Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

761.94/700

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 670

Tokyo, February 8, 1934.
[Received February 24.]

Sir: In the last several months the Embassy has endeavored to keep the Department currently apprised of developments in the strained relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, without material modification of the views expressed in my letter of October 6, 1933, to the Under Secretary of State,⁴⁴ to the effect that war between the two countries was not unlikely, and that a logical moment for such a conflict, barring provocative incidents of a serious nature, might occur in 1935. I am not now prepared to alter those views. Few if any careful foreign observers in Japan today would maintain that the risk of war had been eliminated by the recent developments and indications which I shall discuss in this despatch. Many such observers, however, feel that the possibility of avoiding such a conflict is greater than it was six months ago, and to substantiate this opinion the following factors are adduced.

(1) There has been in recent months a noticeable reaction against the military and especially against the vast military expenditures and demands in the budget. This reaction has manifested itself in the Cabinet, in the press and especially in the Diet. I have already reported the schism in the Cabinet which resulted in a compromise.^* The recent attacks on the Army and Navy through interpellations in the Diet have been the most direct and forcible anti-military manifestations that have occurred in Japan since the Manchurian adventure began in 1931.

(2) The forcible nature of these interpellations in the Diet indicate a growing strength and confidence of the political leaders. The military have overplayed their hand. It now remains to be seen whether these political elements, with their increasing confidence, will in turn overplay their hand. If they do so, there will be a risk of further terroristic activities. Angry reverberations have already been heard from the Navy.^† Once the Diet is adjourned, however, there will be less opportunity for the politicians to express their views in public, although they will have had full opportunity to register their concern at the dangerous situation into which military aggressiveness has been leading the country.

(3) Public feeling against the Army has been accentuated by the light sentences given to the officers concerned in the assassination of Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932, compared to the heavy sentences meted out to the civilians, although the latter were involved to a lesser degree. General Araki, it has been reliably reported to me, remarked not long ago that the military Court Martial, in determining the military sentences made a serious mistake, having totally misjudged the force of public opinion. He added that if the officers who assassinated Premier Inukai had committed hara-kiri on his door-step instead, there would have been an immediate revolution, but they adopted the wrong method of gaining their ends.

(4) It is generally felt that General Araki’s resignation, actually due to his illness—which many feel to have been providential dispensation—has relieved the situation of an inflammatory element. While his successor’s attitude towards a Soviet-Japanese war is not known, it can at least be said that there will now be less public rattling of the sabre and fewer provocative utterances from the military. This should exert a calming influence.

(5) The middle classes, including the liberal professions, merchants, industrialists, landlords, have changed their mentality during the past year, and in the face of the economic prosperity caused by increasing exports, they desire a continuation of the status quo and dread the upsets which a war would bring. The rural population has not shared fully in the prosperity which has fallen to the industrial and merchant classes. In the face of constantly rising living costs, the farmer’s income has remained stationary, or nearly so. In addition, the modern urge for improved living conditions has affected rural areas, and the people there are no longer content with the simple hard life of their ancestors. These factors, added to the heavy taxation which rural communities have to bear, have caused a great deal of unrest in the country districts. They naturally desire relief, and are showing more interest in, and opposition to, heavy military expenditures than they have ever done before.

(6) The highest influences in the country are pacific. The Emperor is a man of mild and peaceful character. The era of his reign is characterized by the word “showa” which he himself chose and which means “enlightened peace”. There is no reason to believe that he approved of the Manchurian adventure, for the matter did not lie in his decision. Prince Saionji, the Genro, and Count Makino are profoundly imbued with the horrors of war. Since 1931 they have not been able to make their views publicly felt, but they are constantly working behind the scenes and it is believed that their influence is gradually increasing. The Prime Minister is personally an influence more peaceful than bellicose. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has displayed unexpected strength and is personally largely responsible for the comparatively milder tone of the press since he took office and for a new orientation in endeavoring to develop better relations with foreign countries. A strong group of liberals in the country have been steadily working behind the scenes and are, it is believed, developing more strength than they formerly possessed. At a recent dinner at the Tokyo Club in honor of Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador, and Ambassador Debuchi, Baron Hayashi, the chairman, in introducing the speakers, said slowly and with firmness, in a tone nearly menacing and emphasizing his remark with a bang of his fist on the table: “We want peace!”. This is a small detail, but Baron Hayashi is Grand Master of Ceremonies of the Imperial Court and one of the Emperor’s favorites.

