Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/83: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, June 12, 1934—1 p.m.
[Received June 12—12:10 p.m.]

893. For the Secretary and the President.

1. I am becoming concerned about the situation that has been created with regard to the naval conversations in having them head up through the Embassy. I understand the reasons for inaugurating the plan in this fashion but it is becoming increasingly clear to me that in a matter as delicate, difficult and technical as this the danger of crossing wires by having two responsible sources in Europe is so great as to outweigh the considerations which guided you in putting the plan on foot in this manner.

2. There are indications that during the coming weeks I may be concerned from time to time with the broader aspects of the General Disarmament Conference and if the responsibility for the naval phases of disarmament rests upon me then I feel that it must rest upon me alone as it will be very difficult to draw the line with the Embassy as to what appertains to general disarmament and what to naval conversations.

3. Matsudaira is chief of the Japanese Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, I am chief of the American Delegation and Mac-Donald is head of the British Delegation. It would, therefore, seem much simpler as well as much more palatable to the French if the naval conversations in London were consigned to the hands of the chief delegates to the Disarmament Conference.

4. I would not of course under any circumstances want to go into Bingham’s jurisdiction without showing every possible consideration and without cooperating with him most closely. Indeed I should want to seek his cooperation and advice. If, however, the conversations were to head through the Embassy it would raise all sorts of complications and difficulties as to official status and responsibility. I need only mention one difficulty to make my meaning clear and that is the risk of having another spokesman in London during any possible temporary absence on general disarmament work.

5. I realize the delicacy and the possible embarrassment to you but as the task assigned to me is sufficiently difficult under the best of circumstances I feel that I must ask you to clarify my status and responsibility in such a way that there can be no misunderstanding. After all I think there is a considerable strategic advantage in taking the position that these conversations are a part of the general disarmament problem.

6. For instance, it is conceivable that there may be a conference limited to the three great naval powers but if it goes beyond that it is hardly conceivable that it could be limited to less than ten or twelve powers because France fearing the application of the equality of rights in Germany’s case would insist upon bringing in Germany, Russia, Turkey and Sweden.

7. It would not be just to either Bingham or myself to have a divided responsibility in this matter.

Davis