500.A15A5/353: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 28—8:15 p.m.]
87. 1. Admiral Standley had the following conversation with Yamamoto who called on him early this afternoon:
(a) Yamamoto said that the Japanese Government had instructed its delegation here to notify the British that Japan could not accept the British suggestion as to building programs and that it must not vary essentially from the principles which were put forward by Japan at the opening of the present conversations. He also said that his Government favored a reduction in the building programs rather than an increase.
Yamamoto said that he felt no useful purpose could be served by continuing the conversations further at this time and that he had requested instructions to return home and thought he might leave London on or about January 15th.
(b)Yamamoto then asked Admiral Standley how the United States would respond to a proposal to postpone for a period which he did not specify the replacement of capital ships, coupled with a satisfactory understanding in regard to destroyers and submarines. Admiral Standley replied that he could not express an opinion now but that if Japan made such a proposal he was certain that the United States would give it careful thought.
(c) He then asked Admiral Standley’s opinion on the question of reduction in number of battleships, to which Admiral Standley replied that we had proposed practically a 20 percent reduction in all categories and that this would mean 12 battleships for the United States which was a reduction in numbers but that this proposition was opposed by the British.
We believe that Yamamoto probably sounded out Standley on his own initiative with a view to the possibility of formulating a plan for presentation by the Japanese Government to extend limitation in certain naval categories for a further period of time.
2. Later in the afternoon Craigie called to inform me of the talk he and Admiral Chatfield had had today with the Japanese. He confirmed substantially what Yamamoto had said to Standley. He said, however, that when they pressed the Japanese for a definite answer as to whether or not the Japanese Government had rejected the British suggestions they replied that they had neither rejected nor accepted them but would like to discuss reductions. The British told the Japanese categorically that they must reject the Japanese proposal for a common upper limit, that, while they were willing to discuss building programs which for a period of 6 years would maintain the present relative strength, they could not make the reductions [Page 405] which the Japanese would like, and that the Japanese must consider seriously the political situation that would result from a failure to get agreement. Matsudaira and Yamamoto both said that they realized the seriousness of this and thought it advisable that Yamamoto return home to talk the situation over with their Government. They were still of the opinion that an agreement could be worked out in accordance with the British suggestions. The British concurred in the advisability of Yamamoto going but Craigie told me the Japanese expressed some doubt as to whether their Government would authorize it. Craigie said they are still confident the Japanese will ultimately come around but that it is necessary to exercise patience.