign participation in the trade and commercial development of “Manchukuo” to commodities and lines of business that Japan itself could not supply or take care of. Sir Victor said that of course neither the American nor the British Government could recognize “Manchukuo” for at least a number of years. He referred to the fact that recognition of “Manchukuo” by the American or by the British Government would probably result in an anti-British or anti-American boycott in China.
Sir Victor inquired whether I had heard of any possible alignment between Germany and Japan. I said that I had not. We agreed that the fact that both countries wanted allies and that they both were somewhat isolated internationally at the present time might afford a basis for some sort of an alliance between them.
I inquired whether the British Government had given any thought to the question of there being held a new conference to discuss the Washington Conference Nine Power Treaty in regard to China,63 and the whole question of the Far East. Sir Victor said that the idea of such a conference filled him with horror; that he did not see that anything could be discussed to advantage at this time; and that he was strongly opposed to conferences unless there had been preliminary work sufficient to insure the success of the conference.
Sir Victor inquired whether I thought that Japan had it in mind to expand to the south to the Philippine Islands and to the Straits. I replied that it was very difficult to say what Japan had in mind but that I personally believed that, under present conditions in Japan and in the light of the present attitude and mind of the Japanese military, Japan would, in case the United States should now withdraw definitely from the Philippine Islands, take over possession of those islands within five or ten years.
Sir Victor mentioned the serious nature of the competition that British interests were facing from Japanese products.
Sir Victor inquired whether I thought that Communism in China represented a real menace. I replied that it seemed to me that it was entirely possible that the so-called Communistic movement might develop to the point where it would take over control of the Government.
Sir Victor referred to general conditions in China and said that it seemed to him that amid the continuing civil wars and disorders [Page 57] China was making some actual progress. In this connection I mentioned a statement made to me by a Chinese professor to the effect that the present officials of China were probably just as grasping and unprincipled as their predecessors but that the impact of the West forced the present officials to inaugurate and carry out definite improvements such as the building of new roads and highways, the installation of sewerage and lighting systems, and harbor development.
In closing the conversation, I referred to the fact that in connection with Far Eastern problems of mutual interest we found it helpful to confer with the British Foreign Office. I expressed the hope that the British Foreign Office would continue to discuss such matters with American representatives. Sir Victor said that he entirely agreed that such consultation was helpful, and that in his opinion it was very important. He said that he was very much in favor of personal conversations, which, in his view, were much more likely to be productive of good results than attempting to discuss questions entirely by means of telegraphic or written communications. He said that unless there were in the British Embassy at Washington and in the American Embassy at London officers familiar with the complicated and difficult questions arising in the Far East, it was very difficult for those officers to present matters adequately to the respective Foreign Offices.
Sir Victor asked that I convey his regards to Mr. Hornbeck.
- Transmitted to the Department by Mr. Hamilton, upon his return to Washington from London and the Far East, as an enclosure to his covering letter of March 10, 1934.↩
- Signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.↩