500.A15A4 General Committee/944: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:19 p.m.]
866. 1. I have been too overwhelmed during the past few days to answer adequately your 418, May 30, noon. I entirely agree that the crux of the problem is the resumption of German participation in disarmament negotiations under the auspices of the Conference. The discrepancy between the proposal in my speech and my subsequent telegram is more apparent than real in that the proposal in my speech was followed by the statement that in taking the draft convention as a basis “we may of course have due regard for subsequent contributions that may have been made towards agreement”. By this I had in mind particularly three documents—the French note to Germany of January 1st84 which Barthou has just stated they stand by and are ready to use as a basis for negotiations, the British memorandum of January 29th,85 and particularly the German note of April 16th to the British.86 I emphasize particularly the last in that while it still presents difficulties it clears up the apparently insoluble question of what to do with the regulation of military organizations.
2. As the result of innumerable discussions since the suggestion advanced by me in my speech it becomes clearer that the differences between France, England, and Germany have been considerably reduced as a result of these three communications and that the principal outstanding technical difficulty now is with regard to aviation.
3. The indications are now that the General Commission will adjourn next week, perhaps Wednesday, giving instructions to the [Page 96] Bureau or to a committee to be designated by it. The question under consideration now is the type of instructions.
4. The meeting yesterday of the General Commission made it evident that all of Central and Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of Germany and Poland, are desirous of laying emphasis on security problems.87 It will be the task of those nations that desire to lay special emphasis on disarmament rather than security to find the way to insert in the mandate to the Bureau such instructions as will keep disarmament on an equal if not superior plane with security and do this by approaching the vital matter of German cooperation.
5. An idea has been developing that this might perhaps be accomplished as follows: the General Commission might instruct the Bureau that since the divergence between the various points of view in the documents mentioned is not profound it is hoped that the Bureau or a committee of powers appointed by the Bureau by taking these three documents will be able to reconcile the differences and work out a compromise. At the same time the Commission will instruct the Bureau or committee to invite any power to participate which they judge necessary or useful. The first power of course which would occur to them would be Germany.
6. While the British are still sore Eden told Henderson, Wilson, and myself today that the British would favor such an effort and program but he preferred to have Henderson undertake it rather than a committee. He said, however, that in any event their acquiescence would depend upon prompt action to ascertain whether Germany could be brought into the negotiations and whether any effective progress could be made towards agreement. He reiterated in substance what Simon said yesterday, namely, that they do not intend to sit idly by while Germany continues to rearm and while France continues to arrange her combinations and alliances as a condition precedent to any disarmament agreement and as a protection in case of non-agreement.
7. As it will probably be necessary to take a position along these lines at the Bureau meeting Monday afternoon I would appreciate an early reply in the event that you see any objection to my proceeding along these lines if circumstances seem to make it advisable.
8. Schwartz, a German who is here as unofficial informant of Colonel Haselmeyer, told me today that Germany would be agreeable to resuming her participation provided some method can be devised which would make it politically feasible. He in fact told me that in a telephone conversation with Haselmeyer yesterday the latter told him they would like very much to have me come to Berlin as they were satisfied this would make it possible to arrange something. I told [Page 97] Schwartz that would be impossible as Germany was not in the Conference. I told him also that it was not fair to him or to me for negotiations to be carried on between an unofficial German and myself but that I would be glad to see anyone Germany wished to send officially to see me.
9. The present situation of the Conference is too fluid to permit of prediction. A certain group will press for the Turkish resolution88 which was introduced yesterday and which was prepared with the active collaboration of Barthou. On the other hand, if a resolution is introduced and supported by the British and ourselves and the “neutral” countries89 it would make it difficult for either Germany or France to refuse to go along.
10. There is much informed opinion here to the effect that just as the French have been using the League to support the Versailles Treaty status so they in conjunction with Russia, the Little Entente and Turkey wish to use the Conference as a cloak under which they could complete their arrangements which will either result in an Eastern Locarno which would then permit a program of disarmament or in default thereof an alliance which would encircle Germany. If this is the case there is no time factor for the French and they will be willing to let the Conference dawdle along while working under its cover to bring Poland into line and complete such arrangements.
11. Litvinoff, whose chief preoccupations now are Japan and Germany, is pressing the French hard for immediate action with regard to the political arrangements indicated. The Russians and some of the French are now openly stating that they have no objection to the British disassociating themselves now as they are only in their way and that they would like to have the Conference adjourn until October and then reconvene when they will be all ready. For the British the time factor is imperative because of their own armament situation. Furthermore, they look upon such political moves as dangerous to the peace of Europe and as undermining their own position in Europe.