Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

500.A15A5/159

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)

[Washington,] May 24, 1934.

Our Diplomatic Position, as of Today, in the Far East, With Special Reference to Naval Conference and Need for Naval Construction

1. There have occurred recently two things of particular importance with regard to our problems in relation to the Far East:

(A) The disclosure, in consequence of the statement²⁵ by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, of the contents of Japan’s instruction to the Japanese Minister to China (which was also circulated by the Japanese Foreign Office to Japanese missions elsewhere) of which the concluding paragraph (of translation as furnished us by Mr. Saito) reads:

“5. From the points of view above stated we think our guiding principle should be generally to defeat foreign activities in China at present, not only those of a joint nature but those conducted individually, in view of the fact that China is still trying to tie Japan’s hands through using the influence of foreign Powers.”

(B) The disclosure, by virtue (1) of evidence which we have directly from London which shows that the British Government has experienced some sudden change of mind,—if not of heart—with regard to the Naval Conference and (2) of evidence telegraphed us from Tokyo which suggests that the British are leaning heavily toward refusal on Great Britain’s part to oppose Japan’s demand, if and when, for naval parity,—disclosure of the fact that we cannot rely on Great Britain as a diplomatic ally in support of our view and position that there should not be granted by agreement revision in Japan’s favor of the existing naval ratios.

2. We should welcome these developments. They do not alter the situation in the Far East or the problems which confront us there. They do make it clearer to us and easier for us to make clear to others just what that situation and those problems are. The clarification should facilitate our efforts to chart the course which the United States should follow and to devise methods and create (or seek to obtain) agencies and instruments for dealing adequately with the problems which are ours.

It is of advantage to us to know, on the authority not of a statement or statements by individual Japanese but of a definite instruction of the Japanese Government to its diplomatic representatives that, “From the points of view above stated we think our guiding principle should be generally to defeat foreign activities in China at present, not only those of a joint nature but those conducted individually, in view of the fact that China is still trying to tie Japan’s hands through using the influence of foreign Powers.”

It is of advantage to us to know, from the evidence of statements made not once but on several occasions and in several ways by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs and of statements made by high British officials in London and in the Far East and of statements by influential British leaders not in office, that Great Britain cannot be counted on to make with us a united front of opposition to Japan and may on the contrary be expected to endeavor to make compromises with Japan both in reference to China and in reference to naval matters. (Note: It may be assumed that the British hope and expect that we will play the role of defensive full back in these connections.)

3. The British feel—and rightly—that they cannot rely on us for maintenance of a united front when and where the problem presented in the Far East calls or may call—as they see it—for “positive action”. They are not willing to take a position wherein they may be exposed and find us leaving them in the lurch. We are not willing to make commitments to them. Such being the case, it is just as well for us to divest ourselves of hope that they will take an advanced position before and until we shall have taken it and shown ourselves irrevocably committed to it. When we shall have done that, we may expect that they will in some cases come along side and in other cases not. In some matters we and they have a common interest; in many matters our interests and theirs are not common. In relation to some matters we and they have a common psychology; in relation to many matters our reactions and our thoughts are not the same. They have certain perplexities and solicitudes in world politics which are not ours. We have certain theories and ideals which are not theirs. In those connections where there is not community of interest and of concern, it is futile for anyone to expect that they and we will see alike, think alike and act alike—or in common.

4. This country is blessed with comparative remoteness from the storm centers in world politics. We have no strong and/or hostile near neighbors. We have within our continental boundaries, within a single united and unified area, unparalleled natural resources, a stimulating climate, and a population of 125,000,000 persons possessed of comparatively rugged and dynamic physical and mental qualities. We are in better position than is any other nation to live according to our own conceptions of what is right and desirable. We should make it our determination that we will in the field of foreign relations as well as in that of internal affairs take those positions which we deem to be right and practicable—due consideration being given to the rights and interests and views of other nations—hoping for but not expecting or relying upon support of other countries.

5. To facilitate our doing this, we need to be free to make our own decisions and to pursue our own courses with regard to such questions in the political field as are vital. Among those questions or problems is that of national security. Unless and until there prevails definitely and obviously among all the major powers a conclusive will to peace, a devotion comparable to ours to the principles and promises embodied in such instruments as the Pact of Paris,²⁶ we should be sole judge of the size and the character of the equipment which we need to ensure this country against successful military assault from without upon our territories or our interests. If we wish, further, to ensure due respect for our views and procedure in the councils of the family of nations; if we wish to be assured that other nations will live up to the provisions of agreements into which they have entered with us, we need to be free to expand, at any time and in such manner as we may deem fit, that equipment. Therefore, the world being what it is, it would be well for us to acquire and preserve freedom of action in regard to naval construction.

