Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/6685

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

No. 686

London, May 7, 1934.
[Received May 16.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegraphic instruction No. 176, May 2, 4 p.m., asking for an analysis of the British Government’s attitude and action with regard to the Japanese statement on April 17th.

Before discussing the motivating forces formulating the British attitude on this question it seems desirable, even at the risk of repeating to some extent information previously reported by telegram, to summarize chronologically the events subsequent to April 17th.

The first mention of the Japanese statement appeared in the London press on April 19th, and I saw the Foreign Secretary on April 20th (see my No. 183 [187], April 21, 10 a.m.⁹⁸) who had just received a report from the British Ambassador at Tokyo. Obviously at that time Sir John Simon personally took an apprehensive view of what Japan might have in mind, and he anticipated, once the facts were established, an early exchange of views with the United States Government. I cannot but feel that Sir John Simon’s personal attitude as expressed to me underwent considerable modification by the time he made his statement in the House of Commons (my No. 190, April 23, 4 p.m.), since in this statement he took pains to emphasize that the British Government had already made “a friendly inquiry” at Tokyo (which instruction to the British Ambassador in fact had only been drawn up on the previous evening) with the object of “clarifying certain aspects” of the Japanese statement; and in response to questions addressed to him regarding cooperation with the United States he was obviously anxious to avoid making any definite answer.

The statements of the Japanese Ambassador at Washington were reported in the press here, as also were the remarks of the Japanese Consul General at Geneva and the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. Ambassador Nagai’s assertions were particularly scrutinized in an attempt to estimate whether in fact Japanese and German officialdom, both outside the League of Nations, were in any accord. It may also be well to point out that in general the press carried very full reports of the United States attitude towards this policy of Japan, particular reference being made to the gravity with which it was viewed in Washington.

While naturally press despatches from abroad were much featured in the daily newspapers, the London Foreign Office, through its spokesman, was consistently pointing out that until Japan’s intentions were definitely ascertained, and until it was determined how far, if at all, Great Britain was affected, it would be a mistake to assume that this statement of policy was as serious as a first casual reading might indicate. Consequently there was rather limited editorial comment, and it was not until April 26th that the Times published its first editorial reviewing the situation to date. This editorial started off with the sentence: “The latest developments at Tokyo suggest that to condemn Japanese policy towards China unheard is just as premature as to applaud it.” But it is the last paragraph which is of particular interest, in that it pointed to the prosperous British colony of Hong Kong and to the extent of British investments in Shanghai (which the Secretary of the China Society in London later stated were even underestimated in that editorial, for while “the Japanese population[”] (in Shanghai) “exceeds the British, the total of British capital invested there, as shown by a recent investigation of a neutral economist of repute, is three times as large as that of Japanese capital. Moreover, as Shanghai does more than half China’s foreign import trade, and the value of the British exports to China (excluding Manchuria) last year exceeded Japan’s, there is ground for claiming that commercially also our interests in the port are larger than her’s.”)

On April 30th the Times also carried the text of a statement telegraphed by its correspondent in Tokyo as the only version of the official spokesman’s oral statement of April 17th for which responsibility was accepted by the Tokyo Foreign Office. The text is as follows:⁹⁹

“Japan has no wish to infringe the independent interests or prosperity of China. As regards Manchukuo, we ask the other Powers to recognize the fair and free actions of that country. Neither in Manchukuo nor in China have we any territorial ambitions. Japan is geographically in the position to share in trade profits if China is united and developed, but the unification and prosperity of China must be attained by her own awakening, not by the selfish exploitation of other Powers.

“We have no intention to interfere with the interests of third parties. If other Powers engage in trade with China for the benefit of China we welcome it. We have no desire to deviate from the policy of the open door and equal opportunity, or to infringe treaties, but Japan objects to any action whatsoever by other Powers that may lead to disturbance of peace and order in East Asia. Japan bears the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia with other Asiatic Powers, particularly China. The time has passed when other Powers or the League can exercise their policies only for the exploitation of China.”

