793.94/6691: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 19—11:40 a.m.]
267. It seems advisable to amplify my 265, May 18, 4 p.m. and American press reports by quoting verbatim official text of that portion of Simon’s statement dealing with sanctions in which he referred to American cooperation.
“It is absolutely no use talking about economic pressure unless you make certain that it is going to be effective. So far as the principal countries of Europe are concerned, you cannot, as a matter of fact, make a system effective unless the United States actively cooperate. [Page 187] We all in this country acknowledge with every possible gratitude the contributions which the United States is able to make towards the improvement of international affairs. The United States was in fact one of the principal authors of the Covenant, and it was a matter of great regret to the rest of us that when the time came the United States was not prepared to join the League.
It is not a matter for us to reproach anybody with. It merely is to be observed as a fact. But notwithstanding that the United States have constantly made the most valuable contributions towards the work which the League of Nations is trying to do. Either by appointing an observer, or sometimes by nominating an ambassador at large, sometimes through diplomatic channels, the Americans, although not members of [the] League, have joined in a great deal of the good work, and certainly I would be the very last not to recognize gratefully and publicly the service which America has done for the world. But realizing [really] there is no sort of good in our pretending not to observe the limitations within which the United States is likely to act.
I am going to give the House an illustration. The House may remember that in the course of the discussions on the British draft convention at Geneva,20 we attempted to draft in the best possible form the articles in the convention to deal with security. We tried to put in articles what is called the consultative pact to provide that if there were anything of a threat of a breach of the Kellogg Pact,21 there should be a consultation between signatories and that action should then be discussed and decided upon, and we would endeaver to act together. I, myself, was responsible for the final form in which those articles were drafted. I might say that I drafted them with Mr. Stimson’s declaration before my eyes, because my object was to present, on behalf of the British Government, something which, as far as I could see, was exactly in the form most likely to secure American support. When the matter came to be discussed, the American representative, Mr. Norman Davis, made a very careful declaration,22 and I should like to read a couple of sentences from the declaration in order that we may see for ourselves what it is foolish not to face—to estimate what is the measure of the promise of help in respect of such things as consultative pacts and action thereupon which we might hope to get from the great Republic on the other side of the ocean. This is what Mr. Norman Davis said:
‘We are willing to consult with other states in case of a threat of [to] peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the states in conference determine that a state has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which the states may thus make to restore peace’.
Nothing could be clearer than that. I certainly am not going to invite anybody to deny that it is valuable, but it is “[quite] absurd to pretend that that declaration, solemnly made with the authority of the American [Page 188] Government at Geneva, encourages us to believe that America would take full part in economic sanctions. If I call attention to two passages in that declaration, I do hope that the House will believe that I do not do it with any desire to minimize the value of the declaration, but I do it for the purpose of clearness. In the first place, if all the conditions here are satisfied, what is it that the United States are good enough to say their Government would do? It is this, ‘we will refrain from any action’—not ‘we will take any action’—‘tending to defeat such collective effort’. Whose collective effort? Not a collective effort in which the United States take part, but a collective effort of other people, ‘which the states’—not the United States—’may thus make to restore peace’.
My honorable and learned friend the member for South Nottingham (Mr. Knight) has lately [just] said that it is a [valuable] declaration, and I would be the very last to say it is not because it means this: suppose there arose what I may perhaps call a flagrant case in which the American nation was deeply stirred and suppose that the states of Europe or the other states of the world had the means by which they could put some pressure upon what is here called ‘the violator’ and suppose we will insofar [went so far] as to do it, it is a very material thing to know that if such action commended itself to the United States we might be sure that the United States Government would do nothing whatever to encourage its own citizens or to defend them if they tried to break the ring. It is a very material thing, and corresponds in some degree with the situation which developed at one stage of the war. But it is a very different thing the [from] saying, ‘here are economic sanctions waiting to be adopted if it were not for the pusillanimity of the British Government, and if only the critics in the House formed a government we would have economic sanctions before you could say “Jack Robinson.”’”
Following Simon, Baldwin23 pointed out that in his opinion limitation was probably the only practical form of disarmament in air, that it was difficult to see how sanctions could be avoided against a transgressor and “if we go in for the collective maintenance of peace, it is no good going in for it [first] unless we are prepared to fight in will and also in material. Nothing could be a worse guarantee to the world or a more cruel deception of our own people than to say, we will guarantee peace by arms, but not be ready for information [it]. There is no doubt that if we are going to enforce a collective guarantee or collective sanction, it means we have to make this country a great deal stronger than she is today.”
Baldwin then referred to his recent pronouncement on air policy (despatch No. 566, March 1624) and stated that the required preliminary work to strengthen the air force was being done so that no time should be lost if his pledge had to be implemented.
- For discussions at the General Disarmament Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, ibid., 1928, vol. i, p. 153.↩
- See telegram No. 644, May 19, 1933, 11 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, ibid., 1933, vol. i, p. 154.↩
- Stanley A. Baldwin, British Lord President of the Council.↩
- Not printed.↩