500.A15A/137: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 10—11:55 a.m.]
395. From Norman Davis. Your 287, July 6, 7 p.m. In view of the delay in the arrival of the Japanese representative which alters the situation considerably I had thought it advisable to discontinue as soon as possible the preliminary talks with the British and accordingly made tentative reservations for the delegation to sail on the Washington, July 19th, hoping by that time to reach some more definite understanding with Baldwin with regard to a joint statement. While I am satisfied that the British will welcome a suspension of the conversations with us and that they are desirous of issuing a joint statement the next few days will determine whether they will agree on a statement of common objectives that means very much. I shall of course not consider issuing any statement without previously obtaining your approval.
While the British seemed irritated over the Japanese delay I suspect that upon reflection they will feel that this gives them still more time in which to determine what their policy shall be.
In a talk with Matsudaira yesterday afternoon I told him what Simon had told me about the Japanese plans which he confirmed but [Page 291] with the explanation that he was authorized and prepared to discuss now questions of procedure as set forth in the Japanese acceptance; that he had explained to his Government it would be futile to have such a limited discussion if there is to be any adequate preparation for the Naval Conference and that apparently the Government had finally accepted his views as they informed him last week—and he so informed the Foreign Office here—that they would have in London in October the necessary naval advisors and that he could then proceed to discuss naval questions fully.
I asked him if his Government intended to make an announcement of this fact. He said they had not said anything about that but if we would like to have them do so he would communicate with his Government and was satisfied there would be no objection. I said I first preferred to talk with Simon as I felt this was rather a matter for the British to decide.
He told me personally and confidentially that the Japanese Foreign Office is endeavoring to get the Admiralty to be more moderate and that in his opinion the chief reason for the delay in entering upon a full discussion of naval questions was to have more time for formulating their policy and mollifying the present irreconcilable attitude. He also told me that the new Prime Minister17 shares the views of the Foreign Office as to the importance of avoiding an impasse over the naval question and that he hopes the Prime Minister can in time bring the Admiralty around.
I asked Matsudaira about the report that the Japanese were now sending a junior naval officer to London via Washington in connection with the naval conversations. He told me that all he knew was that Captain Iwashita, a former Naval Attaché and now on the Naval Board, was coming to London to attend the annual meeting of the Japanese Naval Attachés. He would probably go by Washington for a few days, spend 2 or 3 days in London, go to Paris and then return to Japan via Siberia. Matsudaira was satisfied the Japanese Government had not yet decided just what position it would take with regard to fundamental naval questions such as ratios and that for the technical discussions in October they would send higher ranking naval officials.
After Barthou leaves I will see Simon and suggest the desirability of making public the plans of the Japanese.
Please advise where the “later press despatch” referred to in second paragraph of your 287 originated as I have been unable to trace any such story originating here. [Davis.]
- Admiral Keisuke Okada.↩