Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/126

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 838

Tokyo, June 14, 1934.
[Received July 2.]

Sir: As the moment for the preliminary naval conversations in London approaches, there has arisen a reported divergence of views between the Foreign Office and the Navy Department over the important question of what action Japan should take, if any, in abrogating the Washington Agreement of 1921 [1922].⁶⁴ This problem has been the subject of considerable discussion in the joint conference between the Foreign Office, the Navy Department and the War Department, and the Navy Department is pressing for abrogation at the earliest possible moment, that is on December 31, 1934, in order that Japan may lose no time in seeking liberation from the terms of that agreement. The War Department supports this view. On the other hand the Foreign Office opposes this policy on the ground that it would be undesirable and tactically unwise for Japan to take the initiative in abrogating the Treaty since it will lapse automatically when replaced by a further agreement if the Disarmament Conference in 1935 should prove successful. In the event that the Conference should fail, it is pointed out that Japan can then give notice of abrogation and that the delay of one year would not be of great importance. It is doubtful whether the question will be settled, however, until after the preliminary conversations shall have been concluded or at any rate until there has been an opportunity to obtain the views of Ambassador Saito, following his proposed visit to Tokyo next month.

That the Navy appears Department to be of no mind to alter its policy may be deduced from its reported statement in the press that the Foreign Office views are harmful to the interests of the country because they give the impression that Japan’s views in the matter are not unified.

The report that the Anglo-American preliminary conversations may begin before the Anglo-Japanese conversations has given rise to warnings in the press that Japan will oppose any agreement based upon a tacit arrangement previously agreed upon between the United States and Great Britain and has evoked reference to the alleged understanding between Mr. Hoover and Mr. MacDonald⁶⁵ before the London Conference as a result of which Japan felt that her interests had been neglected and her feelings injured. It is stated that a thorough understanding on this point has been reached, however, between the British Foreign Office and Ambassador Matsudaira in London and that the British Government has assured the Japanese Government that the conversations will be made as informal as possible, that confidences exchanged will be strictly honored and that all the conversations will be conducted separately and in accordance with the principles of strict equality. It is understood here that the details of any previous conversations will be made known to Ambassador Matsudaira.

Of considerable interest also is the fact reported in the Asahi Shimbun of June 10 that despite the present political crisis in Japan, due in part to the scandal in which the Finance Ministry is involved, the Navy Department has decided to formulate plans for its 1935–36 budget to meet its own requirements, regardless of what turn the present political situation may take. In the expectation that if the Finance Minister, Mr. Takahashi, is forced to resign his successor will carry out his policies, Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy, has already given instructions to each of the Department heads on the preparation of the budget. This is said to be drawn up with a view to demanding a considerable increase in the amount alloted for new construction, far exceeding the current year’s expenditures of ¥234,000,000, on the grounds that at the Conference Japan will demand restoration of her independent rights in the question of determining the requirements of her national defense.

The desire of Germany and Soviet Russia to participate in the preliminary naval conversations has also been discussed in the press and it is said that the German Ambassador, Dr. Von Dirksen, has informally approached the Foreign Office in an attempt to secure Japan’s support of Germany’s wishes. While the Foreign Office has indicated that it will take no formal action on behalf of Germany or Soviet Russia it is the opinion of the press that Japan will maintain a sympathetic attitude toward Germany’s desire to participate.

The policy of the United States with regard to the 1935 Conference is interpreted to the Japanese public by the press in the following terms:

1. The status quo to be maintained.

2. Maintenace of the present ratios.

3. Opposition to abolition of capital ships.

4. Maintenance of 10,000 ton cruisers.

In addition the United States is reported in the Japanese press to be willing to acquiesce in a proposal to make London the seat of the Conference. As the Nichi Nichi Shimbun of June 7 states: “The American policy is very thoughtful and far-seeing.”

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

64. Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington, February 6, 1922; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247.
65. For correspondence concerning the visit of the British Prime Minister to the United States, October 4–10, 1929, see ibid., 1929, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.