500.A15A5/45½
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: Referring further to the question of the (problematical) Naval Conference:
Right or wrong, like it or not, this country is at the head of the column and therefore must function within and according to the character imposed upon it by virtue of its being in that position.
We ought, therefore, as I see it, to make up our minds definitely in regard to what action, positive or negative, we wish to see consummated: whether forward, backward, to left or right, or a standstill: and what position we wish to take in regard thereto.
In my opinion, we should think first of our own interests, in terms of national security. Clearly, the security of this country would be best ensured if arrangements could be made which would ensure the peace of all countries. But, such arrangements could be made only if all countries wished and were determined that there be peace or if, being in a majority, those countries which wish peace were willing to pool their forces and efforts in order to coerce (toward maintenance of peace) those that are not adequately imbued with the ideal of peace. The attainment of either of these alternatives still lies far in the future. The nations are still under the necessity of providing in substantial measure each for its own security. China has been attacked and invaded by Japan in consequence of the two facts that, on the one hand, Japan is willing to use force, and, on the other hand, China was not and is not able to defend herself or to induce other powers to come to her defense. Russia would have been attacked by Japan before now were it not that the Russians have armed themselves to such an extent that the Japanese hesitate to make the attack. Had the United States been less adequately prepared to defend itself, if attacked by Japan, we would have had, in 1932, either to keep silent on the subject of the Pact of Paris29 and other treaties and the subject of peace or to have sustained an attack at the hands of Japan’s armed forces.
[Page 231]The naval ratios as they now stand were designed, it is believed, on the principle of making it possible, on the one hand, for each of the powers concerned adequately to safeguard its own interests, on a defensive basis, and of making it impossible, on the other hand, for any one of the powers provided that each and all built up to and maintained its allotment of naval equipment, to indulge in aggression against one or more of the others. Assuming that the technical calculations have been sound, the existing ratios are the correct ratios for the purpose of maintaining the equilibrium thus sought. The situation has not changed, as regards the rightful interests of the various powers concerned, separately and collectively, from the point of view of problems of self-defense (as distinguished from possible contemplated programs of aggression), since these ratios were worked out and agreed upon. It would therefore seem that any alteration of the ratios in favor, upward, of any one power, would tend toward an upset of the equilibrium and would impair the principle on which the powers have proceeded in the formulating and concluding of naval limitation agreements.
It therefore is believed that, although we might admit need for making readjustments in detail within the ratios, we should hold and adhere to the view that, insofar as any agreement to which we would be parties is concerned, the ratios themselves must continue to stand.
It is believed that this should be our fixed position in relation to the agenda of any naval conference contemplated or held. The President has intimated recently, in his statement on the Vinson Act, that such is our idea and hope.
We should be prepared to let it be known, at an opportune moment and in a carefully prepared statement, that such is our position. Thereafter we could await evidence of desire and intention on the part of other powers. And, no matter what appeared or failed to appear, we should make that position the fixed point from which, to which and around which any and all further consideration by the American Government of the question of a naval conference and (if and when such conference is held) of agenda and action thereat must proceed.
If action in the sense above suggested, by this Government, should result in there being held next year no conference, we could, it is believed, view that development with equanimity. We would not be subject to any military attack or formidable diplomatic assault because of it.
There is perceived no reason why we should discuss or enter into any agreement by and under the provisions of which Japan would, with our assent, become relatively stronger and we become relatively weaker in naval armament. It is believed that no step that we might take would contribute more effectively toward rendering real in the long run likelihood of war between Japan and this country than would such a step.