Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4 General Committee/630: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, October 13, 1933—1 p.m.
[Received October 13—12:20 p.m.]

738. For the President and the Secretary.

1. In a brief conversation with Nadolny Wednesday night⁶⁵ I gathered the impression he had not succeeded as he had hoped in persuading his Government to recede from its demand for rearmament during the first stage of the convention. Subsequent information received by the British and French from Berlin indicated that whereas on Monday and Tuesday the German Government was prepared to concede this point and reach an agreement something had happened Wednesday to reverse this conciliatory attitude. Yesterday we began to get some indications that the British and the French had decided to bring the question to an issue and in effect impose terms on Germany.

2. In a talk with Simon late yesterday afternoon he informed me that at the meeting of the Bureau tomorrow he was contemplating making a speech with reference to the reply which the German Government had made to the British and Italian Governments in order to state the British Government’s opposition to Germany’s claim for the right to rearm and to take the position that this fundamental issue must be decided before proceeding further with the work of the Conference. I told him the time might come when something of the kind might be necessary and certainly we could not wait much longer without ascertaining whether or not it were possible to achieve an agreement but that my own opinion was that if the British Government thus made a public reply to a private and oral communication from the German Government the chances for negotiating an agreement would be clearly reduced. I said that I did not feel that we had as yet by any means exhausted the possibilities for negotiating an agreement. Simon replied that the British Government must answer the German reply in some way. I said that this was, of course, something for the British Government to decide and not for me but that my personal opinion was that it could find an equally effective and less risky way to do so and that a public British declaration might force the German Government as a matter of national pride either to take a still more determined stand or to surrender in a humiliating way. After some discussion he concurred in the view that it would be better to take the middle ground by explaining the British attitude as regards the fundamental questions and issues and the kind of a disarmament program Great Britain would support without making any specific mention of the German reply and without making a direct issue of it.

3. At this stage of our conversation Simon received word that Nadolny would like to see him as soon as possible. Simon then said he thought it would be well for Nadolny to see both of us together and asked me to remain. Upon Nadolny’s arrival he told him I was there and asked if he wished to see Simon alone or if he would like to see us together. Nadolny said he would be glad to see us together. He began by saying that he had reported to his Government the result of his talk with Sir John on Wednesday night in which Sir John had informed him of the decisions of the British Cabinet and of the proposals which the British Government had made. He had just received a telegram from Berlin to the effect that the British conditions were inadmissible and instructing him to return to Berlin immediately for consultation. Simon replied that he had not made any proposal or conditions; that he had merely repeated to Nadolny what he had stated to the German Ambassador in London on Tuesday in reply to a communication which in effect was a statement of the British position with regard to questions raised by the German Government in a communication to the British Government. This in substance was that the British Government thought it was neither wise nor possible to enter into a disarmament convention that would have as a condition precedent the right of Germany to begin immediately to rearm but that it was willing to agree that during the later stages of the proposed convention Germany would have a status of qualitative equality. Nadolny contended that the denial to Germany for 4 years of the right of equality status which had been agreed to in principle last December was inadmissible to his Government and a reflection on the national honor. I then explained to Nadolny our position which was substantially that of the British Government, that the equality to be granted to Germany under the December agreement was in a system of security; that it was understood that the practical application of such equality would have to be brought about through stages and that we were striving to reach a general disarmament convention which would be binding upon all nations as well as Germany and which would free Germany from part V of the Treaty of Versailles; that aside from the fact that we were opposed in principle to making the early rearmament of Germany a condition precedent to a treaty providing for the disarmament of the heavily armed powers it was simply impossible to get the Continental powers to agree to free Germany from the Treaty of Versailles and to bind themselves to disarm on any other basis than that which had been outlined to him.

4. Nadolny tried to make a case that the British were imposing conditions on Germany to which Simon replied effectively that they were not. Nadolny then said that the German reply to the British and Italian Governments was not the last word of Germany and that he had called to see Sir John before returning to Berlin in the hope that Simon would tell him that what the British Government had said to the Ambassador in London and to him did not represent the last word of the British Government. Simon told him in effect that he had informed him of a decision of the British Cabinet which he had no authority to change, that while he was satisfied that they could not alter their opinion as to the immediate rearmament of Germany they would be glad to try to work out something that would be as acceptable to Germany as possible. He added that if the German Government modified its attitude and was really desirous of reaching an agreement then the British Government might somewhat modify its own position. But he proceeded to impress upon Nadolny as did I that we saw no possibility of an agreement on a basis that provided for immediate rearmament by Germany but that it did seem to us that the German Government on the basis proposed would be getting so much over and above what it now has that they should endeavor to reach an agreement on that basis at the earliest possible moment.

Davis

65. October 11.