6. There are in the Far East three oriental powers: Japan, Russia and China. There are possessed in important measure of territory in eastern Asia and the western Pacific three occidental powers: Great Britain, France and the Netherlands.

There are, however, in and on the Pacific Ocean, facing and faced by each other on that ocean, two great powers, and only two; the United States and Japan. Of these two powers, both have unusual rights and obligations—by agreements to which both (along with other powers) are parties—in and with regard to another country, China. That third country, China, is located on the western side of the Pacific Ocean. Between it and us, in the Pacific Ocean, and not very far from us, as distances go today, lie Japan and Japan’s insular possessions.

7. With regard to many matters, the concepts and the methods of the Japanese people and those of the American people differ; with regard to some, they are in definite and obvious conflict. For example, the American people have throughout their history shown a tendency to exalt the authority of international law, of treaties, of formal international agreements, and to deprecate and discourage possession and use of military force (Note: We have fought a great deal, and we will fight; but in principle we are opposed to fighting). The Japanese people have had until recently no familiarity with international law or treaties or international agreements; they have shown themselves in late years a little disposed to regard such as of high authority; and they have always placed high value upon possession of military weapons and processes of direct display and use of force.

8. Almost all of the other nations have felt during recent years that Japan’s policies and methods are a menace to the public peace and the public welfare. The majority of the nations have given expression in one way or another to this feeling. In connection with developments in Manchuria, the United States and the League of Nations made definite objection in the form of diplomatic remonstrances and pronouncements, to the course which Japan was pursuing. It seems clear, however, that the people of the United States manifested deeper and more widespread concern than did those of any other country. Whatever may be our strategy and tactics, it is a fact that, after China and Russia, this country has more reason than has any other for apprehension with regard to the use which Japan may make of the military equipment which that country possesses or acquires. The Japanese army is a menace to Russia and to China. The Japanese army and navy are a menace to China. The Japanese navy is a menace to us. Great Britain, France and the Netherlands have reason to fear that Japan may impair their interests or drive them from the Far East. They have little reason to fear an assault by the Japanese upon their home territories. They are powers in but not powers on the Pacific Ocean. We are a power both in and on that ocean. The political responsibilities and political concepts of the others differ less from and are less in conflict with those of Japan than are ours. We have more reason than have the others to be apprehensive with regard to the ultimate use which the Japanese may make of their naval force. The question of Japanese comparative naval strength is therefore of more direct and vital concern to us than to any other of the powers.

9. The maximum of insurance which we can take out against injury to ourselves by and from Japan lies along the line of naval construction. The Japanese speak and understand the language of force. Whether we wish to insist upon our views or to safeguard ourselves as far as possible against an attack by Japan, the soundest course for us lies on the line of possessing naval strength such that the Japanese will not dare to take the risk of resort to force against us.

10. In a sense the British may be regarded as being in the act of “letting us down”. In another sense the course which they are pursuing simply forces us to do what we ought in any case to do.

We should refuse to become parties to any agreement whereby the existing naval ratio is revised in Japan’s favor. We should be glad to be released, if it so happens, from our commitment to the existing naval ratio. There rests upon us no obligation to convene the Naval Conference. So far as any country is under that obligation, Great Britain’s responsibility is greater than is ours. We should welcome non-convening of the Conference. We should welcome lapsing of the existing agreements.

The most effective step that can be taken by the present Administration in this country toward making our position in relation to Far Eastern questions what it should be lies in the direction of bending this country’s energy toward the building up of a definitely “superior” U. S. Navy. The Administration should do everything that it can in that direction during its present term. If it can carry that program sufficiently far before November 1936, it may expect to be able during its next term to devote its energies, with some prospect of making reasonable progress, toward the development of “peace machinery.”

S[tanley] K. H[ornbeck]

25. Unofficial Statement by the Japanese Foreign Office, April 17, 1934; known as the “Amau Statement”; for text, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 224.
26. Foreign Relations, 1928, vol, i, p. 153.