The press on April 30th carried in general a long report of the American position, intimating that President Roosevelt himself took’ a serious view of the situation. That afternoon Sir John Simon made his second statement in the House of Commons, the text of which was contained in my telegram No. 230 [213] April 30, 3 [5] p.m. Editorial opinion subsequent to the Foreign Secretary’s statement of April 30th was forwarded in the Embassy’s despatch No. 675, May 2, 1934,¹ which pointed out that the general tone of the responsible daily press (likewise prevalent in conversations) was an attempt to whitewash the intent of Japanese policy because of the alleged satisfactory assurances that have been received in reply to inquiries made at Tokyo and especially because of specific assurances that in any event Japanese policy was not directed against Great Britain. A contrary view is expressed in the Economist of May 5th (copy attached).¹ An Evening Standard cartoon (copy attached)¹ is also an unconscious endorsement of this contrary point of view.

Sir John Simon’s statement to the House of Commons on April 30th contained the reference which gave rise to question 3 in the Department’s telegraphic instruction No. 176, May 2, 4 p.m. When a written question is asked of the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons it is submitted to the geographical department of the Foreign Office to frame a reply in the first instance. The present head of the Far Eastern Department, Mr. Orde, is away on leave and his assistant apparently drafted the reply Simon made (my No. 213, April 30, 5 p.m.). Since then the Chinese Legation and the press have been closely questioning the Foreign Office as to the particular significance of the phrase. In every case it has been pointed out that the phraseology had no hidden meaning and was intended merely to describe certain rights and concessions which Japan enjoyed and were not shared by other Powers, as, for instance, Japanese concessions in Hankow and Tientsin and certain policing rights with railways (i. e., the South Manchuria Railway was tentatively mentioned on one occasion; on another occasion the Kiukian Railway). When the Acting Chief of the Far Eastern Department was asked by a member of my staff about this particular phrase he was obviously pervious on this point and conveyed the impression that he had in truth framed the draft reply for Sir John Simon to read in the House of Commons. “Obviously the phrase was an unfortunate one, but not intended to cover any special significance, for”, said this Acting Chief, “Great Britain has certain rights in China that are not shared by other countries, as we know France has, etc., and we wanted merely to make clear that whatever Japan had in this category of rights were also excepted.”

The above, I believe, is the correct interpretation of this phrase and, in my opinion, no particular significance should be attached to it.

In presenting this chronological diary of official statements and press reports on the Japanese statement I venture also to set forth certain points of view that have been expressed repeatedly as considerations the Government had in mind in reaching its determination of policy.

The two compelling problems before the British Government are, first, the uncertainty of the European situation, particularly as regards the rearmament of Germany and the general breakdown of disarmament negotiations; secondly, the necessity of fostering Great Britain’s progress to economic and financial recovery. The first problem needs no elaboration. The requirements of the second problem, which are equally evident, were authoritatively explained in the budget speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in which he took pains to point out that, whereas the first impetus to increased British trade had come from the home market, further recovery depended entirely on the improvement of world conditions and world trade (and it so happened that this speech announcing reductions in the British income tax and remissions in the emergency cuts of 1931 was made on the very day the Japanese spokesman made his initial statement in Tokyo). The export of cotton and woolen textiles is not the least important part of British foreign trade, and the problem of Japanese competition in this and other fields has for some months been receiving the serious attention of the Cabinet, as has been reported by this Embassy in earlier despatches. There is no doubt that the Cabinet, at the moment of formulating its position on the Japanese statement, had clearly in mind the fact that there would be announced shortly a scheme of colonial import quota restrictions directed in the main against Japanese goods. In view of the Empire’s favorable balance of trade with Japan, such a policy would defeat its object if the moderate amount of support which can be given Lancashire by drastic action in the Empire would create deep trade hostility or provoke open or disguised Japanese retaliation. For, in the last analysis, the market for British textiles, as is the case with most British exports, is the world, not the colonial market. So it follows that in determining its attitude at the present time the British Government was not inclined to consider any immediate policy to add political fuel to the conflagration shortly to be augmented by the arbitrary restriction of Japanese imports into British colonial possessions, (See my despatch of today’s date).²

Therefore, except in the fact of a direct and pressing menace to the Empire in the Far East, and in view of other considerations enumerated previously, it is unquestionably the British view that the present is not the propitious moment to press the Japanese question, especially since it is reasoned that the United States and Russia will adopt such an attitude at the present time as to defer a crisis.

Then, too, there has been an element in this country traditionally friendly to Japan which has for some time pointed out that a strong China in the Far East was not necessarily a favorable factor to England, since Chinese nationalism has bred British boycotts, the Shanghai situation of 1930 [1925?], agitation for the abolition of extraterritoriality and concessions resultant, for instance, in the recession of Weihaiwei and the demand for the renunciation of Hong Kong. This British element with Far Eastern interests is opposed to antagonizing the Japanese politically for the following reasons:

(1) Such a policy would cause Japanese retaliation against British trade, not only in Japan, but also in China, since the Japanese would certainly institute more or less effective propaganda and indirect controls against British-Chinese trade.

