500.A15A5/95
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation61
(Conversation already begun) …
Ambassador Davis: The statement expressed in my cable of day before yesterday62 was prompted by my keen interest in this naval question and my desire to do everything possible to make it a success.
Secretary Hull: We know how you feel, of course.
Ambassador Davis: I do not feel at all that there is any need for those conversations to fail and I do not believe they will unless we so restrict the scope. We are doomed to fail in this by placing too much limitation. Now of course there is no [need?] whatever to try to [Page 251] write any treaty, but unless we lay the ground for it that will make for a conference later, to call the conference without appropriate preparation we would be doomed to a lamentable failure. I entirely concur in your view, for psychological reasons if for nothing else. [It might not be] advisable to set up a separate delegation in London now with no relation to the Embassy. On the other hand, a considerable amount of work will necessarily be involved in the so-called exploratory conversations. The naval advisers and myself have simply got to have some space in which to work. I have been informed that there is no available space at the Embassy. Therefore it will be necessary to at least have a physical separation. As I also stated in my 893, I not only want to cooperate with Bingham, but our friendship is such that I know we can cooperate satisfactorily.
Secretary: Yes, we know that.
Ambassador: It can be distinctly understood that these conversations are to be carried on in connection with the Embassy, but as you know it is absolutely impossible for two people with joint responsibility actually to conduct negotiations. One or the other must take the lead and be primarily responsible.
Secretary: Of course we know who would do most of the work in any event.
Ambassador: He is not conversant with naval problems. He would, I expect, as he did when I was there before, expect me to take the lead in carrying on the conversations, but. I think you have got to make a choice of either conducting this solely through diplomatic channels or to strike a happy medium here and have it done in connection with the Embassy,—but have it clearly understood that I have got the responsibility for carrying on the conversations. I mean I just did not want any misunderstanding about it.
Secretary: Yes.
Ambassador: I do not think it is possible to play down these conversations successfully. I wish it were. But the eyes of the whole world are right now turned on this thing and I do not think it is advisable to confine them to superficial exploration. If you feel that it is of such vital importance that this thing should be played down in every possible way, I am just a little afraid my presence in London would make that a little more difficult.
Secretary: Norman, are you ready for me to comment?
Ambassador: Yes.
Secretary: What happened was that our Japanese friends were very suspicious and were insisting that they would not discuss any phase of even the technical side of things; that they were not in favor of any preliminary conference, but only informal conversations at London,—and we felt obliged to tell them that we were not organizing any systematic organization of any kind for this purpose and then is [Page 252] when we made that reference to handling these informal conversations by letting them head up through the Embassy. That is the way it came about. They were extremely suspicious and pressing us to the last degree. Now, with that situation, we felt that we could well get away from it for the time being and that since it really was not under the jurisdiction of either the Embassy or of your delegation that we might at least start out by asking you and Bingham jointly to take care of it, and if it should progress and expand and by degrees take the form of more of a preliminary conference and the Japanese have agreed so far that they would stand for the moment, then we could take up the question of responsibility.
Ambassador: I can clear that pretty quickly with the British, Cordell. I see your point. That is all right. I am perfectly in accord. I just didn’t want to have some experience of divided responsibility.
Secretary: We appreciate that fully and we know that you will do all the work and that you are equipped, but we got into this situation with the Japanese.
Ambassador: We can work that out but if you and the President, if it is in accord with you, so that there will be no misunderstanding, if you would cable Bingham and say that because of my knowledge you want—that while we are associated together, because of my knowledge of the naval question you actually would expect me to take the lead in carrying on the conversations.
Secretary: I think he will recognize that just like he recognized your special qualifications when you were there before.
Ambassador: Yes, that is true, but
Secretary: We will be glad to say anything we can without getting into too much trouble with Bingham. I do not suppose we would get into any. We will want to say anything we can to facilitate the matter, and if the proceedings take on the appearance of a preliminary conference or anything resembling it, then we can take up the question of responsibility.
