[Subenclosure]
secret
Note on Cruiser Tonnage
I. Possible decrease in total
tonnage under method proposed by Great Britain
Put very shortly the American desiderata
are stated to be (a) a reduction of 20
per cent, on the tonnage levels of existing naval treaties or
(b) failing that, the maintenance of
existing treaty levels. Similarly, the statement of British
requirements put forward in the recent conversations, by reason
of the limitations on the unit size of vessels and the abolition
of the submarine which it suggests, would, if adopted in its
entirety, permit of a decrease of 10 per cent, on the tonnages
provided for under existing treaties. Had the British
representatives, paying no regard to the requirements of the
United States, put forward a statement of the full qualitative
reductions which Great Britain is prepared to advocate, they
would have been able to propose an ultimate decrease of 22 per
cent, on existing treaty tonnages. Any suggestion therefore that
the United States stands in general for naval reductions while
Great Britain stands in general for naval increases would be
incorrect and misleading, particularly when it is remembered
that all naval Powers other than the United States are prepared
to agree to considerable reductions in the unit size of most
categories of ships. Both countries are, in fact, prepared for
reductions, but unfortunately only by methods which, for vital
strategical reasons, would be unacceptable to the other. It is
felt therefore that the only hope of reaching a solution
satisfactory to both Powers is to approach this question from a
strictly practical point of view, each country recognising the
special difficulties and the strategical problems with which the
other is faced and attempting to reach an understanding based
upon the political situation as it exists to-day. In such
circumstances there seems no reason why the resulting treaty
should show more than a slight increase in the under-age tonnage
for all categories, which would be a small price to pay for the
resultant political appeasement and the prevention of
unrestricted naval competition. Naval limitation cannot be said
to serve its full purpose if it leaves behind it a genuine sense
of insecurity on the part of one or other of the signatories of
the treaty.
II. Relative sizes of British
and other cruisers
It has been suggested that, because in the London Naval
Treaty28 Great
Britain agreed to the United States having 18 8” gun cruisers
[Page 301]
to 15 British 8”
gun cruisers (the difference being made good by a larger 6” gun
cruiser allowance to Great Britain), Great Britain is prepared
to agree in principle to construct cruisers for trade protection
purposes of a smaller displacement than those which are being
constructed by other Powers. This is quite incorrect. The
arrangement referred to affected the British and United States
cruiser strengths only and, as has frequently been stated, a
settlement of this cruiser difficulty would be simple enough
were it one between the two countries only and were it not that
the minimum size of cruiser acceptable to the United States
regulates automatically the average size of cruiser to be
constructed by other Powers. There has never been any question
of Great Britain agreeing to construct cruisers which, when
placed upon the trade routes in isolated positions would, ship
for ship, be outclassed by the cruisers of a potential
adversary. Nor is it believed that the United States would wish
to urge upon Great Britain the adoption of such a course.
III. Why cruiser tonnage
figures must automatically increase independently of
increase in number of British cruisers
If Great Britain was able in the London Naval Treaty to agree to
the exceptionally low total cruiser tonnage figure of 339,000
tons this was because:
- (a)
- the figure was calculated on a basis of 50
cruisers;
- (b)
- it was hoped and believed that no other Power would
build large 6” gun cruisers of 9,000 or 10,000 tons
displacement, and that, in consequence, no such cruisers
would be required by Great Britain, which has indeed
since 1930 led the way with smaller ships of Leander class;
- (c)
- the international outlook permitted a steady
replacement programme of about 3 ships a year, so that
during the period of the treaty the small type of
cruisers averaging 4,000 to 5,000 tons and designed for
North Sea warfare would still be retained in
considerable numbers.
(b) and (c) no
longer apply, so that even if the future cruiser figure for
Great Britain were to be based on the number of 50 cruisers, it
would have to be considerably larger than 339,000 tons. Great
Britain cannot be expected to replace her existing small wartime
cruisers by ships which will be outclassed from the start by
those in other navies, nor is it believed that such a course is
seriously suggested by the United States. From this it follows
that there must be an automatic increase, without any increase
in the number of 50 cruisers, from a tonnage of 339,000 tons to
408,600 tons, which is arrived at as follows:—
[Page 302]
| 15 |
8” gun cruisers |
146,800 |
|
| 10 |
‘M’ class 6” gun cruisers |
95,000 |
|
| 8 |
Leanders (7,030 to 7,250
tons) |
57,000 |
|
| 12 |
new 7,000 tons |
84,000 |
|
| 4 |
Arethusas (5,200 tons) |
20,800 |
|
| 1 |
new 5,000 tons |
5,000 |
|
| 50 |
|
408,600 |
tons. |
It will be seen that this figure of 408,600 tons for 50 cruisers
is based on the general acceptance of a future limitation of
7,000 tons beyond a specified number of large 6” gun cruisers.
If this limitation of 7,000 tons could not be accepted by other
Powers, and the limit remained as at present at 10,000 tons,
then the automatic increase of the London Naval Treaty figure
would bring the British figure up to 438,600 (in a period of 10
years). In estimating the total tonnage increase consequent on
the increased number of cruisers that we require, the figure of
408,600 tons—not the London Naval Treaty figure 339,000
tons—should in all fairness be taken as the point of
departure.
IV. Why an increase in the
number of British cruisers is necessary
In the London Naval Treaty Great Britain accepted a cruiser
tonnage figure based on the tonnage of 50 cruisers for the
following reasons:
- (a)
- The Treaty was for 6 years only, and under the
international conditions existing at that time there was
a reasonable assurance that there would be more than 6
years of peace.
- (b)
- It was accepted, subject to the Powers other than the
three signatories to Part III of the London Naval Treaty
agreeing to corresponding reductions. This has not
occurred; on the contrary the Naval Forces in Europe
have greatly increased. If the “escalator” clause has
not been invoked, this has not been because the building
of other naval Powers did not justify such a step but
because it was thought better to await the meeting of
the 1935 Conference to explain the grounds on which the
cruiser tonnages accepted by Great Britain in 1930 could
no longer hold good.
- (c)
- In 1930 we were on the eve of the summoning of a
general disarmament conference from which much was
hoped.
- (d)
- Owing to the small size and worn out condition of the
14 cruisers that have been, or are being, scrapped since
the London Naval Treaty was signed, it would not have
been possible to keep these ships as efficient cruisers.
Therefore, the number 50 could not in any case have been
increased by December 1936 without departing from a
steady building programme and providing more new
ships.
- (e)
- In the process of the steady reconstruction of the
Fleet after the war, a halt had been called in cruiser
building for some years in the hope of inducing a
corresponding halt in the building of foreign cruisers.
Thus the curve indicating the number of British
under-age cruisers was at its lowest during the period
of the Treaty.
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It is unfortunately the case that, since the London Naval Treaty
was concluded in 1930, a serious deterioration in the
international and political outlook has occurred. Furthermore
there are not present to-day any of the other conditions that
rendered possible the acceptance in 1930 of a cruiser tonnage
figure based on 50 ships. That this figure was an exceptional
one was made clear during the 1930 Conference and by the Prime
Minister and First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons
immediately afterwards. Moreover, an allusion to this fact was
contained in Article 23 of the London Naval Treaty which states,
with reference to the Naval Conference to be held in 1935, that
“none of the provisions of the present Treaty should prejudice
the attitude of any of the High Contracting Parties at the
Conference agreed to.”
