793.94/6573
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 24.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that the Japanese appear to be striving to persuade the Chinese authorities to support a policy of Sino-Japanese “friendship”, a policy which would clarify and stabilize, at least for the time being, Sino-Japanese relations, which would increase Japanese authority in North China without resort to subversive or militant activities, and which would relieve Japan of danger from North China in case Japan were to become seriously engaged elsewhere.
The Legation has been reliably informed of statements made recently by a close friend of General Huang Fu, General Chiang Kaishek’s representative nominally in control of North China. This man was sent to Japan as General Huang Fu’s “personal representative” and, while there, conferred with leading military and civilian authorities. (Although the Legation’s informant felt constrained [Page 47] to withhold the name of the “personal representative”, it is probable that he is Mr. Li Cheh-li who was educated in the Japanese military academy and who was reported in the press as having visited Japan last November, allegedly unofficially.) To a few Chinese friends, one of whom retailed the conversation to a member of the Legation staff, this “personal representative” made certain statements early in the present month which are of interest, especially as there is no reason to believe that they have been reported inaccurately and as their general tenor is in harmony with information reaching the Legation from other sources.
According to this “personal representative”, the Japanese authorities whom he met are now agreed in desiring the “friendship” of China—under certain conditions. One proposal and two threats were made to him. The proposal was that Japan would support Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu in all necessary ways in return for certain concessions, which may be supposed to include a settlement favorable to Japanese interests of such questions as Sino-“Manchukuo” customs, post, telegraph, telephone, railway traffic, and air lines and which definitely included the removal from North China of General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, and General Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Chahar Provincial Government, together with their troops, the Japanese apparently viewing these two generals as the most probable source in North China of action detrimental to Japanese interest. (It may be pertinent to recall in this regard that General Sung’s troops were among those few which offered any genuine resistance to the Japanese in their occupation of Jehol Province last spring, that Japanese officials have recently made statements indicating dissatisfaction with General Yu Hsueh-chung and his subordinates, and to note that in to-day’s press appears for the first time a statement that reports are current that the removal of General Yu Hsueh-chung from Hopei to Chekiang Province is under consideration.)
It was the opinion of the “personal representative” that the Japanese hope to obtain through Chinese compliance with this proposal a North China under General Huang Fu practically independent of Nanking and practically dependent on Japanese direction; in effect, a buffer state subservient to Japan. (The desire of the Japanese to have General Huang Fu in chargé, notwithstanding his lack of financial and military backing, is probably due to the fact that he is respected as a man of integrity who is anxious to improve the Sino-Japanese situation and that he is satisfactory to deal with because, having been educated in the Japanese military academy, he understands the Japanese.) The Legation’s informant understood that a time limit for agreement, probably the end of next month (March), [Page 48] had been set by the Japanese. Failure to agree, the Japanese informed the “personal representative”, would make it necessary for them to attempt to follow a second course; namely, the putting of North China under the nominal control of either General Han Fuchu, Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government, or General Yen Hsi-shan, Pacification Commissioner for Shansi Province, if either of these generals could be induced to submit to the Japanese yoke. The “personal representative” was then informed that, if this alternative plan failed, more strenuous action would be undertaken, it being at least inferred that such action might include the transporting of Mr. Pu Yi from Hsinking to Peiping.
The foregoing statements are supported to some extent by other information reaching the Legation. In January there was held in Shanghai a conference of important Japanese military officers. Although their decisions have been carefully guarded, the Legation has learned from unofficial Japanese and Korean sources that the Japanese military are believed to have approved a policy of support of Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu in return for an approximately free hand in North China and that, following this decision, a considerable number of so-called Japanese ronin and civilian-clothed Japanese military left China, apparently because with the establishment of such a policy subversive activities which have heretofore been in progress for the purpose of diminishing the authority of the present government would be unnecessary. What the attitude of General Chiang and other officials with regard to this policy may be is not yet known. It is reliably reported, however, that General Huang Fu’s “personal representative” has been urging General Huang not to accede to the Japanese proposal but to resign in order to escape a debacle in North China and the ruin of his career. It may be added that a secretary of the Japanese Legation recently stated that, although the Japanese military have not told him what took place at the Shanghai conference, he believes the foregoing account of it to be accurate.