Ambassador: You want this thing to succeed.
Secretary: Unquestionably.
Ambassador: I think right now at the very beginning is the time to get it headed down the road you want it to go on, and if I am taking the back seat I will not be worth anything to you.
Secretary: We would not have you take the back seat at all. It would be very foolish to do that. We want results and we know your equipment. On the other hand, we cannot tell you all that has been going on among our Japanese friends and how careful we have to be to get out of this embarrassing situation that they forced us into.
Ambassador: My information is that they are afraid we are both going to want to open up that Far Eastern situation with them. They [Page 253] do not understand that we don’t want to do that, and that is what I understand from the British is their understanding of it. Now I think that once we sit down with the British, after two or three conversations, we can bring this right into line without any trouble.
Secretary: Yes. Well, I think we can adjust ourselves as we go along over there so as to conform to whatever course the thing takes, and we will be ready here to cooperate with you to that end.
Ambassador: You see, if you go into a place where we have an Ambassador, even if you go there, his rank is something that you cannot disregard, and I think if you would just send a personal cable to Bingham explaining to him that it should be for strategic reasons handled through the Embassy but that in view of my connection with this, my knowledge of it, you would want him to cooperate with me and assume responsibility to a limited degree. A divided responsibility is what is worrying me.
President Roosevelt: Norman, this is Franklin. Look, I am on the other phone. This whole thing is largely a question of time-table.
Ambassador: Yes. I want to play your game too.
President: You see, between now and the time the Japs arrive in London on the 15th of July we want to keep, so far as any publicity goes, we want to keep the thing a purely diplomatic matter, and therefore on the surface we want to keep it officially under the Ambassador. There is no reason at all why you cannot act during this preliminary period of informal conversations as informal adviser so far as the public knows, and then after the thing has gone on for two or three weeks it may develop into a more serious conference and in that case, of course, your participation in it will be much more widely known and recognized than it would be during the first two or three weeks. It is only a question of tiding this preliminary question over.
Ambassador: I am not wanting public recognition. I wish it could be done without anybody knowing it. But I just don’t think you are going to succeed in playing this thing down as there is too much excitement over it and the preliminary talks with the British are going to be of such importance.
President: You will be in on those as adviser.
Ambassador: One of us has to take the lead.
President: You will be in on those.
Ambassador: If Bingham feels that his job is to take the lead on that, I really think it will be very embarrassing and I think it would cause you trouble. I am willing to play the game where I can.
President: He is not going to do anything except sign the things in the first instance from the public point of view.
Ambassador: Naturally I would expect him to do that. If we sit down one of us has to take the lead in conversations and in negotiations [Page 254] leading up to this thing, and I thought if Cordell would send him a cable just making that clear to him there would not be any trouble at all about it.
President: We can straighten that out with Bob Bingham easily. I can make it clear to him.
Ambassador: When I was here before that was the way it was worked. [If] done through the Embassy then he would think that I was coming over there to act as his assistant.
President: No, no. We can straighten that out with him all right. I will talk to him. Cordell will send him a wire on that.
Ambassador: I think this thing can be done. You have had a lot of bad news, but frankly I am much more confident than you seem to be over there.
President: I think there is a real possibility.
Ambassador: I think there is a tremendous possibility.
President: At Geneva were they all sore at the end?
Ambassador: No, they got over it. I am to see Barthou63 tomorrow. He is going to London right after the first of July and the Germans now are [coming?] around again today. They are very anxious to do something and wanted to know if they could come to see me in London. I said I would let them know but I said it would have to be done openly. Because they said they had an idea of these fellows going to Berlin tonight to talk it over. [Henderson?] is more happy now, and I think that the situation improves very gradually. Of course it will all be decided in about the next two or three weeks. We can tell much better in three weeks.
President: That is fine. Goodbye.
- Between Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the American delegation to the General Disarmament Conference, in Geneva and President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull in Washington, 11:45 a.m.↩
- Telegram No. 893, June 12, 1 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 247.↩
- French Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