(7) From the point of view of the Army itself—for in the last analysis the Army is likely to have the last word as to whether it shall be peace or war—new factors may exert a restraining influence. Even in the Army itself there are not lacking sane elements who are aware of the seriousness of a Japanese-Soviet conflict and who question whether the end to be attained would justify the risks run—whether the game would be worth the candle. Undoubtedly the Army has complete confidence as to its ability to take Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces and probably all of the territory up to Lake Baikal, for the Russians, separated by several thousand kilometers from their home base of supplies, will always be in a strategically hazardous position. But their defenses in the East have been materially strengthened, and their air forces in Vladivostok and elsewhere along the frontier constitute a serious threat to Tokyo and other important Japanese cities. Furthermore, American recognition of Soviet Russia has injected an important psychological element into the situation and gives pause to those in authority in Japan, for regardless of the pacific policy of the United States, American action in the event of a Japanese-Soviet conflict would be to the Japanese an unknown and disturbing factor, necessarily to be taken into consideration. Military plans may be regarded as infallible; but the attitude and possible action of the United States constitutes an element of uncertainty and therefore an unknown hazard. American recognition has increased self-confidence and bluster in Moscow, but no one believes that the Soviet Union will commence hostilities. I therefore believe that our recognition of the Soviet Union has injected into the situation a restraining influence, probably of greater effect than any other single integral.

(8) The opinion among the military attachés in Tokyo, and one which I set forth in my letter of October 7 [6], 1933, to the Under Secretary of State,⁴⁵ is that the Japanese Army will reach the zenith of combat efficiency in 1935, and that after that period, time will tell in favor of Soviet Russia in point of lines of communication, organized man power, fortification and equipment. The hypothesis was advanced, and is firmly held by the majority of foreign observers, that in the general scheme of Japanese expansionist ambitions the Maritime Provinces and Eastern Siberia occupy an important position, and that in those ambitions the Soviet Union constitutes an obstacle which must be removed at a favorable moment. Granting that this is true, I nevertheless believe that an increasingly influential body of opinion in Japan recognizes the importance of consolidating gains already made before embarking on further military adventures. The creation of the “Manchukuo Empire” is a step towards that consolidation. This school of thought feels that “Manchukuo” must first justify itself before the world as a stable and progressive political unit before further expansionist plans should be put into operation. There seems at present to be greater hope that the influence of this saner element in the country may predominate over those who are less amenable to reason.

In spite of the foregoing tendencies and considerations, the course of future events is subject to incidents and uncertainties which no one can predict. The foreign Military Attachés are, I believe, unanimously pessimistic. It is certain that an important faction of the armed forces of the Empire, especially the younger elements, earnestly desire a conflict with the Soviet Union, for the primary purpose of which all the energies of the Army and Navy are united in an intense and unanimous effort of preparation. I have once before drawn the parallel of the intensively-trained football team which, being convinced of its superiority and dissatisfied with mere practise, desires a game. This is precisely the attitude of a considerable element of the Army, just as it was the attitude of the German Army in 1914. If this element has its way, there will be war, and there will always exist the hazard that this element will work to create a situation where war will be unavoidable. As an illustration of this hazard I have been told the following incident by Mr. J. B. Powell, editor of the China Weekly Review. He was dining with a young Japanese officer in Mukden who pointed out a small table in his apartment which he said was historical. “On that table” he remarked, “were worked out the plans for bombing Chingchow. There was a difference of opinion, and I myself voted against it, but the majority of my friends voted in the affirmative and the bombing was therefore carried out as planned”. The implication was that the step was taken without higher instructions. I cannot of course guarantee the accuracy of the story, but Mr. Powell was convinced of its truth. It is in line with other incidents of the 1931 campaign in Manchuria. We must not close our eyes to the fact that similar incidents may occur in future, regardless of the views and policies of those in authority either in Tokyo or at the front, and that any one serious incident might create a situation where war with Soviet Russia would become unavoidable.

To sum up, the pacifist tendencies latent in Japan have in the past few months been able to make themselves felt and heard to a greater degree than at any time since September 18, 1931. If the proponents of these tendencies do not overplay their hand, they may be expected to gather strength and influence, and they may, in the long run, effectively guide the country into saner and less aggressively militaristic channels. The possibility of avoiding a conflict with the Soviet Union depends to some degree upon the continued strengthening of these newly manifested tendencies, for which, at the present moment, there appear to be reasonable grounds for optimism.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

44. Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. iii, p. 421.
45. Embassy’s despatch No. 566 of October 31, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
46. Embassy’s despatch No. 664 of February 6, 1934. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
45. Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. iii, p. 421.