There is other supporting, though inconclusive, evidence of Japan’s efforts toward “friendship”. Both the Chinese press and Japanese officers state that General Huang Fu will shortly visit General Chiang Kai-shek, and, according to the former, the Japanese Minister is now on a visit to Nanking, following the conclusion of which he will proceed to Tokyo. Shanhaikwan was nominally returned to China on February 10, “nominally” because the Japanese still control it militarily through their soldiers stationed within the railway zone and north of the Great Wall just outside Shanhaikwan. (According to an officer of the Japanese Legation, practically all public offices at Shanhaikwan have been restored to the Chinese but misunderstanding [Page 49] on the part of the public has arisen because of the fact that a number of “Manchukuo” offices are still retained in Shanhaikwan awaiting completion of new quarters north of the Wall.) Japanese officials have been very busy making public statements with regard to improved relations between China and Japan and with regard to the importance of further improvement. Within the past few days the Japanese Minister at Nanking and Colonel Nemoto, reputedly Japanese “adviser” to General Huang Fu, have, according to the press, made such statements. It is known also that Japanese officials have been talking along similar lines when in conversation with Chinese officials.
Whether or not Japan is overtly attempting to convince Nanking of the wisdom of adoption of a policy of “friendship”, there have been recent occurrences which might well remind the Central Government of its continuing impotence vis-à-vis Japan. Japanese troops invaded Chahar Province in December and again in January without meeting effective resistance; a few thousand bandit troops of General Liu Kuei-t’ang revolted in December in Chahar Province and proceeded southward through North China pillaging as they went without being effectively checked; in January the Japanese military “advised” the Kuomintang organizations in North China to end their activities detrimental to Japanese interests; and Japanese agents have been at work among North China militarists restive under Nanking’s nominal control.
It may be conjectured that the desire of the Japanese for the establishment of such a policy of “friendship” with China is based on such factors as: (1) Japan’s apprehension that within the near future it may become involved seriously with a third power, in which case a friendly North China, to all intents a tributary state, would add to Japan’s security; (2) the advantage of being on stable terms with China before the convening of the approaching naval conference; (3) the apparently increasing appreciation, even on the part of over-zealous Japanese military officers, of the dangers and costliness of aggression by arms; (4) realization that peaceful penetration of North China would be more economical and less offensive to the Chinese than armed penetration; (5) probable growth of Sino-Japanese trade; (6) financial and economic benefit to “Manchukuo” of resumption of intercourse between it and China; (7) nominal preservation of the unity of China would be advantageous in that there would continue to be a Central Government with which Japan could deal; (8) Japanese control of North China would place Japan in a position of being able to prevent the Nanking Government, in case it might become strong, from injuring Japanese interests; [Page 50] and (9) Japan would be in a position to extend its control further south in China at such time as it might deem desirable.
It would not be surprising were the Central Government to agree to the policy Japan is said to have proposed. Since the beginning of Japan’s military occupation of Manchuria General Chiang Kai-shek has shown no inclination to employ his troops against the invaders, not even after the fall of Jehol Province and the advance of Japanese forces south of the Great Wall. There were unsubstantiated reports last May when the Sino-Japanese truce at Tangku was made that General Chiang’s representative had promised considerably more to Japan than appeared in the agreement as published.58 General Chiang, together with the second most powerful figure in the Nanking Government, Dr. Wang Ching-wei, has stated again and again that the internal recovery of China is of primary importance, not war against an aggressor. It is known that at the conference of Chinese leaders last summer at Kuling General Chiang was in favor of a policy of conciliation of Japan, his position in this regard being strengthened by the resignation last October of Mr. T. V. Soong as Minister of Finance who was the chief opponent to such a policy.
To-day, as a result of his successful quelling of the rebellion in Fukien Province last month, General Chiang can more easily impose his will on other members of the Government than has been possible for some time. If he desires to subscribe to a policy of “friendship” with Japan, he may therefore be met with little opposition. This subservience of Nanking’s officials was illustrated by the lack of opposition during the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held last month.
General Chiang is aware, as is the vast majority of thinking Chinese, that China cannot effectively resist Japan. This realization is indicated by the decline of the movement for the boycott of Japanese goods even in South China. The decline of the boycott also shows the short memory Chinese have for wrongs suffered. General Chiang is confronted with such internal problems as the subjection of communist forces, the extension of his control over Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, the pacification of the Northwest. It is not unlikely that he would rather see the Japanese obtain what they want in North China peacefully, leaving it under his nominal control and giving him time to consolidate his strength in the rest of China than to invite Japan, by a policy of resistance, to sever North China completely from Nanking and to follow a policy even more inimical to his interests.
Respectfully yours,
- Signed May 31, 1933, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 120.↩