793.94 Commission/688: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

77. My 76, December 19, 7 p.m. Following is a summary of memorandum from Sweetser with regard to today’s concluding meeting of the Committee of Nineteen.

The Secretary General reported recent negotiations he and the President of the Drafting Committee had carried on with the two parties to the dispute. Drummond stated Japanese delegation had presented its own preliminary views on the Drafting Committee’s proposals which had been transmitted to Tokyo as the instructions which the delegation hoped would be given them. The Japanese delegation had been informed that these suggestions would surely be quite unacceptable to the Committee of Nineteen and that the Drafting Committee therefore would not present them to the Committee of Nineteen. The Japanese had then indicated that this was not their last word and that they would ask for further instructions. The Secretary General hoped these would be more conciliatory.

The Chinese seemed generally to accept Committee’s texts but did not desire to commit themselves finally until learning whether the Japanese were in agreement.

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The Turkish delegation asked for further details regarding the points of difficulty. Drummond then explained the Japanese objections as follows:

1.
Objection to 2 of 10 principles in chapter 9 regarding autonomy and demilitarization of Manchuria, and Chinese sovereignty.
2.
Objection to the description of first eight chapters as a clear and impartial exposition of the facts.
3.
Objection to the last paragraph in the “statement of reasons” regarding recognition.
4.
Objection to the invitation to the United States and Russia.
5.
Objections to various other questions of a formal procedural nature.

Drummond’s explanations to the Turkish delegation continued to the effect that when the Japanese had presented these very important points of substance and had stated that they had suggested them to Tokyo as their instructions, Drummond had informed the Japanese that the divergencies were so great between the Japanese point of view and that of the Committee that any more delay along these lines was [un]pardonable. The Japanese delegation had accordingly communicated to their Government that the Committee of Nineteen were unprepared to yield in any way. Before, however, this second telegram could reach Tokyo a reply had come from the Japanese Government to the first telegram giving the Japanese delegation the original instructions for which they had asked.

There had not been time for a reply to the second telegram but the Secretary General hoped it might modify the Japanese Government’s first decision which had been based entirely on the views of the Japanese delegation.

Regarding the Chinese there had been only a short telegram expressing disappointment mainly because the Nanking Government had hoped for a pronouncement of judgment instead of an attempt at conciliation. The Chinese delegation, however, understood the reasons therefor and were apparently prepared to accept the Committee’s texts without fundamental change.

In his statement in the Committee of Nineteen the Secretary General emphasized that if there had been any delay it was not at all due to the Chinese who would naturally want to wait until learning of Japanese acceptance in principle.

The president of the Committee of Nineteen then read the text of the agreement for adjournment as proposed by the Drafting Committee.

Lester, Ireland, emphasized that the Japanese were diametrically opposed to the Committee on every point and that he thought it very important that if adjournment were agreed to it should be made very [Page 449] clear that this was one more demonstration of the League’s constant purpose of being conciliatory.

Lange, Norway, strongly supported this viewpoint. Weizsäcker, Germany, emphasized the extreme desirability for secrecy in order to allow for negotiation.

The various communiqués and adjournment by Committee of Nineteen were agreed upon.

Wilson