500.A15A5/330: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 13—3:49 p.m.]
72. Your 50, December 12, 1 p.m. I think my 70, December 12, 10 p.m. will have answered paragraphs 1 and 2.
As regards paragraph 3 I pointed out to Craigie that the formula they were discussing was not consistent with our previous understanding that any building programs to be acceptable should be contractual. He said that was partially true but insisted that they were achieving the same results in practice through a contractual undertaking for previous consultation and for 12 months’ notice, a provision which would constitute a satisfactory substitute for the present escalator clause. At any rate he said we were not being asked to agree to this now, that it would be a question for future consideration, although so far as the British were concerned, they felt there were certain advantages in such a proposal quite aside from attempting to find a face saving formula.
As regards your fourth paragraph I told Craigie I did not know whether we would feel justified in discussing our 1937–1942 naval [Page 399] program and that we would certainly not be willing to present it even tentatively until we knew the character of the Japanese program. He replied that he would not expect us to do so.
As to your paragraph 5 I fully agree with you as to the inadvisability of introducing any new element into the conversations at the present time such as entering upon a discussion of the technical differences of opinion between the British and ourselves.
This morning’s Times in an obviously inspired article on the future of the naval talks contains the following passage.
“The American delegation consider that the Washington Treaty gave all its signatories equality of security. Great Britain agrees with this view but would like if possible to meet in some way the Japanese objection to being classified in a lower category…”40
- Omission indicated in the original.↩