(2) Such a policy, which would tend to strengthen the militarist element in Japan, might lead to an issue at a time when the Singapore Base, as revealed in the Admiralty conference of last autumn, is almost two years from completion.

(3) Should England eventually decide upon a policy of resistance to Japan it must be calculated upon cooperation with the United States which will not be truly effective unless the public will of the United States is back of the Government in a policy of aggressive resistance. Such an exchange of notes as Mr. Hull and Mr. Hirota recently completed and the withdrawal of the American fleet from the Pacific are both cited as instances that the American Government wants to play down the Japanese situation.

Paradoxically, the conclusions of this group are tacitly reinforced by the attitude of the strong antiwar element in this country. This group is entirely dissatisfied with the Government’s Japanese policy and with its supine acceptance of Japanese explanations. But while it is in principle opposed to the use or threat of force, in such a case, to suppress aggression it is somewhat at sea in this situation since its former panacea in such circumstances, the League of Nations, seems to offer no solution in the present crisis, as it was unable to enforce its will in the Manchurian situation.

These, then, are arguments which have been given consideration in determining policy here, obtained incidentally in conversations with high Government officials (other than those reported in my No. 196, April 24, 8 p.m., and my No. 200, April 25, 6 p.m., together with the memorandum forwarded by letter dated April 24, 1934, to Mr. Hornbeck³). I venture also to outline a little more fully than in my telegram No. 228, May 7, 11 a.m., to Mr. Norman Davis,⁴ the very definite conclusions I have reached regarding British policy.

The British Government has made up its mind to run no risk so far as the Far Eastern situation is concerned at this time and to concentrate all its efforts in trying to keep peace in Europe and to rehabilitate its economic life. England considers that the seriousness with which the Japanese statement of policy of April 17th was viewed in the United States, in Russia and in China is sufficient to deter Japan from taking any provocative action at the present time; that for the moment no threat to the British Empire lies in the Far Eastern situation, nor is Japan likely to provoke a war in the Far East unless Germany precipitates a war in Europe. For the time being England will endeavor to refrain from any provocative action vis-à-vis Japan (which purely economic considerations do not demand) which would tend to increase tension in the Far East or more particularly between Japan and England. For this reason, although until the Japanese statement of April 17th the British Government was prepared to join with the United States Government in exploratory conversations for the forthcoming naval conference, this policy is now under review by a special Cabinet Council and no decision has as yet been reached. This accounts for the recommendation in my telegram to Mr. Norman Davis (No. 228) that no further inquiries be made of the British Government regarding Anglo-American naval conversations until the outcome of the British Cabinet’s decisions is known.

I have learned from usually well informed sources that it has even been suggested in the present Cabinet Council discussions that this was not a particularly happy moment, from a purely British viewpoint, for a renewal of the London Naval Treaty discussions, provided in these discussions England would attempt to maintain parity with the American navy and by Anglo-American cooperation to force Japan into the maintenance of an inferior position she was not willing to accept. Predicated on the fact that the American navy would never be used against Great Britain, it was a question for study whether England would not do better to consider her requirements vis-à-vis her European neighbors, the defence of her sea routes, and especially her Far Eastern requirements, outside the compromise of a possibly unsatisfactory future naval treaty.

From the long term point of view, I am certain the British are under no illusions as to the objective of Japanese policy in regard to China from the twenty-one demands of 1915 to date; that this policy will not be carried forward aggressively whenever world indifference or world disturbances permit. The English realize that ultimately this situation will have to be met, preferably side by side with the United States; but for the present, with the uncertain conditions in Europe, and economic adjustments to be made at home, they do not want to jeopardize the Far Eastern status quo or England’s comparatively advantageous position in China by any appearance of such Anglo-American cooperation, coercion or preparedness as would put Japan back again in the hands of her militarists and force an issue thereby, which for the time being the British Empire does not want to meet.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Ray Atherton

Counselor of Embassy

98. See also telegram No. 188, April 21, 11 a.m., p. 122.
99. For other versions of the Amau statement, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 224 and 229.
1. Not printed.
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2. No. 693, May 7; not printed.
3. Latter not printed, but see reply dated May 29, p. 196.
4. Not printed.