882.01 Foreign Control/643: Telegram
The Chargé in Liberia (Werlich) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 9—2:40 a.m.]
78. From General Winship.
1. No developments have occurred in connection with the matters mentioned in my telegram No. 77, September 2, 2 p.m.
2. I saw Barclay yesterday. I referred to an unsolicited call upon me 10 days ago by three members of the Cabinet who had seemed not unfriendly to the general purposes of the League plan and whose specific objections I had suggested they take up in detail with Mackenzie. I said they had done so but pointed out that no definitive turn seemed to have been reached. I then referred to the delays Mackenzie had experienced in Monrovia, an interview with Secretary of the Treasury Dennis to discuss the Ligthart recommendations …
I then recalled to Barclay a conversation between us shortly after my arrival when he had assured me that he desired the assistance of the League and had said that, if an arrangement satisfactory to him were formulated by the League of Nations, he would be prepared to indorse it to the Liberian Legislature and to resign the Presidency if it were not accepted. Barclay confirmed this, but reiterated that he objected to certain features in the present proposals and desired to send them to the League Council for the purpose of obtaining modifications.
Grimes is accordingly sailing for Europe today. Barclay emphasized that Grimes will have full power to accept a modified plan on behalf of the Liberian Government, [subject?] of course to subsequent ratification by the legislature.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. In the Liberian opposition to the present plan I believe French encouragement and that derived from certain groups in the United States have been the decisive factors, together with the Liberian assumption that in the absence of some overt act against Americans here, our actions will be confined to remonstrances and note sending.
4. The principal Liberian objections appear to be as follows:
- (a)
- In reference to the League plan and Ligthart report:
- (1st)
- Too wide authority for League officials, which would result in “virtually destroying the sovereignty of the Republic.”
- (2d)
- An American, the Chief Adviser.
- (3d)
- Increase in debt to Firestone interests represented by issue of $150,000 Finance Corporation bonds to provide working capital fund.
- (4th)
- Alleged excessive cost of plan, coupled with reduction to $300,000 (recommended by Ligthart) of the budget for annual ordinary operating expenses of the Government.
- (b)
- In reference to the proposed supplementary loan agreement:
- (1st)
- The $300,000 budget mentioned above.
- (2d)
- Provision that command of Frontier Force should be given to a foreign official.
Other difficulties regarding Finance Corporation interests that remain unliquidated are the depository agreement, and the proposed internal bond issue. The latter would be contrary to the existing loan agreement and also against specific recommendations of Ligthart. I reminded Barclay of this yesterday and also of the assurance (see telegram number 37, April 12, 4 p.m.) that pending negotiations nothing would arise to aggravate the situation. Barclay finally agreed to withhold action on the bond issue until after a decision has been reached on the League plan.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. There is obviously nothing further to be accomplished here at present. Mackenzie, Briggs, Gallant and I are sailing tomorrow steamship Jamaique for Bordeaux due there September 21st. A call is scheduled at Teneriffe on the 16th. Mackenzie is informing League and hopes it will be possible for consideration to be given to the Liberian problem immediately upon arrival at Geneva. Promptness is very important in view of the assembly of the Liberian Legislature October 8th.
7. In order to assist you in deciding what policy to adopt in the event that it should prove impossible to obtain sufficient pressure from the League to induce Liberia to accept the present plan (in which connection the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3 and the possibility that further support for the Liberian contentions may develop at Geneva should be borne in mind) I am submitting the following observations.
In this case I would foresee two alternatives:
(1st) To concede the defeat of our [efforts?] directed toward a solution on the basis of a League plan. (Mackenzie gives the impression that the League might not be averse to abandoning its effort in view of Liberia’s reluctance to accept assistance.) Practically nothing would then have been accomplished; neither termination of the unfair practices against the natives nor of the injustices arising from application of provisions of act, nor a remedy of the dangerous health situation, nor a settlement of the Finance Corporation difficulties.
Left alone I predict the eventual disintegration of Americo-Liberian administration through decay and incompetence. But I do not believe Liberia would be left to work out her own destruction or salvation. The British, who have, I think, supported us to the limit on this matter since the last Liberian Committee meeting, might find themselves in a very difficult position here, particularly in comparison with the French who might not delay in pressing for the special favors which France desires. Hence I think that following League withdrawal, if that occurred, might [Page 933] come a British request to us to remedy the situation accompanied by a citation of conditions the existence of which we ourselves had admitted. This could only be done by the use of force; it would be fruitless, in my estimation, for the American Government alone to accept the responsibility of sending further “advisers” without sanctions to this country. But if we decline to accede to the British request, the British Government might then say that since we recognized that conditions here were disgraceful, and since we refused to remedy them, we should interpose no objection to their remedying them, possibly in concert with the French. (The health menace alone would provide ample occasion for such inspectorship.)
I do not believe the American Government should allow itself to drift into this position which would be untenable unless we were prepared either to take over the country and reorganize it, or else not to object to this being done by others who are more immediately affected if less traditionally concerned with Liberia than we are.
(2d) To make the strongest possible further efforts to prevent the failure of international cooperation under the League. This might entail our proposing as a last resort a redrafted League plan on a smaller scale, meeting practically all the Liberian objections; that is, a neutral Chief Adviser with not exceeding three assistants, et cetera, at a reduced initial cost if possible to be defrayed from Liberian revenues, thus freeing the plan from the necessity of obtaining Firestone agreement.
8. I should deeply appreciate receiving your views and would suggest that they be sent to Paris where we shall proceed immediately from Bordeaux. [Winship.]