500.A15A5/116: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27—1:46 p.m.]
363. For President and the Secretary from Norman Davis. Your 269 and 270 of June 26th are very helpful. We are having a meeting in MacDonald’s office at the House of Commons at 3:30 this afternoon which we will report at once.
In the meantime Bingham and I are impressed by the fact that while the British are showing disturbance over our reaction to their technical proposals they are holding strongly to their position. They intimate that we have misconstrued the spirit and intention which animates them and do not fully appreciate the difficulties they are facing. In substance they tell us that in 1930 England and America faced a single problem, namely, the Japanese; whereas today America still faces only this single problem, England now also faces the acute problem of Europe which is relatively academic to the United States. Although they believe that real understanding between the United States, Great Britain is developing in spite of many differences, which in the long run will grow and improve, they feel that our policy in the Pacific is an uncertain factor, increasingly so on account of our withdrawal from the Philippines, and that, therefore, they must, themselves, be prepared for all eventualities. This opinion is predominant in the Baldwin group which is the dominant factor in British politics. They are thus confronted with the problem of dealing with the Japanese alone, for which they want to be prepared but which they do not wish to tackle until the European situation is eased. While they do not definitely say so they intimate that if they cannot count on our cooperation in the Pacific they must be prepared to deal with it alone but that if we could agree upon a policy of cooperation in the Far East—which they would like very much to do—our differences on technical naval questions would automatically solve themselves. They intimate however that public opinion here would not approve of any understanding with us as to such a policy unless it were embodied in an agreement ratified by the Senate.
I believe they would deplore with the utmost frankness the development of any impression that Anglo-American naval conversations were unsatisfactory. In their view it is not practicable to reach a more definite understanding on technical questions now as they must wait until the more imponderable questions clarify themselves to some extent. Some of these imponderables will doubtless be somewhat clarified [Page 280] by the forthcoming bilateral conversations with the French and Japanese, and other imponderables as well as European and especially the German situation will probably diminish between now and next spring. So that even if conversations should shortly cease temporarily, the British desire that they be adjourned on the understanding that we had examined not only the positions of the two Governments as to the date and place of the conference but the conditions under which the two Governments would be prepared to continue the naval treaties. In this manner we not only do not close the door to further discussions but also remove any impression of tension. The British state frankly that, if we fail to reach an agreement with Japan, they feel that the only wise course would be for the two of us to reach a naval agreement which would then automatically facilitate reconcilement of our views with regard to technical naval programs. They think, however, that it would be inadvisable and premature to consider this until such a contingency arises.
We will agree with the British this afternoon as to the lead to give the press. [Davis.]