500.A15A/109: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
352. From Davis. Embassy’s 349, June 22, 7 p.m. The position taken by the British last Thursday in submitting their naval program is so completely different from what they indicated it would be in their conversations with Bingham and me last April, and so unacceptable from our point of view as a basis for a treaty, that we have all come to the conclusion after full consideration that we should tell MacDonald frankly that the possibility of agreement on such a basis as that indicated is so remote, that we feel it would serve no useful purpose to continue further with the discussions on such a basis.
The program which they propose involves such a radical change from the London Treaty—which itself was a compromise arrived at to reconcile our divergent points of view—that we judged we should contemplate American public opinion, which strongly favors a further reduction in naval armaments international agreement, would never stand for a treaty providing for a large increase in the London Treaty limitations and that we would be unwilling to negotiate along such lines. Furthermore if we should agree to open the door so wide for the British it would make an agreement with Japan all the more difficult and give Japan an excuse to press for alteration in ratios.
We think that it would be inadvisable now to counter with any technical proposals of our own as the British are eager to have us do, and [Page 273] that we should take the position that, while there are certain technical modifications we would like to have, we would in general desire a renewal of the London Treaty for 10 to 15 years, preferably with such reductions in individual categories as can be agreed upon. Furthermore we should say that while we would not presume to judge whether they actually require the cruiser tonnage indicated we are concerned about whether a fleet such as they envisage would provide a possible basis for a treaty.
MacDonald had indicated at the meeting on Wednesday [Thursday?]97 that they would explain fully the reasons which had induced them to advance their new program. At the subsequent technical meeting,98 however, they failed to present any real arguments justifying their change of front save to refer to the general “political deterioration” which had taken place. Admiral Little frankly said that their present cruiser figures had always been the Admiralty program and that in 1930 they had been persuaded to accept a limit below 70 cruisers as a temporary measure for a briefer treaty period then was envisaged, in view of the large amount of cruiser tonnage which was due to become over age prior to 1936 and the replacement of which it was desirable to spread over a longer period of years.
Craigie who asked to see me yesterday evidently to ascertain my reaction to their proposals was somewhat disconcerted when I told him that I had not yet sufficiently recovered from the shock to discuss it seriously. He then insisted that we must not consider it either as a definite proposal or as their final position. I told him that two alternatives seemed to lie before us: (1) either a treaty providing for reductions or at most the existing maximum tonnages with no change in ratios; or, (2) no treaty at all and no limitations. In the latter event we would have to consider what to do about the Washington Treaty and the limitations provided therein. He said that we must of course work for a treaty.
It is evident that the Admiralty point of view is at present predominant and that it became so far [as?] a result of the French note of April 1799 terminating diplomatic negotiations on disarmament and the subsequent outburst of Japan with regard to her Far Eastern policy. This confronted the British with two difficult situations with which they did not feel they were in a position to cope if force were required. It is therefore probable that it will take some time for the British to crystallize their future policy which has such a bearing upon the naval question.
[Page 274]Craigie told me in the greatest confidence that there are three alternatives to consider. First, a conciliatory policy towards Japan with a view of insuring against Japanese interference with British interests in the Far East on the assumption that this would enable the British to keep down their naval requirements. This he said, however, was held by a small minority, that it was not shared at all by the Admiralty which is opposed to any concessions to Japan and strongly in favor of the most friendly cooperation with the United States, and that he personally was satisfied that such a policy towards Japan was unwise and would not prevail as it would disrupt the British Empire. The second course would be for them to get an increase in their cruiser tonnage that would enable them to cope with Japan alone if necessary. Or, third, in case Japan refuses [to] make an agreement which is satisfactory to both of us for renewal of the treaty, to have an Anglo-American naval agreement for parity the level of which would be determined by events and that we would in case of necessity consult with regard to same. He hoped therefore that we would continue our discussions on the present frank and friendly basis with the Admiralty because he personally was satisfied that with the right spirit we would be able to reconcile our divergent points of view.
This conversation with Craigie confirms our view that the proper strategy for us is to take a strong stand at the outset and thus face the British Government with the danger of an early break-down of the conversations over their demand for a large increase in cruiser tonnage. While it would be unfortunate if this should result in terminating the conversations, it would be even more unfortunate to pursue them indefinitely and ultimately fail to reach a sufficient understanding to insure subsequent agreement at a [later date?] at least between the British and ourselves. On the other hand, this strategy will leave the door open to a possible eventual reconsideration by the British of their program in the face of our unwillingness to bargain over their extreme demands.
Please advise as soon as possible whether you agree. [Davis.]
- Telegram in two sections.↩
- June 21; see telegram No. 343, June 21, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 266.↩
- See telegram No. 344, June 22, noon, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 267.↩
- Great Britain, Cmd. 4559, Miscellaneous No. 5 (1934): Further Memoranda on Disarmament, February 14 to April 17, 1934, p. 20.↩