500.A15A4/2287
The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 25.]
Sir: I have the honor to give below an analysis of the situation created for France by the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. The conclusions which [Page 280] I set forth are based on the opinions of persons of varied political complexion and on a wide range of the press. It would appear that the future holds four possibilities of action:
- 1.
- reconciliation with Germany and a direct agreement reached outside the scope of either the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Disarmament Conference;
- 2.
- a mere waiting policy keeping up the present armaments while hoping that something would intervene before Germany could have reached sufficient military strength to take action;
- 3.
- a race in armaments in order to preserve the present superiority in matériel over Germany;
- 4.
- an immediate warlike demonstration toward Germany with the possible occupation of the Rhine provinces.
With respect to the first contingency, it would seem that no bilateral agreement which could be reached directly with Germany would be sufficient to give France that security, without which the French people would never feel safe either to disarm or to permit the armaments of Germany to increase.
As I have reported, (see my telegram No. 454, October 15, 3 P.M.), the use of the Four Power Pact to obtain such guarantees does not seem sufficient to the French Government, and they would be unwilling to commit themselves far on that basis.
With reference to the second possibility of merely playing a waiting game in hopes of some well-nigh miraculous intervention that would prevent ultimate conflict, such a course is not in accordance with French mentality which always stresses over-preparation and is absolutely opposed to taking any risk.
The third possibility has not perhaps been faced as yet, namely, the continuation of a race in armaments. The French are so much occupied in attempting to balance their budget, which did not envisage the necessity of a race against Germany or an increase in armaments, that they have been as yet unwilling to direct their thoughts to the additional costs it would mean for them to increase the speed and amount of their armaments expenditures. Yet, of all the possibilities, this is the one, given the attitude of the present government, that is most likely, as its disastrous effects would be felt in France more slowly and largely through adverse financial effects on the budget.
As regards the fourth possibility, the realistic viewpoint of the General Staff is in favor of an immediate military action in Germany, basing this proposal on the fact that France has at present as much a superiority over Germany as it is likely to have in the future, no matter what race in armaments is undertaken, for the reason that, although France may be able to keep its present superiority in matériel at expenditure of vast sums, it cannot keep even a proportionate superiority [Page 281] in personnel, since the classes subject to military service in France will, due to the falling off of the birthrate during the war, be so sensibly diminished—probably by 40%—from the years 1935–40, that it will be necessary either to lengthen military service or increase the permanent corps of the army. An action taken well-nigh immediately, which would crush the Hitler regime and hamper Germany’s military development for a number of years to come would, in the eyes of the General Staff, serve as a preventative of a future and greater war and save France in the end the sums to be expended in a long armaments race and lives, whose proportion to the existing man power would be greater at any time in the future than at present.
All of these possibilities are very much in the background of French consciousness. All of them, except the first, would be extremely difficult for French economy, since they all involve increased military expenditure either for materiel or personnel, or both. Nor are the intelligent Frenchmen unaware that their action with respect to debts and other questions has alienated a considerable body of opinion in the United States, and at a time like the present, when they are casting about for possible support in case of need and certainly for credit, if increased war preparation becomes necessary, they have become increasingly aware of the fact that they would have great difficulty in obtaining aid, either financial or military, in the United States.
Respectfully yours,