893.01 Manchuria/1032
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
I have had information from two or three sources which indicates that there is being carried on quietly in some quarters what appears to be a campaign of under-cover propaganda directed toward influencing the Administration with a view to effecting a change of position with regard to the declaration made by the previous Administration that the United States did “not intend to recognize” in connection with various steps taken and situations created contrary to treaties, etc., in Manchuria.
There is perceived no good reason why American citizens should be taken in by or lend themselves to propaganda, if it be such, the success of which, if it took the form of action by the American Government, would be to the advantage of Japan (and the Japanese program in relation to Manchuria) only, and in no way to the advantage of the United States.
[Page 37]Much may be said, pro and contra, with regard to the merits of the non-recognition doctrine and the use of it in prosecution of policy. The subject is one well worth the consideration of and discussion by students of international law and diplomacy. But, from point of view of practical and actual international relations, the simple facts are: the American Government announced in 1932 that it “did not intend to recognize”; maintenance by it of that position calls for no new action and no new affirmation; recognition of the “State of Manchukuo” and the “Government of Manchukuo” are being sought only by the Japanese (and their proteges in the present administration of Manchuria) and only for purposes of Japanese policy; the question of recognition or non-recognition by this country of “Manchukuo” is not at present an “issue” between Japan and the United States; our persistence in withholding recognition is not substantially interfering with Japan’s program for the development of Manchuria and is not depriving the people of Manchuria of any right or any substantial benefit; and the so-called “State of Manchukuo” has not yet shown itself to be possessed of all the characteristics of statehood (one of the most important of which is ability to stand alone). In connection with any affirmation that the American Government should reverse itself and proceed to take the positive step (in place of a negative attitude) of recognizing “Manchukuo” the affirmation should be subjected to the rule that the burden of proof rests upon him who affirms. Any proposal that this Government should recognize “Manchukuo” constitutes a proposal for action involving not alone our relations with Japan but our relations with China and our relations with the League of Nations. When we took our stand in declaration of an intention not to recognize, we set an example which became the basis on which the League of Nations subsequently took its stand in a similar sense and which also considerably influenced the course subsequently pursued by the Chinese Government. If and when we choose to reconsider our position we should give due consideration to those facts and to the responsibility which is ours by virtue of them.
Altogether undue weight is attached currently to the impression that there is a terrific state of tension between Japan and the United States. Starting with and motivated by that thought, a great many well intentioned people are casting about for ways and means for the relief of this supposed-to-exist tension. In nearly every instance the suggestions which these people evolve are suggestions the adoption of which would involve concessions or free grant of favors to Japan by the United States. Now as a matter of fact the tension is not extraordinary. In so far as it has existed, it has been in process of constant diminution over a period of several months past, and it has been substantially diminished within the past three days by the fact that the extraordinary budget, with its enormous appropriations for [Page 38] the army and navy, in Japan, has now passed the Diet. No small part of the great hullabaloo in Japan in discussion of possible war with the United States and/or with Russia and/or with both has been artificially induced by interested parties in Japan for the purpose of insuring the passage of that budget. Recently the tendency in circles in authority in Japan has been to clamp down on the chauvinistic talk of certain outstanding figures among their militarists and at the same time to play up the subject of friendly relations with the United States. It is true that the Japanese would like to have us recognize “Manchukuo” and that they would like to have us amend our Immigration Act47 and that they would like to have us indicate that we will be agreeable when the times comes to an alteration favorable to them of the existing naval ratios. But none of these things are real “vital” issues and there is nothing in the situation as between the United States and Japan which makes it in any way imperative that the American Government go out of its way or indulge in the free giving of gifts in order to placate Japan and insure against hostile acts on Japan’s part against this country.
There may come a time when it will be advisable for us to consider on its intrinsic merits the question whether a certain political entity called “Manchukuo” is entitled to and should be accorded recognition by the United States. That time has not yet come and it probably lies a considerable distance in the future.
For the present, the simplest and the wisest course for this Government to pursue is to stand pat upon and refrain from discussion of the position taken by the previous Administration in 1932 and reaffirmed by the present Administration (in a communication to the League of Nations, in September, 193348) of intention not to recognize.
And the simplest way in which to deal with suggestions for reconsideration would be to listen to whatever the proponents of that idea may have to say but to respond with silence or with the simple affirmation that no useful purpose can be served by raising this question at this time.
- Approved May 26, 1924; 43 Stat. 153.↩
- Dated September 20, 1933, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 122.↩