500.A15A4 Steering Committee/400: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:50 p.m.]
17. 1. Wilson has seen Henderson and Eden. Henderson explained that the officers of the Conference meeting in London on February 13th had to adopt one of two alternatives: (a) a decision that no useful work could now be carried on. In this event a meeting of the Bureau will be called immediately and the Bureau will be asked to take a decision as to whether it desires to close the Conference, or to adjourn for a further period and if so what period; (b) that work could usefully be prosecuted. In this event the Bureau would be summoned for February 20th. Henderson stated that if it appeared probable that the officers would adopt decision (b) he would communicate with Wilson as far in advance as possible in order that Mr. Davis could be notified in sufficient time to arrive if he felt it advisable.
Henderson stated that the negotiations held out some hope but that he was definitely under the impression that the time was ripe for a vigorous effort to find common ground between the French and Germans. He believed that this could only be done by Great Britain and the United States acting together, perhaps with cooperation from Italy. Henderson felt confident that the Government officers would urge such a course on us. I need not enter here into what Wilson said as the matter is covered in conversations with Eden reported later.
2. Strang35 in the Foreign Office showed us the full correspondence between France and Germany on the one hand, and Great Britain and Germany on the other. These included the two German memoranda to France and Great Britain of January 19th. Inasmuch as we only read the notes and did not have copies I do not attempt from memory to summarize them, especially since Marriner36 has already telegraphed his 48, January 23, 1 p.m. Briefly put, Wilson feels that there is some approach between the French and Germans, the French [Page 12] being less definite in their demand for “a trial period” and furthering destruction in the early stages (des les premières années) of 50 percent of their military air force, however, the Germans on the other hand show a willingness to bargain which it may be possible to take advantage of.
3. Eden talked very freely and very confidentially, explaining that in spite of two Cabinet meetings a decision as to next step was not yet definitely reached, and that therefore he was merely “thinking aloud” to give us an idea of what was in his mind and to get the benefit of our criticism. Eden states that since the German note asked the opinion of His Majesty’s Government on certain points unquestionably the note must be answered. How shall it be answered? Either, (1), a further exchange of confidential notes giving the British point of view and without further discussions, or, (2), an explanation of the British view accompanied by definite proposals to both Germans and French, proposals based on the British draft convention37 and drawn up in the light of the fuller information now available through exchange of memoranda. Eden himself strongly favors the second of the two alternatives, as I feel, does the British Cabinet. If the second course is adopted Eden would desire to, either he or Simon, or both, go to see Hitler with the note in his pocket, both to create as friendly a reception for it as possible and to elucidate it further if necessary, France to be informed of a review of the note at the same time as Hitler.
Eden had hoped that Wilson would stay long enough to go over the draft of the reply (which Eden thinks must be sent promptly) before it was put in final form but Wilson, who felt that such a procedure on his part would be of doubtful wisdom at the present time, informed Eden that he felt he must proceed to his post. Eden was very anxious that the American Government should, if possible, state to the Germans at least that they considered the British offer a hopeful basis of accord. We told him that our principal preoccupation at the present time, when matters of primarily European concern were under discussion, was to avoid the appearance of pressure upon either side and that we feared that to diminish [give?] such an expression of opinion might have the appearance of pressure. It was understood in any case that as soon as the note had been prepared and before its publication or presentation to Germany Eden would transmit it to Wilson who would forward it to Washington for any action or no action, as our Government might think wise. Eden also hopes to get the cooperation of Mussolini in such action as he contemplates. The rest of the conversation was taken up with discussion of details which [Page 13] are in such fluid state that no useful purpose would be served in reporting them.
4. Thus Eden’s conversation bore out the expectation which had been expressed by Henderson. Wilson and I both feel that whatever you may think it wise to do regarding the proposed British reply to Germany, we should take no share in its preparation, even confidentially, since a share in the preparation clearly means a share in the responsibility. Further steps, if any, can be determined after perusal of draft note.
5. An impression which I had held, and which Wilson shares since he has been conversant with events of the last few days, was confirmed in our conversation with Eden, namely: that there are inherent in the present Austrian crises38 dangers which may develop to an extent where interest in disarmament will be secondary, and where disarmament activities will be held in abeyance at least until the meeting of the officers of the Conference on February 13th.
6. Wilson proceeds Paris tomorrow, arrives Geneva 30th.
Copies Paris, Geneva.
- William Strang, Counselor in the British Foreign Office.↩
- J. Theodore Marriner, Counselor of Embassy in France; the telegram referred to was signed by the Ambassador.↩
- Conference Documents, vol. ii, p. 476.↩
- For correspondence, see vol. ii, pp. 1 ff.↩