500.A14/690
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Persian Minister called and stated that he had received a communication from his government about the Senate reservation to the Small Arms Treaty referring to the jurisdiction over the Persian Gulf as it affects Persia and England. This was presumably inspired by the transmission to the American Minister to Persia of a copy of my reprimand31 of the Persian Minister in Washington on account of his going over the head of the State Department and endeavoring to secure a Senate reservation [by personal contact with Senators King and Pittman, particularly the former.]32 The Minister said that his Government regretted the incident and at the same time it was obliged to feel appreciative of what had been done by the Senate with respect to the adoption of the reservation, to the effect that the ratification of the Small Arms Treaty should not be construed as affecting any rights [Page 470] that Persia might have in and to the waters of the Persian Gulf, etc. He said that his government desired very earnestly to urge that the President ratify this Treaty with the Senate reservation intact. This he repeated many times, stating in each instance that this Treaty without reservations would unquestionably infringe upon the rights of Persia in the Persian Gulf; that it was not possible to ratify the Treaty without a reservation without at the same time dealing with the jurisdiction of Persia over the Gulf and settling the matter on its merits against Persia.
I replied that I would first repeat my condemnation and that of my Government of the tactics of the Minister in going over the head of the State Department as aforesaid; that such action was unjustifiable, and, from my viewpoint, inexcusable; that it only confuses the situation, especially in this instance, without getting any results, to say nothing of the bad taste on the part of the Minister in pursuing such tactics.
I then stated that the different notes I sent the Minister and his government fully explained the attitude of the United States Government then and now; that our paramount purpose was to promote small arms reduction by cooperating in the ratification of the Treaty of 1925; that it was not our purpose to take any part between his government and any other government with respect to individual controversies; that we proposed to ratify the Small Arms Treaty without reservation, and, as my different notes assured the Minister and the Persian Government, if, by any possibility or any particular construction, any error or mistake should reveal itself, my government would be ready in a separate meeting or conference or proceeding to take any and all steps necessary to do justice in the matter. I added that this was still the attitude of my government. I stated that the President would naturally go over the entire record in determining whether he would or would not ratify the Treaty with the Senate amendment; and that it would then remain to be seen whether, in the event the Treaty should be passed on to the French Government as the depository, other governments would be circularized and what would be their action.
The Minister of course insisted that the Treaty should be killed, for the reason that it undertakes to settle in England’s favor by implication at least more or less of the claims of Persia to jurisdiction over the Persian Gulf and its islands.
I again repeated to him the position of this government and declined to indicate to him that I would recommend to the President anything in the least different from the position the State Department has occupied in this matter from the beginning.