500.A15A4 General Committee/959: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)
425. Your No. 859, June 1, 10 p.m.
(1) International agreement upon an ideal and entirely effective method of dealing with the evils arising from the private manufacture of arms and the international traffic therein is obviously unattainable at this time. Therefore, we should concentrate our efforts upon the elaboration of a program on which a substantial measure of international agreement can probably be secured, and upon urging agreement on this program. In the light of the debates in the Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and the Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War and of recent developments at Geneva, it would appear that the program outlined below is probably the maximum attainable at this time. Its adoption would be [Page 103] a tremendous step in the right direction and would lay a foundation for international agreement upon more drastic measures in the future.
The incorporation of provisions dealing with this matter in a General Disarmament Convention would be, of course, infinitely preferable. A convention dealing exclusively with manufacture of and traffic in arms should be considered an expedient to be adopted only in case a General Disarmament Convention becomes manifestly unattainable at this time. The details of the provisions dealing with this matter would be different in the one case from what they would be in the other. But I see no reason why the underlying principles and the general system of supervision and control established should not be the same in both cases. This Government is prepared to go just as far in dealing with this matter in a separate convention as it would be prepared to go in dealing with it in provisions incorporated in a General Disarmament Convention.
Pending the negotiation of a new and more satisfactory convention, every effort should be made to secure ratification by as many governments as possible of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925.1
(2) In the present situation a revision of the proposed Draft Convention with regard to the Supervision of the Private Manufacture and Publicity of the Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition and Implements of War of 1929 would appear to be the most practical method of dealing with questions of manufacture. This Government has withdrawn2 its former objection on constitutional grounds to a Convention obligating it to establish national supervision of arms manufacture. The essential provisions of that Convention, viz:—the licensing of all manufactures of all categories of arms, munitions and implements of war by each of the contracting parties within its own jurisdiction, and the publication by an international body of all licenses and of full information in regard to the quantities of the various articles manufactured thereunder, and of the disposition thereof—should be retained. The same system should be established for manufacture by the state as for private manufacture. Automatic and continuous inspection under the direction of an international body should be provided for. This inspection should relate to the concordance between licenses issued and the operations carried on thereunder, the accuracy of reports of arms manufacturers and the quantities of the various categories of arms, munitions and implements of war manufactured or in process of manufacture. It should not, however, extend to the methods and processes of manufacture. Should [Page 104] the provisions dealing with this matter be incorporated in a General Disarmament Convention containing provisions prohibiting certain types of weapons or limiting the quantities of certain types in the possession of the several contracting parties, the inspection should extend also to the verification of the carrying out of these provisions.
(3) The most practical method of dealing with the questions arising from the international traffic in arms would appear to be the strengthening of the provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 and their coordination with the provisions relating to manufacture. The essential principles of that Convention should be retained: (a) the prohibition of sales other than sales to governments or to public authorities acting with the consent of governments; (b) the issuance of licenses by the several contracting parties, each within its own jurisdiction, to cover each shipment exported or imported; and (c) publication by an international body of all licenses issued with full information in regard to the origin and destination of all shipments thereunder.
This Government has no interest in Chapter III of the Convention establishing Special Zones. If such provisions must be retained in the interest of other Powers, they might well be modified to meet as far as possible the objections of the governments of those countries which are included in or adjacent to such zones.
(4) Such a system of supervision and control as is outlined above under (2) and (3) would admit of considerable variation in the domestic legislation of the several contracting parties. In carrying out the obligations under such a Convention, governments could if they desired impose supervision and control more far reaching than that which they were obligated to impose. This Government would be disposed to recommend such legislation.
- Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925, Foreign Relations, 1925, vol. i, p. 61. For correspondence concerning efforts to secure ratification of this treaty by the United States, see pp. 449 ff.↩
- See paragraph (1) of telegram No. 357, June 17, 1933, to the Chairman of the American delegation, Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, p. 196.↩