500.A15A4 General Committee (Arms)/21
The Acting Secretary of War (Woodring) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to Document Conf. D/C.C.F./S.C.F./30(1), dated June 27, 1934, of the General Disarmament Conference, which presents the draft articles for the regulation of the manufacture of and the trade in arms, and to Geneva Telegram No. 917, dated July 2, 1934, which announces that these draft articles were adopted by the whole committee on that date.
On the assumption that the United States Government will be called upon for an expression of opinion as to the acceptability of these draft articles for incorporation in a convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments, a preliminary study has been made in the War Department of the draft articles as presented in the conference document above referred to. As a result of this preliminary study, the following comments are presented for your consideration in connection with such future action as the United States Government may be called upon to take.
Article G of the draft relates primarily to the status of national armaments as to quantity and efficiency, rather than to the subject of control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms. Consequently it is believed that Article G does not properly belong among the provisions for such control. From its own plain implications, Article G is especially applicable to the relations existing among the continental European states. If made universally applicable, its possible operation might prove decidedly unfavorable to the United States, especially in relation to necessary replacement of equipment in our overseas possessions. It is suggested that, if the provisions of Article G are to be included in the final Disarmament Convention, they should be incorporated in Chapter 2 of Section 1 in Part II of the Draft Convention, pertaining to continental European states only.
Prior to the announcement of the Administration’s adherence to a policy of supporting drastic international control of arms manufacture and traffic,61 the War Department had repeatedly and consistently opposed such proposals. The comments which follow are not to be understood as embodying further opposition to the general principle, but to point out certain considerations which it is believed should be borne in mind in approaching the further commitments which will be necessary to implement the general principle.
Whether or not the principle of international control and inspection be adopted, the implementation of Articles H and I, and of any other [Page 140] articles relating to inspections made under direction of the Disarmament Commission, by a detailed system of organization and procedure, will be required, as previously indicated. If this implementation should be incorporated in the convention itself, it would be subject to ratification and scrutiny prior thereto, thus affording the United States Government and all other High Contracting Parties the opportunity to pass upon the detailed operations involved and would not commit them to accept rules and regulations drafted after the treaty by an international body provided for therein.
If, on the other hand, as undoubtedly would be urged as a matter of practical convenience, the details of the implementation above referred to should be excluded from the convention and left to be set up by the Permanent Disarmament Commission, its interpretation of the scope of its activities would be authoritative, and it is easily possible that an international body outside the direct control of the United States might impose on us a system of inquisition and examination which would not only be irritating, but might be seriously injurious to national defense.
We should reasonably expect, in connection with the development and operation of the practical measures involved in a system of international inspections of any kind, that the nations with aggressive tendencies will be the ones most alert and interested. If international inspection be made the normal course of procedure, rather than national inspection and control except when a complaint based on reasonable evidence is made, it will be to the advantage of aggressor nations, since their representatives may, in such inspections, secure timely and adequate information as to the nature and quantity of defensive equipment available to other states. Thus a potential aggressor against the United States would be interested not so much in our offensive equipment, as in our defensive equipment, so that with precise knowledge of our defensive means, the aggressor could plan advisedly how to overmatch this defensive equipment with his own offensive equipment.
In summary, I therefore commend to your consideration the following:
- (1)
- Elimination of the provisions of Article G from the draft articles for the control of arms manufacture and traffic. If these provisions are to be included in the final Disarmament Convention, they should be incorporated in Chapter 2 of Section 1 in Part II (of the British Draft Convention62), pertaining to continental European states only.
- (2)
- Interpret the principle of permanent and automatic inspections so as to emphasize that these inspections will be primarily and normally national in character, by an inspection system set up by each [Page 141] signatory, and international only in the event of a charge establishing a prima facie case of violation, in which event the inspectors of the Permanent Disarmament Commission would be associated with the national inspectors to make the special inquiry which the case required. The scope of these special international inspections to be limited strictly to the requirements of the special complaint.
- (3)
- In any event to insist that the organization and procedure necessary to implement the system of inspection, as well as the scope of authority of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, be incorporated in the Disarmament Convention.
Sincerely yours,