Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/74: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, June 2, 1934—3 a.m.
[Received June 1—11:30 p.m.]

864. Referring to your 202, May 24, 3 p.m. to Paris, and London Embassy’s 292, May 31, 5 p.m., to the Department.

1. I am somewhat concerned about the British proposal that the naval discussions shall be bilateral instead of tripartite and also the Japanese stipulation that the bilateral London conversations shall not preclude the Japanese from negotiating with the powers concerned in places other than London.

2. As a matter of strategy, it is most important in my opinion that we adhere to the procedure envisaged in my talks in London; namely, that the British and ourselves informally have preliminary talks to agree upon questions relating to our two respective Navies and what we are willing to do with regard to the Japanese claims. Once the Japanese technical advisers arrive, which Simon indicated today he thought would be somewhat delayed, we can have a tripartite meeting which will inaugurate officially the conversation. Otherwise we may be jockeyed into a position where the British will be acting as a mediator between the Japanese and ourselves, interpreting to the Japanese our position and to us the Japanese position, and thereby getting all the benefits of the “honest inaccuracies”. For this and other reasons I frankly doubt the advisability of carrying on naval discussions with the Japanese in Washington or Tokyo. I realize, of course, that if such a distinguished visitor as Prince Kanya [Konoye?]⁵⁸ should visit Washington that you want to show him every courtesy but I think the serious endeavor must be concentrated in London, otherwise wires will be crossed.

3. I am confirmed in this view because Saito, who called to see me here apparently on a fishing expedition, tried to engage me in conversation on the Navy which I dealt with in a guarded manner. In the course of his talk he said that the Japanese could understand why the British with so much commerce and so many seas to cover were fully entitled to a naval ratio of 5 to 3 with Japan but that they could not understand why the United States needed such predominance. I merely remarked that we felt that in 1922 we had made considerable concessions in limiting ourselves to a 5 to 3 ratio because with the program that was then under way we would have soon had a Navy overwhelmingly greater than Japan and that I hoped that the Japanese would not take an unreasonable position on this matter because if they did we could only construe it as a desire not to have a naval agreement.

4. I think it advisable for Field to sail for London on June 6th.

Davis

58. President of the Japanese House of Peers.