760d.61/384: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
847. The press today publishes the text of Molotov’s speech to the Supreme Soviet last evening.
The first portion dealing with the general international situation consists largely of a repetition of views previously expressed in the Soviet press relating to Soviet-German friendship, the collapse of [Page 787] the Polish State, support of German peace efforts, a denunciation of England and France for continuing the war for “imperialist aims” under cover of the slogan of democracy. He announced that in the light of recent events the terms “aggression” and “aggressor” have acquired a new concrete meaning and that the roles were now reversed with Germany striving for peace and: England and France for war. He mentioned the necessity of a “strong” Germany for an enduring peace in Europe and spoke with sympathy of Germany’s efforts to throw off the Treaty of Versailles85 created by France and England “with the active participation of the United States”. After dwelling at length on Soviet-German friendship he mentioned especially the successful progress of economic negotiations taking place here and in Germany.
After justifying Soviet “liberation” of Western Ukraine and White Russia, Molotov discussed the recently concluded treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania86 emphasizing the benefits conferred on those countries and vigorously denying any intention on the part of the Soviet Union to interfere in their internal affairs.
Molotov then dwelt at great length on the negotiations with Finland.87 After stating that relations with Finland as compared to the other Baltic States were in a special category primarily due to the fact that a “variety of outside influences emanating from third countries were at work in Finland”. He denounced the inventions and lies of the foreign press, concerning the Soviet proposals which he said were extremely modest and the minimum necessary for the protection of Soviet security. Turning to the actual negotiations, Molotov stated that since the Finnish Government had been unwilling to conclude a pact of mutual assistance similar to the pacts concluded with other Baltic States, the Soviet Government had not insisted on this point. He then outlined the concrete proposals submitted by the Soviet Government, substantially along the lines previously reported by the Embassy revealing that the two major points now at issue concern the territory north of Leningrad and a Soviet base at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. He observed “the differences in regard to certain of our proposals are not yet overcome and the concessions made by Finland in this connection, for example, the partial cession of territory on the Karelian Isthmus, clearly do not achieve their purpose”.
Molotov then referred to the concessions made to Finland, mentioning the withdrawal of the Soviet objections to the fortification of the Aland Islands, provided it was done by Finland alone and [Page 788] without the participation of any third power; the demilitarization of the Finnish-Soviet frontier on the Karelian Isthmus; and the supplementing of the Soviet-Finnish pact of nonaggression89 by mutual guarantees and development of economic relations between the two countries. He then stated that, “After all this we do not think that Finland should begin to seek grounds for a rupture of the proposed agreement. This would not be in conformity with the policy of friendly Soviet-Finnish relations and would certainly cause serious harm to Finland.” He added, “We are certain that the importance of the strengthening of friendly Soviet relations will be correctly understood by the ruling Finnish circles and that the Finnish statesmen will not give in to any anti-Soviet pressure and incitement on the part of anyone.”
Molotov then observed: “I must, however, report that even the President of the United States found it appropriate to interfere in these questions, which is difficult to reconcile with the policy of American neutrality. In his message of October 12, addressed to Kalinin,90 President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Roosevelt expressed a hope for the preservation and development of friendly and peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. It might be thought that insofar as the United States is concerned matters are better let us say, with the Philippines or Cuba which have long demanded from the United States their freedom and independence and have been unable to receive them, than with the Soviet Union and Finland which long ago received from the Soviet Union its freedom and state independence.”
Molotov then quoted the text of Kalinin’s reply to the President,91 omitting, however, the initial greeting, and beginning with the words, “I consider it appropriate to remind you Mr. President”. He then continued, “After such a clear answer from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics it should be entirely obvious that with good-will the Finnish Government will meet our minimum proposals which not only do not contravene the national and state interests of Finland but strengthen its external security and create a broad basis for the further broad development of political and economic relations between our two countries.”
[Page 789]In respect of Turkey Molotov stated that despite the wildest comment abroad the Soviet-Turkish negotiations concerned only the conclusion of a bilateral pact of mutual assistance limited to the Black Sea area and the straits with the reservation that nothing thereunder should involve the Soviet Union in armed conflict with Germany; and a guarantee that Turkey would not permit the warships of a non-Black Sea power to pass through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea. Both of these reservations Molotov charged, Turkey had refused and thereby rendered impossible the conclusion of the pact. Molotov then asserted that even though unsuccessful the negotiations had been of value in that as a result the policy of Turkey was now much clearer to the Soviet Union. After charging that Turkey had now abandoned a policy of neutrality and had been drawn into the orbit of the war in the interests of England and France, Molotov hinted Turkey might some day regret the step that it had taken.92 In respect of the Soviet Union, however, he added that in conformity with its general policy which consisted in retaining liberty of action, the pursuance of a policy of neutrality and cooperation in the movement for the reestablishment of peace, this policy would be equally applied in the area of the Black Sea.
Molotov then spoke of the improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations which had resulted from the conclusion of a truce on Japanese initiative on the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier.93 He characterized this conflict as entirely unnecessary, having been due to the attempts of the Japanese to seize a portion of the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic. The liquidation of this conflict, Molotov stated, constituted the first step in the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. He continued that if good-will were displayed in the work of the mixed frontier commissions a successful solution of the frontier conflicts might be expected. After referring to the possibility of trade negotiations between the Soviet Union and Japan, Molotov concluded his reference to Soviet-Japanese relations with the statement that while there had been a tendency towards improvement in these relations at the present time it is difficult to judge to what extent it is possible to count on rapid development of this tendency. [“]We have not yet succeeded in finding out how seriously the ground has been prepared in Japanese circles. For our part it must be said that we are favorably disposed to Japanese proposal of this nature and will approach them from the point of view of our basic political position and our interest in peace.[”]
[Page 790](It is significant that Molotov makes no reference in his speech to Soviet relations with China).
Molotov then outlined in brief the Soviet position in regard to contraband of war as set forth in the Soviet note to Great Britain and concluded that from the point of view of the termination of the war the decision of the American Senate in removing the embargo on arms94 arouses “legitimate doubts”. He added, indeed there can be no doubt that this decision will have as its result neither a slowing down nor a curtailment of the war; but on the contrary an increasing intensification and prolongation of the war. Obviously such a decision will assure higher profits for the American munitions industry. But the question is: “Can this circumstance serve the justification for the repeal of the embargo on the export of arms from America? It is clear that it cannot.”
- Telegram in two sections.↩
- Signed on June 28, 1919; for text, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 55.↩
- For the enforced conclusion of pacts of mutual assistance between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union, see pp. 934 ff.↩
- See supra. ↩
- Signed at Helsinki, January 21, 1932; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clvii, p. 393. For protocol prolonging the validity of this treaty until December 31, 1945, signed at Moscow on April 7, 1934, see ibid., vol. clv, p. 325.↩
- The President’s message was dated October 11, 1939, and delivered on October 12; for text, see Department of State, Bulletin, October 21, 1939, p. 395.↩
- For text, see ibid., p. 395.↩
- A treaty of mutual assistance was signed between Great Britain, France, and Turkey at Ankara on October 19, 1939, following the breaking off of the Turkish-Soviet negotiations in Moscow; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167, or Department of State, Bulletin, November 11, 1939, p. 544.↩
- September 15, 1939.↩
- The Neutrality Act of 1939, passed by the Senate on October 27, 1939, was approved on November 4, 1939; 54 Stat. 4.↩